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Essays on Risk Reporting Disclosures by Portuguese Companies 
Abstract 
This thesis explores two subjects: risk-related disclosure [RRD] practices; and 
motivations for RRD. Its primary aim is to extend knowledge of RRD. Multi-theoretical 
frameworks are developed to explain RRD by non-finance companies (combining 
agency theory, legitimacy theory, and resources-based perspectives), and RRD by 
finance companies (combining legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives). 
According to these theoretical frameworks the drivers of corporate RRD are related to 
corporate governance characteristics, corporate reputation, and public visibility. 
This research into risk reporting in Portugal investigates RRD practices in the 
annual reports of 81 listed and unlisted Portuguese companies in the non-finance sector, 
and in the annual reports of 190 Portuguese credit-granting institutions [PCI]. Using a 
content analysis of annual reports, RRD by non-finance companies was classified into 
the following categories: financial risks; non-financial risks; and risk management 
framework. RRD by finance companies was classified into the following categories: 
risk management objectives and policies; credit risk; market risk, liquidity risk; 
operational risk; and capital structure and adequacy. 
The main findings indicate that risk reporting is not satisfying the information 
needs of investors. RRD is basically qualitative, backward-looking, generic, and vague. 
RRD lacks transparency in the finance sector. The deficiencies identified most often 
involved a lack of comparability and understandability, even after the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards [IFRS] 7 (Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures). These deficiencies undermine market discipline. They indicate the need 
for improved enforcement mechanisms. This thesis also provides an extensive literature 
review of the risk research developed in the decade from 2000 (that is, from before the 
Enron and Worldcom collapses until after the Global Financial Crisis [GFC] of 
2008/09). The risk reporting literature has grown substantially in this decade. 
Nonetheless, risk reporting continues to be under-researched. Several avenues for future 
research are proposed. 
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Ensaios sobre Relato Financeiro do Risco pelas Empresas Portuguesas 
Resumo 
A presente tese explora as práticas e as motivações do relato financeiro do risco [RFR]. 
O seu principal objectivo é contribuir para o conhecimento das práticas do RFR em 
Portugal. Nela desenvolvem-se enquadramentos teóricos para explicar o RFR das 
empresas não financeiras (teoria da agência, teoria da legitimidade e a resources-based 
perspectives) e o RFR das empresas financeiras (teoria da legitimidade e a resources-
based perspectives). De acordo com estes enquadramentos teóricos, o RFR pode ser 
explicado pelas características do governo das sociedades, pela reputação da empresa e 
pela sua visibilidade pública. 
 Este trabalho investiga as práticas do RFR nos relatórios e contas anuais de 81 
empresas Portuguesas não financeiras cotadas e não cotadas e nos relatórios e contas 
anuais de 190 instituições de crédito Portuguesas. Através de uma análise de conteúdo 
da totalidade dos relatórios e contas anuais o RFR das empresas não financeiras foi 
classificado nas seguintes categorias: riscos financeiros; riscos não financeiros; e 
estrutura de gestão de riscos. O RFR das empresas financeiras foi classificado nas 
seguintes categorias: políticas e objectivos de gestão de risco; riscos de crédito; riscos 
de mercado; riscos de liquidez; riscos operacionais; e estrutura e adequabilidade de 
capital. 
 Os principais resultados indicam que o RFR não satisfaz as necessidades de 
informação dos investidores. O RFR é essencialmente qualitativo, histórico, genérico e 
vago. No sector financeiro, o RFR não é totalmente transparente. A falta de 
comparabilidade e compreensibilidade são as deficiências mais comuns, mesmo após a 
adopção da IFRS 7 (Instrumentos Financeiros: Divulgações). Estas deficiências 
enfraquecem a disciplina de mercado e são indicativas da necessidade de melhores 
mecanismos de enforcement. 
 Esta tese também fornece uma extensa revisão da literatura compreendendo os 
estudos sobre o RFR desenvolvidos  na década de 2000 (antes dos colapsos financeiros 
das empresas Enron e Worldcom até após a crise financeira mundial de 2008/09). A 
literatura sobre o RFR aumentou substancialmente nesta década. Contudo, este campo 
de investigação continua a estar pouco desenvolvido. Através desta revisão da literatura 
são propostos vários caminhos para futuros estudos que poderão melhorar a 
investigação sobre o RFR nos próximos anos. 
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Background 
The history of human society is a chronology of exposures to risk of all kinds and of 
human efforts to deal with those risks. However, only with the Industrial Revolution, in 
the eighteenth century, did the topic of risk start to earn a greater importance. New 
sources of risks arose with the technological advances generated. Subsequently, risk 
began to have a presence in management literature. Fayol (1949) recognized its 
importance when he structured industrial activities into six functions. One of these 
functions was called security. It sought to mitigate potential risks and safeguard 
property and persons against threats, hazards and the endangerment of business 
progress. 
 Risk has been defined in many different ways. The concept has evolved 
throughout the years. First, the concept of risk initially only included the negative 
dimension of risk or downside risk. But the concept of risk has been extended to also 
incorporate the positive dimension (upside risk). That is, the risk of embracing any 
potential opportunities that may arise in the future. Moreover, risk should be 
measurable. Otherwise, assessment of its impact on business performance will be 
impossible. Second, initially risk was restricted to real world events and was connected 
to companies’ external environments. However, there is now a broader view, in partial 
recognition of the fact that many financial collapses have happened largely because of 
deficiencies in internal controls (for example Barings, Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat). 
 History has taught the importance of implementing appropriate risk management 
and internal control systems within organizations. Such systems are important because 
the business world is evolving continually – as are potential threats. Risk management 
and internal control systems need to foresee these threats and provide alerts to help 
prevent damage and bankruptcy. Because of their inherent systemic risk, regulated 
financial institutions and all companies listed on stock exchanges are highly scrutinized 
by supervisory and regulatory authorities. To control systemic risk and reduce social 
costs, these authorities have forced listed entities to develop their culture, infrastructure, 
and organizational processes and structures to help ensure adequate risk management.  
 Gallagher (1956) proposed that organizations should have an employee 
responsible for managing risk. He contended that risk “must be conceived, even to the 
extent of putting it under one executive, who in a large company might be a full-time 
risk manager” (Gallagher, 1956, p. 75). However, only since the 1990’s have there been 
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concerted endeavours to either regulate risk reporting or develop frameworks to 
implement risk management systems. These endeavours have stipulated norms of best 
practice about how to implement corporate risk management in firms – usually in the 
area of corporate governance. These norms vary from binding requirements (such as the 
Sarbannes-Oxley Act [SOX], and the Basel II Accord); to non-binding requirements 
(such as the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations [COSO] Report, Turnbull Report) 
issued by regulatory and supervisory entities (e.g., Financial Reporting Council [FRC]) 
or professional and national standards setters (e.g., Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
England and Wales [ICAEW]).  
 In the United States of America [US] the COSO report of 1992 (Internal 
Control: integrated framework) established guidelines on the design of internal control 
systems. These guidelines were intended to help identify the causes of fraudulent 
financial reporting. They present a common definition of internal control and provide a 
framework for the assessment and improvement of internal control systems. The COSO 
report saw internal controls as processes that embrace five elements: control 
environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and 
monitoring. These elements are designed to provide reasonable assurance about 
achievement of the following three objectives: effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations 
(Woods, 2008). 
 Gupta (2006) found evidence that there was limited adoption of the COSO 
Integrated Framework by US companies. Therefore, SOX recommended the application 
of COSO 1992 guidelines (especially in compliance with its section 404) as an answer 
to the financial scandals of Worldcom and Enron. This recommendation was motivated 
by a desire to improve the reliability of financial reporting based on the idea that good 
internal controls would assure that reliability. Section 404 of SOX required each annual 
report to contain an internal control report. This report should state management’s 
responsibility for estabilishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure 
and procedures for financial reporting; and assess the effectiveness of the internal 
control system. However, in 2006, due to the increased cost of compliance with section 
404, (which shifted most Initial Public Offerings [IPO] away from the US to the United 
Kingdom [UK]), the US Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] changed its 
position in relation to COSO.  
23 
 
In 2004, COSO published a revised version of its internal control framework 
(Enterprise Risk Management – integrated framework). This added three more elements 
to the initial five: objective setting, event identification, and risk response. Enterprise 
risk management encompasses the internal control concept, broadens the definition of 
risk, and sees risk management as serving a strategic function. Recently, COSO released 
two additional documents on Enterprise Risk Management [ERM]. The first of these 
documents (Embracing Enterprise Risk Management: practical approaches for getting 
started) provides an action plan that can be used in ERM implementation. The second 
document (Developing Key Indicators to Strengthen Enterprise Risk Management) 
discusses the importance of developing key indicators for monitoring the risks that 
might emerge to affect the strategic success of a company. 
In the UK, risk management issues were given prominence in about 1992 with 
the publication of the Cadbury Report and Code. This report focused on accountability 
and risk management aspects of corporate governance (Demirag et al., 2000). However, 
it neglected aspects related to disclosure of internal controls and risk management. 
Problems with internal controls have serious consequences that are associated with 
corporate governance incompetence and malpractice. The Turnbull Report 
recommendations for implementing the Combined Code on corporate governance  
requirements (issued by the Hampel Committee) demanded an annual review of the 
effectiveness of a company’s system of internal controls, accompanied by an 
appropriate report to shareholders about the evaluation conducted (Linsley & Shrives, 
2000). However, this report did not require any explanation of specific risks. As such, it 
did not allow readers to properly assess the risk position of a company (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2005a). The last revision of the Combined Code on corporate governance (The 
UK Corporate Governance Code) added a new principle: “the board is responsible for 
determining the nature and the extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in 
achieving its strategic objectives” (FRC, 2010, p. 7). In the near future the FRC will 
hold a series of meetings to explore how companies are responding to this new 
principle. They will then consider whether the Turnbull Report guidance on risk and 
internal control needs to be amended. 
In 1998, an ICAEW report (Financial Reporting of Risk: proposals for a 
statement of business risk) proposed that listed companies should report information 
voluntarily about business risk in a specific statement within the annual report. Some of 
the benefits associated with risk reporting were claimed to be a reduction in the cost of 
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capital, the possibility of signalling best risk management abilities to the market, 
encouraging better risk management, and improving accountability. The Combined 
Code and the Turnbull Report did not require any explanation of specific risks. The 
ICAEW report’s main focus was to overcome this gap by proposing the publication of a 
risk statement within annual reports. In this statement companies could discuss (using a 
full disclosure perspective) their significant risk exposures and how they were dealing 
with them (Linsley & Shrives, 2005a). 
 One disadvantage of the full disclosure model arises from the peculiar 
characteristics of the risk concept. Inherently, risk information is commercially 
sensitive. It is information with competitive advantages that, if perceived by 
competitors, could impair future economic benefits of a company. According to 
Verrechia’s (1983) proprietary costs perspective, voluntary risk reporting has a 
threshold of an optimal level of disclosure. Consequently, in 1999 and in 2002, 
respectively, the ICAEW issued two documents (No Surprises: the case for better risk 
reporting) and (No Surprises: working for better risk reporting). Both incorporated an 
opt-out clause that permitted the disclosure of risk information to be excluded in the 
presence of proprietary costs. 
 In the finance sector, in 1988 the Bank of International Settlements [BIS] sought 
to reduce systemic risk of companies, enhance market discipline and assure the stability 
of the financial system, by issuing the Basel I Accord (International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards). This established standards to calculate 
the capital adequacy of a finance company. In 1998, in its document (Enhancing Bank 
Transparency) the BIS proposed that banks should disclose information about their 
financial performance, financial position, risk management strategies and risk exposures 
of all kinds (credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, operational risk and legal risk). In 
2005, the BIS published a revised framework (International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: a revised framework), known as the Basel II 
Accord. This reinforced minimal capital requirements, supervision arrangements, and 
market discipline.  
 Recently, in the aftermath of the GFC of 2008/09, one of The Group of Twenty 
[G20] endeavours to accomplish the objectives stated in the Report of the Financial 
Stability Forum on Enchancing Market and Institutional Resilience (Financial Stability 
Forum, 2008) culminated in several refinements of the Basel II requirements. From 
2009 onwards, several documents have been issued to review the 2005 framework 
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(renamed the Basel III Accord). These documents introduce higher capital requirements 
to capture the credit risks of complex trading activities, stress Value-at-Risk [VaR] 
requirements to reduce procyclicality, and reinforce Pillar 2 and 3 in terms of 
securitizations and off-balance sheet [OBS] exposures and trading activities. 
 Pillar 3 also includes an opt-out disclosure clause for information considered 
confidential. Opt-out clauses can have some perverse effects. Acher (1998, p. 88) states 
that “to have an opt-out clause to exclude reporting on risk regarded as too 
commercially sensitive or prejudicial, in terms of publishing the risks and how 
companies are responding to them, would give a potentially misleading view of a 
company’s risks.” This could lead to one of two behaviors: the inclusion of worthless 
boiler plate statements; or full withholding of information through the use of the 
“commercially sensitive” argument (Linsley & Shrives, 2000). 
 In the field of accounting regulations, the International Accounting Standards 
Board [IASB] issued IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures). This accounting 
standard demands several disclosures about the risk associated with financial 
instruments. The most problematic issue is that the mandatory disclosure requirements 
of IFRS 7 are focused only on financial risks (basically, credit risk, market risk, and 
liquidity risk). But from a management perspective, companies are subject to financial 
and non-financial risks. This can open the opportunity for companies to increase 
discretionary risk reporting behaviour, leading to a false sense of transparency. 
Managers can disclose only selected non-binding information and withhold some news 
to enhance their standing or hide managerial deficiencies.  
 
Purposes 
As the previous discussion reveals the concepts of risk and risk management have 
received substantial attention lately. The need for effective risk management, internal 
control and transparent RRD is an important corporate governance principle. Despite 
the growing attention to risk issues that was highlighted in the aftermath of some 
financial scandals (e.g. Enron, Worldcom) and by the GFC, there is still little academic 
analysis of  RRD. The main purpose of the present thesis is to extend the analysis by 
evaluating the diffusion of RRD practices in Portugal. 
To achieve this objective the thesis provides a series of empirical studies about 
RRD in Portugal. More precisely, the thesis performs an extensive literature review to 
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reveal potential research gaps. Such a literature review was crucial in order to guide the 
empirical studies included here. The literature review should also be helpful to future 
researchers who want to start research projects in the RRD field.  
The literature review revealed that most existing studies were focused on RRD 
practices in Anglo-Saxon countries and that there was a scantiness of RRD studies in 
European Latin countries, in particular Portugal. Portugal is one of the least developed 
countries in the euro-area. It has some unique features regarding capital markets, 
company financing structure and corporate governance systems (Lopes & Rodrigues, 
2007). Thus, it provides a different institutional setting – one that could be helpful in 
determining whether companies in less developed countries adopt different RRD 
practices than those in more developed countries. 
The empirical studies included in this thesis draw upon two different kinds of 
industry-based samples: one from the non-finance sector; and the other from the finance 
sector. The option to study non-finance and finance companies separately draws 
strength from the argument that the distinction between non-finance and finance 
companies is crucial in the context of RRD. Such distinction recognizes that banks 
possess unique qualities: they have opaque assets, are highly leveraged, and rely on 
short-term liabilities (Flannery et al., 2004). They “are risk management entities and can 
be expected to make significantly different types of risk disclosures, and therefore need 
to be studied independently” (Linsley & Shrives, 2006, p. 392). The inclusion of finance 
and non-finance sector enlarges the scope of the thesis. Thereby, it helps to develop a 
comprehensive knowledge of the RRD practices of Portuguese companies and a 
sounder knowledge of the motivations companies have to disclose information about 
their risk exposures, risk management activities and internal controls. 
Given the research purposes, the first set of key research questions is: 
1. What are the RRD practices of Portuguese finance and non-finance 
companies? 
1.1. What kind of RRD do Portuguese companies disclose than others? 
1.2. What kind of companies disclose more risk information than others? 
1.3. When companies disclose risk information do they quantify the 
amounts of risk they are facing? 
1.4. Are the RRD made with a backward-looking perspective or with a 
forward-looking perspective? 
1.5. Are the RRD of finance companies transparent? 
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1.6. Do finance companies use a compliance-driven approach or are they 
proactive in disclosing risks? 
 
Among the several theoretical frameworks capable of explaining the motivations 
for RRD, agency theory is used most often. In terms of this theory, risk information is 
crucial in reducing information asymmetries between shareholders and managers. One 
way to foster the provision of risk information is through the implementation of 
monitoring systems that are able to induce higher levels of information, thereby 
reducing agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Some of these monitoring 
mechanisms are intertwined with corporate governance characteristics, such as 
ownership structure, board independence, audit committee independence, leadership 
duality, and the quality of external auditors (Linsley & Shrives, 2005a).   
Many factors affect company decisions to make RRD. Thus, it is reasonable to 
understand that a single theory is not sufficient to provide a complete explanation. This 
has been acknowledged in prior research that has advocated the benefits of adopting 
multi-theoretical approaches to obtain a wide understanding of factors that drive RRD 
(Linsley et al., 2006; Linsley & Shrives, 2006). 
Thus the second set of key research questions is: 
2. What are the motivations for RRD by Portuguese finance companies and 
Portuguese non-finance companies? 
2.1. Are the incentives for RRD explained by a multi-theoretical 
framework that combines economic theories with social and political 
theories such as agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-
based perspective? 
2.2. How can this theoretical framework be used in this thesis and in 
future research? 
 
3. How do the findings help to improve risk-based regulations? 
 
 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to RRD research in several ways. The first essay reveals a 
comprehensive literature review on RRD divided into three fields of research: RRD 
practices; the value relevance of RRD; and the motivations for RRD. It covers the 
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decade from 2000 – a period in which the volume of literature grew substantially. In 
each of these fields the essay shows several future avenues of research. The findings 
have important potential to assist practice and guide future research initiatives that could 
add additional insights to RRD practices. The thesis also contributes by highlighting the 
usefulness of multi-theoretical frameworks that combine economic theory with social 
and political theory to understand the incentives for RRD. 
Additionally, each of the empirical studies has the potential to make other 
related contributions. The second essay, following Roberts et al. (2005), Aguilera 
(2005), and Linsley and Shrives (2006), proposes a theoretical framework that combines 
agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives to explain the 
motivations for RRD of Portuguese non-finance companies. The essay explores the 
usefulness of RRD practices in terms of their quality. The specific setting studied helps 
to demonstrate the impact of the adoption of International Accounting Standards 
[IAS/IFRS], and EU Modernisation Directive on the quantity and quality of RRD.  
The third essay reveals the level of transparency of RRD made by PCIs. The 
essay assesses the quality of RRD, explores how further reforms of RRD practices have 
addressed the inadequacies and informs future attempts to improve accounting 
regulation. 
The fourth essay considers that some particular characteristics of the banking 
sector (e.g. consumer-oriented entities, high levels of public visibility, multiple set of 
stakeholders, and intensive regulation) can determine the motivations for mandatory and 
voluntary RRD. It contends that shareholder theory is insufficient to explain RRD.  
Bebbington et al.’s (2008) framework is explored to test the suitability of legitimacy 
theory and resources-based perspectives to explain the influence of reputation risk 
management processes on RRD, and in examining whether RRD are made to satisfy 
stakeholders interests. 
The fifth essay uses Bebbington et al.’s (2008) framework complemented by 
Sanchéz-Ballesta and Bernal-Llórens’ (2010, p. 403) argument that disclosure is “a 
market mechanism to create and sustain banks’ reputations” to explain the determinants 
for the voluntary RRD (e.g. operational risk, and capital structure and adequacy) made 
by Portuguese commercial banks in a period that pre-dated the first-time adoption of the 
Basel II Accord. This essay also explores the importance of stakeholder monitoring to 
ensure the effectiveness of market discipline.  
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At the empirical level, this thesis addresses some deficiencies and oversights in 
the RRD literature. It adds to prior literature by extending research on RRD in an under-
researched sector, banking. Moreover, through the use of a multi-theoretical framework 
the thesis explains the importance of corporate governance characteristics, public 
visibility, and corporate reputation, in influencing the levels and patterns of RRD. 
 
Structure 
The thesis is based on five essays, organized in two parts. Part I includes one essay, a 
literature review. Part II is devoted to empirical contributions. It includes four essays on 
RRD practices of Portuguese companies. 
 In Part I, the first essay offers an extensive literature review of RRD studies in 
three main research fields: RRD practices; value relevance of RRD; and motivations for 
RRD. It provides a foundational knowledge resource to inform practice and research 
initiatives and is intended to improve and guide RRD research in the future. 
 Part II contains four empirical studies on RRD practices in Portugal. The second 
essay assesses the RRD practices in annual reports for 2005 of Portuguese companies in 
the non-finance sector. It explores whether the implementation of IAS/IFRS and the 
EU’s Modernisation Directive in 2005 affected the quantity and quality of RRD, and the 
determinants for RRD made by Portuguese non-finance companies.  
 The third essay assesses the RRD practices of 190 PCIs.1 This is based on a 
content analysis of their individual annual reports for 2006. The essay seeks to: a) assess 
the usefulness of RRD based on the four desirable characteristics of financial statements 
enunciated in the IASB’s conceptual framework for accounting: relevance, reliability, 
understandability and comparability; b) assess the extent to which reforms of RRD 
practices in 2007 in IFRS and the Basel II Accord address each of the deficiencies 
identified; and c) make recommendations to Portuguese supervisory authorities.  
The fourth essay analyses individual annual reports for 2006 to assess factors 
affecting the RRD of 190 PCIs.  It examines the suitability of a multi-theoretical 
framework based on legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives to explain the 
motivations for RRD by finance companies. 
                                                 
1 Portuguese credit-granting institutions are part of the Portuguese finance sector whose business “is to receive deposits or other 
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own accounts” (Decree Law 298/92, Article 2). 
 30                                                                   
 
The fifth essay explores the factors that affected the voluntary RRD in the 
individual annual reports for 2006 of Portuguese banks. It explores the extent to which 
the annual reports conformed to Basel II requirements in terms of the voluntary 
disclosure of operational risk and capital structure and adequacy matters. Results 
suggest that the voluntary RRD observed are explained by legitimacy theory and 
resources-based perspectives.  
The conclusions section provides a reflective overview of the essays and 
discusses the main findings. 
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Part I 
 
Risk-related disclosures: literature review and 
avenues for future research 
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Essay 1 
 
Risk reporting: literature review and avenues for future research 
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1.1 Introduction 
Inadequate reporting has been implicated in many episodes of financial distress and 
unexpected corporate failures in the past decade: for example, in the collapses of Enron 
and Worldcom in the USA, and HIH Insurance in Australia; in the financial plight of 
Northern Rock in the UK; and the operational risk management failure of Société 
Générale in France (Ball, 2009). The importance of monitoring the risk exposures and 
risk management practices of business entities have been highlighted in the post-
mortems following the financial implosion of several major investments banks (Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch), the ensuing effects on other firms (such as 
American Insurance Group) and on the global economy. 
The present essay reviews the literature on RRD. It aims to provide a 
foundational knowledge resource to inform practice and research initiatives that are 
directed to improve RRD. The literature we review principally covers the decade from 
2000 ─ a decade in which the risk reporting literature grew substantially (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2006; Woods et al., 2008a). We divide this review into four fields, as follows:  
(a) RRD practices (Tables 1.1 – 1.3);  
(b) impact of the adoption of risk-based regulation (Table 1.4);  
(c) value relevance of RRD (Table 1.5); and  
(d) motivations for RRD (Tables 1.6 – 1.8).  
Consistently, the existing literature has acknowledged serious inadequacies in 
RRD. Risk information has been found to be difficult to read and comprehend (Table 
1.1). Voluntary RRD practices are vague, qualitative, backward-looking, and ineffective 
in communicating risks to users (Table 1.2). Regulatory endeavours have failed to 
remedy the lack of transparency of RRD, particularly in terms of comparability and 
understandability (Table 1.3). Regulation has not resulted in more extensive levels of 
disclosure. Nor has it improved the quality of RRD (Table 1.4).  
Generally, RRD are value-relevant to investors. But results need further 
empirical evidence to corroborate theoretical assumptions related to the ability of RRD 
to reduce the cost of capital (Table 1.5). Commonly, the motivations for RRD are 
explained by agency theory. Basically, they are related to the ability of RRD to reduce 
information asymmetries. Corporate governance structures play a crucial role as a 
monitoring mechanism encouraging RRD (Table 1.6). Other economic theories (such as 
signalling theories, political costs theory, and proprietary costs theory) can explain the 
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motivations for RRD too. But, further empirical evidence is needed. Studies of the 
motivations for RRD based only on social and political theories have reported 
conflicting results (Table 1.7). Finally, studies combining these two theoretical 
approaches seem to be able to explain RRD (Table 1.8). These two theoretical 
dimensions are crucial in obtaining insight, and wider knowledge, about what drives 
RRD.  
Economic theories give a perspective on what managers are trying to avoid 
(such as agency costs, litigation costs, reputation costs). Social and political theories 
highlight the relationships between a company and society that are needed to manage 
strategic resources crucial to the viability of a firm. Thus, study of the holistic 
interactions between economic and social/political perspectives related to the incentives 
for RRD is a promising but unexplored field for future research.  
The following sections present a reflective and critical discussion of the major 
findings of existing literature on RRD practices, the relevance of RRD to investors, and 
the motivations for RRD. At the end of each section some avenues for future research 
are proposed. 
 
1.2 Inadequacies of Risk Reporting Disclosures Practices 
The lack of transparency of risk information is one of the main deficiencies of 
accounting and accountability reports that have been documented in RRD literature 
(Cabedo & Tirado, 2004). Solomon et al. (2000) concluded that RRD were inadequate; 
that managers should provide detailed risk information; that information about risk 
exposure and risk mitigation strategies should be disclosed; and that all types of risks 
should be disclosed equally. Solomon et al. (2000) argued that investors want a clearer 
identification of the principal risks and uncertainties faced by companies. In similar 
vein, Linsley and Lawrence (2007) found that RRD were difficult to read (Table 1.1). 
These findings seem to be at odds with the presumption that RRD should be 
disclosed because they are highly relevant; and that they will lower the cost of capital 
and thereby help a business to prosper (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Dobler, 2008). The 
deficiencies in RRD have been acknowledged. Regulatory efforts to improve 
transparency  in  RRD have been made through Financial Reporting Release [FRR] 48  
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(Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivatives Financial Instruments and 
Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Quantitative and Qualitative 
Information about Market Risk Inherent in Derivatives Financial Instruments, Other 
Financial Instruments and Derivative Commodity Instruments) issued by US SEC, 
German Accounting Standard [GAS] 5 (Risk Reporting), IFRS 7 and the Basel II 
Accord. However, these regulatory efforts have been short sighted (at least in terms of 
RRD) because they are based on a disclosure model that only regards financial risk as 
constituting relevant information (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004). Non-financial risk can also 
have a substantial impact on the future cash flows of a company (see, for example, the 
operational failures detected at Barings or at Société Generale). Regulatory initiatives 
have failed to remedy the lack of RRD transparency. The GFC highligted some 
accounting shortcomings, including failure to account for uncertainty and to adequately 
communicate the impact of risk-taking, undermining the reliability and relevance of 
disclosures (Magnan & Markarian, 2011). This suggests that efforts to improve 
transparency must be supplemented by other means, including voluntary disclosures.  
 The existing literature on RRD practices can be divided into studies of voluntary 
RRD practices and studies of mandatory RRD practices. Empirical evidence shows that 
under a voluntary regime, if a company discloses risk information it is more likely to 
have a higher share price than a company that does not disclose. Under a mandatory 
regime, a company’s value is likely to fall because of the disclosure costs incurred 
(Jorgensen & Kirschenheiter, 2003). Because risk is inherently proprietary in nature, 
both mandatory and voluntary regimes (and especially the voluntary regime) have the 
potential to lead to meaningless “boiler plate” RRD (Woods, 2008a).  
 
1.2.1 Voluntary risk-related disclosure practices 
The major findings of studies regarding the voluntary RRD practices of companies in 
the non-finance sector are shown in Table 1.2. In general, a large variation in content 
and level of detail has been found. Disclosures are often vague, qualitative, backward-
looking and of doubtful decision usefulness. There are too few disclosures about the 
potential impact of exposure to risk, or about risk assessment and risk forecasts. 
Frequently, the annual report is assessed to be an ineffective medium for 
communicating risks to readers (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Carlon et al., 2003; 
Groenland et al., 2006; Konishi & Ali, 2007; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 
2003, 2005a, 2006; Mohobbot, 2005; Papa, 2007; Rajab & Handley-Schachler, 2009). 
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Encouragingly, some studies have found that RRD were basically forward-
looking instead of backward-looking (Linsley & Shrives, 2005a, 2006). Although 
forward-looking disclosures mainly described internal controls, they did not provide 
explicit details regarding relevant risks. Groenland et al. (2006) examined risk sections 
of  annual  reports  and  found  that  a  large  amount  of  narrative content described risk 
management and control systems. However, in prospectuses for IPOs these risk 
disclosure statements were inadequate, and had doubtful decision usefulness (Papa, 
2007). From a legitimacy perspective, the importance of risk mitigation disclosures 
should be acknowledged in signalling the adequacy of internal management control 
mechanisms (Bhimani, 2009). However, such disclosures were assessed to lack decision 
usefulness and to be “insipid general policy statements” (Linsley & Shrives, 2005a, p. 
301) because they only tended to inform readers about the internal control system in 
place and not about risk management mitigation activities. 
  
1.2.2 Mandatory risk-related disclosure practices  
1.2.2.1 An overall assessment 
Generally, the major findings of research on mandatory RRD practices (Table 1.3, Panel 
A) indicate a lack of substantial compliance with regulatory requirements. RRD were 
usually qualitative and backward-looking. The presentation of risk in annual reports was 
not standardized and descriptions of RRD were vague and elusive (Combés-Thuélin et 
al., 2006; Korosec & Horvat, 2005; Linsley et al., 2006; Oliveira et al., 2011a). 
Disclosures regarding internal risk in non-finance companies lacked transparency with 
respect to how risk management was organized. In finance companies this type of 
disclosure was more detailed, despite a tendency to hide information about operational 
risks (Avram & Skully, 2007; Korosec & Horvat, 2005).  
 
1.2.2.2 Mandatory market risk disclosure practices 
Research on RRD practices has tended to concentrate on specific categories of the 
overall risk construct, such as the market risk associated with financial instruments. 
These studies have one of two main focuses: either (a) market risk disclosures related to 
the use of derivatives or financial instruments (Othman & Ameer, 2009; Woods & 
Marginson, 2004; Yong et al., 2005); or (b) VaR disclosure practices (Hirtle, 2007; 
Pérignon et al., 2008; Pérignon & Smith, 2010; Woods et al., 2008b). 
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Table 1.3 (Panel B) indicates that market risk disclosures associated with derivatives 
vary widely in scale, content and format. Disclosures are basically qualitative and 
generic, with little information provided about the internal controls that have been 
established to mitigate risks, and little discussion about how risk arose and was being 
managed. There is also little information provided about VaR disclosure or about the 
results of stress tests or backtests for VaR. Statements about the assumptions and 
parameters of VaR and sensitivity analysis are incomplete. Only larger banks provided 
detailed information about the internal models they used to assess risk (Woods & 
Marginson, 2004; Yong et al., 2005). Taken together, these deficiencies undermine the 
comparability and reliability of disclosures and militate against the capacity of readers 
to assess a firm’s risk profile appropriately (Othman & Ameer, 2009; Woods & 
Marginson, 2004; Yong et al., 2005). 
 Table 1.3 (Panel C) corroborates the lack of transparency found in previous 
studies of market risk disclosures related to VaR information. There are few disclosures 
about backtesting and stress testing. Disclosures of the assumptions, parameters and 
limitations of the VaR model are incomplete and inadequate (Hirtle, 2007). The method 
used most often to assess VaR was that of historical simulation based on past events. 
Thus, very little information emerged about future volatility (Pérignon & Smith, 2010). 
Moreover, these disclosures are very difficult to audit (Woods et al., 2008b). The 
deficiencies highlighted severely affect levels of comparability, reliability and 
understandability of the information provided.  
A systematic overestimation of VaR disclosures by commercial banks has been 
reported (Pérignon et al., 2008; Pérignon & Smith, 2010). This finding contradicts the 
idea that banks would underestimate VaR to reduce their market risk capital charges. 
But several explanations for the overestimation of VaR are plausible. First, the VaR 
aggregation process has an inherent potential to overestimate VaR. Second, companies 
have incentives to manage their potential reputation risk: for example, by intentionally 
overstating risk to distract internal and external attention (Pérignon & Smith, 2010). 
 
1.2.2.3 Mandatory credit risk and liquidity risk disclosure practices 
The few studies of disclosure practices for credit risk and liquidity risk are summarised 
in Table 1.3 (Panel D). In terms of credit risk disclosures, finance companies have 
provided a large flow of uniform information that is assessed to be generally sufficient 
for market participants. However, some transparency deficiencies were found. Forward 
47 
 
 
looking disclosures were scarce. Credit risk disclosures were limited to the amount of 
credit risk exposures. Data on expected credit losses and risk mitigation were not 
uniform and failed to provide direct measurements. There was a general absence of 
disclosures about the assumptions used to estimate future provisioning to the general 
loss allowance (Frolov, 2006). 
 One of the largest sources of credit risk exposures (OBS instruments related to 
loan commitments) is under-researched. The few existing studies document a wide 
variety of reporting practices by European, US and Japanese banks (Khambata & 
Hirche, 2002; Khambata & Badji, 2003). 
 Liquidity risk disclosures were basically qualitative, wide ranging, and 
incomplete. They dealt mainly with the risk management structure and were 
accompanied by explanatory comments on liquidity risk management practices and 
aspects of contingency planning (Boussanni et al., 2007). 
  
1.2.3 Impact of the adoption of risk-based regulations 
Table 1.4 (Panel A) shows that no single set of accounting regulations results in more 
extensive levels of disclosure and in an improved quality of RRD (Woods et al., 2008b). 
Other studies suggest that the adoption of risk-based regulation throughout the World 
has not had a strong impact on quality. 
Table 1.4 (Panel B) documents how FRR 48 in the US affected the extent of 
market risk disclosures, and that companies generally complied with qualitative 
disclosure requirements (Blankley et al., 2002). However, several deficiencies were 
detected. The quality and location of disclosures were less than satisfactory. There was 
little detailed discussion of accounting policies for derivatives or of risk management 
structure and activities. Furthermore, VaR disclosures lacked comparability and 
reliability because of insufficient discussion of the methods, assumptions and 
parameters used; and the quantitative information disclosed lacked detail, influencing 
risk assessments (Elmy et al., 1998; Hodder et al., 2001; Roulstone, 1999).  
Before the adoption of risk regulation (such GAS 5, in Germany) there was a 
large variation in risk reporting (Table 1.4, Panel C). After the adoption of GAS 5 the 
level of RRD increased, but with low levels of compliance (Bungartz, 2003; Fisher & 
Wielmeyer, 2004; Kajüter & Winkler, 2003; Woods & Reber, 2003).  
Table 1.4 (Panel D) shows that the adoption of IAS/IFRS (and more specifically 
the adoption of IFRS 7) only affected the quantity of RRD by banks (Bischof, 2009; 
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Fi
nd
in
gs
 
El
m
y 
et
 a
l. 
(1
99
8)
 
33
 d
om
es
tic
 n
on
-
ba
nk
 S
EC
 re
gi
st
ra
nt
s 
Pe
rio
d:
 1
99
7 
10
-K
 fi
lin
gs
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
M
ar
ke
t r
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
Th
e 
qu
al
ity
 o
f 
th
e 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
an
d 
qu
al
ita
tiv
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
w
as
 le
ss
 
th
an
 sa
tis
fa
ct
or
y.
 
R
ou
ls
to
ne
 
(1
99
9)
 
25
 S
EC
 re
gi
st
ra
nt
s 
Pe
rio
d:
 1
99
6-
19
97
 
10
-K
 fi
lin
gs
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
M
ar
ke
t r
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
Th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 F
R
R
 4
8 
im
pr
ov
ed
 d
is
cl
os
ur
es
. 
B
ut
 d
is
cl
os
ur
es
 
va
rie
d 
w
id
el
y 
in
 d
et
ai
l a
nd
 c
la
rit
y.
 O
nl
y 
ha
lf 
of
 th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
pr
ov
id
ed
 
de
ta
ils
 a
nd
 l
im
ita
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
ris
k 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
m
od
el
s 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s. 
Ta
bu
la
r 
fo
rm
at
 
w
as
 
th
e 
le
as
t 
po
pu
la
r. 
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
 
an
al
ys
is
 w
as
 th
e 
m
os
t p
op
ul
ar
. 
H
od
de
r e
t a
l. 
(2
00
1)
 
--
- 
N
or
m
at
iv
e 
M
ar
ke
t r
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
FR
R
 4
8 
ca
us
es
 j
ud
gm
en
t 
di
ff
ic
ul
tie
s 
du
e 
to
 l
ac
k 
of
 c
om
pa
ra
bl
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
an
d 
de
ta
ile
d 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 
B
la
nk
le
y 
et
 
al
. (
20
02
) 
30
 U
S 
lis
te
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Pe
rio
d:
 1
99
7 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
M
ar
ke
t r
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
Th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
FR
R
 4
8 
re
la
te
d 
to
 q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t m
ar
ke
t r
is
k 
w
er
e 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 fo
llo
w
ed
 b
y 
al
l D
O
W
 
30
 c
om
pa
ni
es
. C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 t
he
 o
th
er
 a
sp
ec
ts
 o
f 
FR
R
 4
8 
w
as
 
m
ix
ed
.  
              
 5
0 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 Pa
ne
l C
 –
 Im
pa
ct
 o
f G
A
S 
5 
in
 r
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 
St
ud
y 
Sa
m
pl
e 
M
et
ho
d 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
M
ai
n 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
M
ai
n 
Fi
nd
in
gs
 
W
oo
ds
 &
 
R
eb
er
 
(2
00
3)
 
12
 U
K
 a
nd
 G
er
m
an
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Pe
rio
d:
 1
99
9 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
R
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
  
G
A
S 
5 
ha
d 
a 
po
si
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
ris
k 
re
po
rti
ng
. T
he
 o
ve
ra
ll 
le
ve
l o
f 
ris
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 w
as
 h
ig
he
r 
in
 t
he
 U
K
 t
ha
n 
in
 G
er
m
an
y.
 U
K
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 d
is
cl
os
ed
 m
or
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 r
is
ks
, 
bu
t 
G
er
m
an
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
pr
ov
id
e 
m
or
e 
de
ta
ile
d 
op
er
at
io
na
l r
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s. 
 
B
un
ga
rtz
 
(2
00
3)
 
11
7 
G
er
m
an
 li
st
ed
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Pe
rio
d:
 2
00
0 
M
an
ag
em
en
t r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
R
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s  
N
A
 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 a
 la
rg
e 
va
ria
tio
n 
in
 m
an
da
to
ry
 r
is
k 
re
po
rti
ng
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 G
A
S 
5.
 R
is
k 
re
po
rts
 w
er
e 
m
ai
nl
y 
qu
al
ita
tiv
e,
 
w
ith
 p
oo
r 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
or
 i
nt
er
re
la
tio
ns
 o
f 
ris
k 
fa
ct
or
s, 
an
d 
fe
w
 
fo
re
ca
st
s. 
K
aj
üt
er
 &
 
W
in
kl
er
 
(2
00
3)
 
82
 G
er
m
an
 li
st
ed
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Pe
rio
d:
 1
99
9-
20
01
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
R
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 a
 l
ar
ge
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
in
 m
an
da
to
ry
 r
is
k 
re
po
rti
ng
. 
R
is
k 
re
po
rts
 w
er
e 
m
ai
nl
y 
qu
al
ita
tiv
e,
 w
ith
 p
oo
r 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
on
 r
is
k 
as
se
ss
m
en
t 
of
 r
is
k 
fa
ct
or
s, 
an
d 
fe
w
 r
is
k 
fo
re
ca
st
s. 
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 
qu
an
tit
y 
of
 r
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
ov
er
 t
im
e,
 b
ut
 n
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 
G
A
S 
5 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
. 
Fi
sh
er
 &
 
V
ie
lm
ey
er
 
(2
00
4)
 
86
 G
er
m
an
 li
st
ed
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
Pe
rio
d:
 1
99
9-
20
02
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
R
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
C
on
si
st
en
t w
ith
 K
aj
üt
er
 a
nd
 W
in
kl
er
 (2
00
3)
 th
er
e 
w
as
 a
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
in
cr
ea
se
 i
n 
th
e 
qu
an
tit
y 
of
 r
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
ov
er
 t
im
e,
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 
af
te
r 
th
e 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t o
f 
G
A
S 
5.
 S
til
l s
ub
st
an
tia
l n
on
-c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 G
A
S 
5 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
. 
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   Pa
ne
l D
 –
 Im
pa
ct
 o
f I
A
S/
IF
R
S 
in
 r
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 
St
ud
y 
Sa
m
pl
e 
M
et
ho
d 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
e 
M
ai
n 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
M
ai
n 
Fi
nd
in
gs
 
PW
C
 (2
00
6)
 
20
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
an
d 
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
an
 b
an
ks
 
Pe
rio
d:
 2
00
5 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
R
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
Th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 I
FR
S 
di
d 
no
t 
ha
ve
 a
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
ris
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
ac
tiv
iti
es
. 
Th
e 
sl
ig
ht
 i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 w
as
 in
 q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s. 
PW
C
 (2
00
8)
 
22
 g
lo
ba
l b
an
ks
 
Pe
rio
d:
 2
00
7 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l r
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
 
N
A
 
IF
R
S 
7 
di
d 
no
t 
im
pr
ov
e 
th
e 
tra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
of
 r
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s. 
B
an
ks
 d
id
 n
ot
 p
re
se
nt
 a
 c
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 a
nd
 c
le
ar
 p
ic
tu
re
 
of
 h
ow
 t
he
y 
m
an
ag
e 
ris
k,
 b
ut
 i
ns
te
ad
 c
om
pl
ie
d 
on
ly
 w
ith
 I
FR
S 
7 
m
in
im
um
 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
. 
W
he
re
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
as
 
di
sc
lo
se
d,
 it
 w
as
 o
fte
n 
no
t e
as
ily
 a
cc
es
si
bl
e 
or
 u
sa
bl
e.
 T
he
 lo
ca
tio
n 
of
 d
is
cl
os
ur
es
 w
as
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
, m
ak
in
g 
it 
di
ff
ic
ul
t f
or
 re
ad
er
s t
o 
fin
d 
an
d 
co
m
pa
re
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
pe
er
s. 
C
re
di
t 
ris
ks
 
w
er
e 
co
nc
en
tra
te
d 
by
 
pr
od
uc
t 
ty
pe
, 
in
du
st
ry
 
an
d 
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
al
 r
eg
io
n.
 T
im
e 
ba
nd
s 
in
 a
ge
in
g 
an
al
ys
is
 v
ar
ie
d.
 T
he
re
 
w
as
 n
o 
de
ta
ile
d 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
of
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
co
lla
te
ra
ls
. 
M
ar
ke
t r
is
k 
as
su
m
pt
io
ns
 f
or
 s
en
si
tiv
ity
 a
na
ly
si
s 
w
er
e 
no
t d
is
cl
os
ed
 
in
 d
et
ai
l. 
Th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
as
 n
ot
 m
ea
ni
ng
fu
l o
r r
el
ev
an
t. 
D
is
cu
ss
io
n 
of
 l
iq
ui
di
ty
 r
is
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
es
 w
as
 g
en
er
ic
. 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
co
m
m
en
ta
ry
 o
n 
ho
w
 l
iq
ui
di
ty
 r
is
k 
w
as
 
m
an
ag
ed
 to
 a
cc
om
pa
ny
 th
e 
qu
an
tit
at
iv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
es
en
te
d 
in
 th
e 
liq
ui
di
ty
 ta
bl
e.
 S
en
si
tiv
ity
 a
na
ly
si
s w
as
 n
ee
de
d.
 
Er
ns
t &
 
Y
ou
ng
 
(2
00
8a
) 
24
 la
rg
es
t E
ur
op
ea
n 
ba
nk
s 
Pe
rio
d:
 2
00
7 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l r
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
 
N
A
 
M
ar
ke
t r
is
k 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
as
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 in
 a
 v
ar
ie
ty
 o
f d
iff
er
en
t w
ay
s, 
us
in
g 
di
ff
er
en
t 
as
su
m
pt
io
ns
, 
th
is
 h
in
de
rs
 c
om
pa
ra
bi
lit
y.
 F
ift
ee
n 
ba
nk
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 a
 g
ra
ph
ic
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 th
ei
r “
ba
ck
te
st
in
g”
 o
f V
aR
. 
B
an
ks
 c
ur
re
nt
ly
 u
se
 a
 w
id
e 
ra
ng
e 
of
 a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 fo
r t
he
ir 
no
n-
V
aR
 
se
ns
iti
vi
ty
 a
na
ly
si
s, 
va
ry
in
g 
fr
om
 1
00
bv
p 
to
 2
00
 b
vp
. 
K
PM
G
 
(2
00
8)
 
17
 la
rg
es
t E
ur
op
ea
n 
ba
nk
s 
Pe
rio
d:
 2
00
6-
20
07
 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
R
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
A
ll 
ba
nk
s 
pr
ov
id
e 
go
od
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 c
re
di
t q
ua
lit
y 
an
d 
liq
ui
di
ty
 
ris
k.
 O
nl
y 
on
e 
th
ird
 v
ol
un
ta
ril
y 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
liq
ui
di
ty
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
th
ei
r f
in
an
ci
al
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r f
in
an
ci
al
 li
ab
ili
tie
s. 
D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 u
nd
er
 
IF
R
S 
7 
ar
e 
lo
ca
te
d 
in
 d
iff
er
en
t s
ec
tio
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
an
nu
al
 r
ep
or
t. 
So
m
e 
ba
nk
s 
ap
pe
ar
ed
 t
o 
co
m
pl
y 
on
ly
 w
ith
 t
he
 l
et
te
r 
of
 t
he
 s
ta
nd
ar
ds
. 
Th
er
e 
w
er
e 
so
m
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s i
n 
qu
al
ity
. 
 5
2 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
A
lm
os
t 
al
l 
ba
nk
s 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
th
ei
r 
cr
ed
it 
ris
k 
ex
po
su
re
 a
nd
 c
re
di
t r
at
in
g 
st
ru
ct
ur
e.
 T
he
 m
aj
or
ity
 o
f b
an
ks
 d
is
cl
os
ed
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 th
ei
r p
as
t d
ue
 a
ss
et
s 
us
in
g 
ho
m
og
en
eo
us
 ti
m
e 
ba
nd
s, 
bu
t t
he
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
va
rie
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
. 
M
ar
ke
t 
ris
k:
 
al
l 
ba
nk
s 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
V
aR
. 
B
ut
 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
w
er
e 
in
co
m
pa
ra
bl
e 
du
e 
to
 th
e 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
 o
f p
ar
am
et
er
s u
se
d.
 
Li
qu
id
ity
 
ris
k:
 
qu
al
ita
tiv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ov
id
ed
 
by
 
al
l 
ba
nk
s 
co
nc
en
tra
te
d 
on
 g
en
er
al
 l
iq
ui
di
ty
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t. 
B
an
ks
 u
se
d 
23
 d
iff
er
en
t t
im
e 
ba
nd
s. 
C
ap
ita
l s
tru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
ad
eq
ua
cy
: f
iv
e 
ba
nk
s 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
ei
r c
ap
ita
l r
at
io
 o
f s
w
itc
hi
ng
 fr
om
 B
as
el
 I 
to
 B
as
el
 II
.  
K
PM
G
 
(2
00
9)
 
16
 la
rg
es
t E
ur
op
ea
n 
ba
nk
s 
Pe
rio
d:
 2
00
8 
A
nn
ua
l r
ep
or
ts
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
R
is
k 
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
 
N
A
 
C
re
di
t 
ris
k:
 a
ll 
ba
nk
s 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 t
he
ir 
cr
ed
it 
ra
tin
g 
st
ru
ct
ur
e.
 F
iv
e 
ba
nk
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 f
ul
l 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
of
 
co
lla
te
ra
l 
he
ld
 a
ga
in
st
 p
as
t 
du
e 
or
 i
m
pa
ire
d 
as
se
ts
. 
M
os
t 
ba
nk
s 
pr
ov
id
ed
 d
at
a 
on
 th
ei
r e
xp
os
ur
e 
to
 c
re
di
t r
is
k.
 C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
of
 ri
sk
 
w
as
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 in
du
st
ria
l s
ec
to
r a
nd
 g
eo
gr
ap
hi
ca
l s
ec
to
r. 
Th
e 
m
aj
or
ity
 o
f 
th
e 
ba
nk
s 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 t
he
ir 
pa
st
 d
ue
 
as
se
ts
, 
bu
t 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
va
rie
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
. 
M
ar
ke
t 
ris
k:
 a
ll 
ba
nk
s d
is
cl
os
ed
 V
aR
, a
lth
ou
gh
 d
iff
er
en
t a
ss
um
pt
io
ns
 a
nd
 p
ar
am
et
er
s 
w
er
e 
us
ed
. B
an
ks
 d
is
cl
os
ed
 m
ar
ke
t r
is
k 
se
ns
iti
vi
tie
s 
in
 a
 v
ar
ie
ty
 o
f 
w
ay
s. 
Fi
fte
en
 b
an
ks
 a
ls
o 
pr
ov
id
ed
 m
ar
ke
t r
is
k 
se
ns
iti
vi
ty
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
in
 a
dd
iti
on
 t
o 
V
aR
. 
Li
qu
id
ity
 r
is
k:
 q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
w
as
 
pr
ov
id
ed
 b
y 
al
l b
an
ks
 a
nd
 fo
cu
se
d 
on
 g
en
er
al
 li
qu
id
ity
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t. 
B
an
ks
 u
se
d 
25
 d
iff
er
en
t 
tim
e 
ba
nd
s. 
C
ap
ita
l 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
an
d 
ad
eq
ua
cy
: t
hi
s 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 f
oc
us
ed
 o
n 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
m
ad
e 
to
 c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 IA
S 
1 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
. 
B
is
ch
of
 
(2
00
9)
 
15
3 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 b
an
ks
 
Pe
rio
d:
 2
00
6-
20
07
 
R
is
k 
se
ct
io
ns
 
A
rc
hi
va
l 
R
is
k-
re
la
te
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
N
A
 
R
is
k 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 q
ua
lit
y 
an
d 
qu
an
tit
y 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
af
te
r 
th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 
IF
R
S 
7.
 I
n 
20
06
 (
20
07
), 
28
%
 (
73
%
) 
of
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
ba
nk
s 
vo
lu
nt
ar
ily
 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 e
xt
er
na
l 
ra
tin
gs
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
cu
st
om
er
s. 
In
 
20
06
 (
20
07
), 
8%
 (
64
%
) 
of
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
ba
nk
s 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
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PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, 2008). But, “the publication of additional risk 
information will not necessarily lead to improved risk communication unless directors” 
improve the quality of RRD (Linsley & Lawrence, 2007, p. 625). The quality of RRD 
did not improve. Banks did not present a clear picture of their risk profile. They only 
complied with minimum disclosure requirements. Disclosures were scattered 
throughout the annual reports and were difficult to compare (KPMG, 2008, 2009; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008). Interestingly, the following deficiencies found before 
the adoption of these standards continued to persist: different time bands for maturing 
and aged past due assets; lack of comparability and reliability of VaR and sensitivity 
analysis disclosures; and a lack of transparency in liquidity risk disclosures (Bischof, 
2009; KPMG, 2008, 2009; Ernst & Young, 2008a; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008). 
 
1.2.4 Discussion and avenues for future research 
International harmonization (at least in terms of RRD) remains more apparent than real. 
For example, IFRS 7 (considered a high quality standard) has not remedied the lack of 
transparency detected in preceding studies. IFRS 7 only deals with financial risks and 
has not prescribed any specific presentation format for financial instruments (Bischof, 
2009; Ernst & Young, 2008a; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008b).  
The Basel II Accord disclosure requirements had the potential to overcome this 
diversity, but their flexibility in permitting the non-disclosure of risk information that is 
deemed confidential or commercially sensitive has not been conducive to enhanced 
transparency. Managers can choose to disclose only selected information and to 
withhold other information to enhance their standing or to hide managerial deficiencies.  
Consequently, the improvement of risk-based regulation does not lead to an 
axiomatic improvement in the quality of RRD. A specific enforcement mechanism is 
needed to help assure appropriate levels of compliance with minimum disclosure 
requirements or to encourage useful voluntary RRD to investors (Bischof, 2009; 
Oliveira et al., 2011a). There is a crucial role to be played by self-enforcement 
mechanisms related to corporate governance structures (such as audit committees, 
independent non-executive directors) and institutional supervisors and regulators. 
Perhaps cognizant of this, the European Parliament and Council issued Directive 
2006/46/EC which reinforces corporate governance structures; and in 2010, the EU 
published a Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and 
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Remuneration Policies, encouraging a risk management culture and the institution of 
risk-related functions.  
Research studies on RRD practices report on disclosure practices before the 
adoption of IFRS 7 (with an exception of studies for finance companies). The adoption 
of GAS 5 in Germany has contributed to the introduction of mandatory RRD 
requirements in the Modernisation Directive (Directive 2003/51/EC) and in the 
Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC). These Directives required extra RRD 
related to financial risks exposures, financial risk management activities, and the main 
risks and uncertainties faced by companies. However, no study has analysed the impact 
of such requirements on the extent of risk information disclosed by European 
companies. More recently, the IASB has issued an IFRS Practice Statement 
(Management Commentary: a Framework for Presentation) that includes 
recommendations for the improvement of RRD. A wave of research studies focusing on 
the impact of EU risk-based regulations, IFRS 7 adoption, and the IFRS Practice 
Statement about Management Commentary on the RRD practices in non-finance and 
finance companies seems likely. Several financial reforms in the aftermath of the GFC 
of 2008/09 prompted amendments to some important risk-based regulations (IFRS 7 
and Basel II Accord). A further wave of research seems likely to focus on analysing the 
impact of the GFC on RRD, and on the feasibility of the financial reforms taken by the 
G20. 
Much of the focus of prior literature has been on large listed non-finance 
companies and banks. However, thousands of smaller non-finance companies have to 
comply with risk-based regulations too. These smaller companies have fewer financial 
resources with which to do so, and have significant challenges in continuing to attract 
qualified expertise and investors. Moreover, another under-researched sector that was 
affected intensely by the GFC is the insurance company sector. Research in these two 
areas may produce new insights beyond those revealed to date.  
Prior research has tended to focus on risk information that is included in annual 
reports. It would seem sensible to explore other sources of risk information (such 10-K 
and 10-Q fillings, interim reports, press-releases, web sites). Questionnaires and 
interviews could be very beneficial in helping to understand the motivation for risk 
disclosures. In the case of finance companies, prior research has had a user-oriented 
focus on a content analysis of annual reports. Until now no study has devoted attention 
to preparers’ perceptions of risk reporting − on how preparers communicate risk 
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exposures, what strategies they implement to mitigate them, and why they report the 
way they do. Directors need to be asked about the risks they are facing currently, or 
have faced, and how they decided to construct their company’s risk narrative. This 
would help to overcome the lack of knowledge of managers’ reactions to changes in a 
bank’s condition due to market monitoring by stakeholders (Bliss & Flannery, 2002; 
Flannery, 2001). It would also help to assess managers’ perceptions of the effectiveness 
of the G20 financial reforms. 
 
1.3 How Informative is Risk Reporting? 
Investors know that creating value requires risk taking. They like to know which risks 
companies are facing and how these risks are (or will be) managed (Eccles et al., 2001). 
Risk reporting has the potential to convey useful information to markets and to enhance 
stakeholders understanding of firms’ risk exposures (Linsmeier et al., 2002). As a 
result, there is a strong demand for transparent risk reporting in annual reports. Such 
reporting will help investors assess firms’ risk profiles and to make investment 
decisions. 
 Existing literature on the informativeness of RRD reflects two streams of 
research: one dealing with the value relevance of RRD; and the other dealing with the 
quality of RRD. The value relevance of RRD indicates the type of risks investors 
consider to be the most important for decision making purposes. Research on the quality 
of RRD indicates the feasibility of the strategies taken by managers in communicating 
risk information.  
 
1.3.1 The value relevance of risk-related disclosures 
Research on the value relevance of RRD can be classified according to focus as: (a) 
RRD in IPOs (Deumes, 2008; Murugesu & Santhapparaj, 2010); (b) risk management 
ability (Poshakwale & Courtis, 2005; Sensarma & Jayadev, 2009); or (c) market risk 
disclosures (Ahmed et al., 2004; Chipalkatti & Datar, 2006; Jorion, 2002; Lin et al., 
2010; Linsmeier et al., 2002). 
 Table 1.5 (Panel A) indicates the relevance of risk reporting in IPOs. RRD 
predict the volatility of future stock prices, the sensitivity of future stock prices to 
market-wide fluctuations, and the likelihood of severe declines in stock price in the 30-  
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month period after publication of prospectuses (Deumes, 2008). Additionally, RRD in 
IPOs reflects offer price and initial returns (Murugesu & Santhapparaj, 2010). 
Table 1.5 (Panel B) shows that disclosure of risk management practices can 
reduce the cost of capital. Investors prefer to buy shares of finance firms that are 
perceived  to  have  superior  risk  management  capabilities.  This is because better risk  
management abilities are associated positively with stock returns (Poshakwale & 
Courtis, 2005; Sensarma & Jayadev, 2009).  
Table 1.5 (Panel C) shows that market risk disclosures (such as interest rate 
maturity gap and VaR) are also value-relevant. Interest rate maturity gap disclosures are  
highly associated with future changes in net interest income (Ahmed et al., 2004). VaR 
disclosures are associated negatively with the sensitivity of trading volume to changes 
in interest rates, foreign currency exchanges rates, and energy prices (Linsmeier et al., 
2002).  VaR is also associated with total risk and firms’ specific risk, when compared to 
other kinds of market risk disclosures (such as those involving tables and sensitivity 
analysis) (Lin et al., 2010). VaR can predict the variability of trading revenues, allowing 
investors to compare different risk profiles (Jorion, 2002). However, if VaR and other 
methods (tabular or sensitivity analysis) are disclosed together, these disclosures are 
also associated positively with the cost of capital (Lin et al., 2010). This conclusion is at 
odds with theoretical assumptions that one of the major benefits of RRD is to reduce the 
cost of capital. It also contradicts results reported by Poshakwale and Courtis (2005).  
 However, other authors have found that market risk disclosures related to VaR 
did not benefit investors. Such disclosures are costly to prepare and complex to 
interpret; and they do not provide useful information to investors at the time of a 
banking crisis (Chipalkatti & Datar, 2006). These findings are intriguing. They conflict 
with previous findings (Jorion, 2002; Lin et al., 2010); but they are consistent with what 
happened in the recent CFC: investors could not rely on VaR values to assess the risk 
profiles of firms.  
 
1.3.2 Quality of risk-related disclosures 
Considering a risk disclosure item as being value-relevant to investors does not mean 
that the way managers disclosed that information would be useful to investors in 
assessing the risk profile of an entity appropriately. Most value relevance studies are 
based on the quantity of disclosure. But quantity should not be used as a proxy for 
quality of information (Botosan, 2004).  
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The quality of disclosures has proven difficult to assess. Some studies have 
assessed quality using disclosure attributes such as monetary/non-monetary, past/future, 
good/bad/neutral news (Linsley & Shrives, 2005a, 2006; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Mohobbot, 2005; Konishi & Ali, 2007). Some authors believe that these attributes 
indicate the quality of disclosures (Gray et al., 1995). Monetary and forward-looking 
risk disclosures are claimed to be more useful than non-monetary risk disclosures, but 
they are highly sensitive to proprietary and litigation costs. Bad news needs to be 
disclosed to improve the credibility of the annual report (Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Linsley et al., 2006). 
 Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) assessed the quality of RRD by proposing a 
framework for risk communication that is based on two assumptions: quantity of 
content and richness of content. However, a framework underpinned by quantity seems 
unlikely to provide a good proxy for the quality of disclosures, for several reasons. 
Quantity measures (such as the number or proportion of pages, number of words, and 
number of sentences) give an idea of the importance of a topic, but are affected by 
margins, page size and font size. Number of words is tabulated easily but is affected by 
different styles of writing. Sentences are identifiable easily, are less subject to inter-
judge variations, and are more suitable in inferring meanings, despite not providing “an 
overall appreciation of the scale and patterns of disclosures”. Indexing methods can 
overcome this difficulty (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Woods et al., 2008a, p. 14). Second, 
prior descriptive studies about RRD practices reveal that RRD has different levels of 
usefulness (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Carlon et al., 2003; Konishi & Ali, 2007; Lajili 
& Zéghal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2005a, 2006; Linsley et al., 2006; Mohobbot, 2005; 
Papa, 2007). Disclosing a huge amount of risk information does not mean that the 
information disclosed is useful to readers. According to Botosan (2004), the quality of 
risk information should be assessed by recourse to the four desired qualitative 
characteristics of financial information: understandability, relevance, reliability, and 
comparability. Oliveira et al. (2011a) used this approach to assess the quality of risk 
reporting.  
 
1.3.3 Discussion and avenues for future research 
From a financial communication perspective, RRD in IPOs has been regarded as an area 
of best practice risk communication (Deumes 2008). However, in terms of internal 
controls and risk management disclosures, RRD in IPOs cannot be considered a good 
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benchmark (Hill & Short, 2009).  In addition, because RRD reflects IPO offer prices 
and initial market returns, it is important to know what kind of risk information is 
potentially useful to users, the different strategies of risk communication used by 
managers, and their different impact on offer prices and initial market returns. These 
two aspects of RRD in IPOs are promising but unexplored avenues for future research. 
 From a shareholder perspective, RRD in IPOs must reflect the effectiveness of 
risk management systems and internal controls in dealing with risk (Murugesu & 
Santhapparaj, 2010). This is understandable in view of the findings of Poshakwale and 
Courtis (2005) that disclosures of risk management practices are most influential in 
reducing the cost of capital; and that better risk management abilities are associated 
positively with stock returns (Sensarma & Jayadev, 2009). However, these results are 
also confounding in view of previous literature indicating that risk management 
disclosure practices lack decision usefulness (Linsley & Shrives, 2005a, 2006; Linsley 
et al., 2006).  
 Although VaR disclosures are value-relevant to investors, previous literature has 
indicated that they lack transparency. VaR disclosure deficiencies undermine their 
comparability, understandability and reliability (Elmy et al., 1998; Hirtle, 2007; Hodder 
et al., 2001; Pérignon et al., 2008; Pérignon & Smith 2010; Roulstone, 1999; Woods et 
al., 2008b).  
Efforts by regulators to improve risk-based disclosures (e.g., European 
Directives 2001/65/EC, 2003/51/EC, 2004/109/EC, and 2006/46/EC; IFRS 7; and the 
recent IFRS Practice Statement (Management Commentary: a Framework for 
Presentation)) have encouraged extra RRD related to financial risk management 
activities. Nonetheless, if an item disclosed is value-relevant but the disclosure lacks 
quality, the question that emerges is: “can investors trust in these value-relevant 
disclosures?” 
A major issue is that the value relevance literature about risk reporting only 
focuses on assessing whether a particular item is disclosed or not; and whether the 
monetary value of a risk disclosure is value-relevant to investors.  This might explain 
why Lin et al. (2010) found a positive association between VaR disclosures and cost of 
capital. VaR is just a “number as opposed to detailing [company’s] position” (Lin et al., 
2010, p. 36). Thus, there is a potential fruitfulness of examining the link between the 
usefulness of RRD (as assessed by the characteristics of relevance, reliability, 
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understandability and comparability) and their value relevance to investors. This would 
assist regulators in further endeavours to improve regulation. 
 
1.4 What Drives Risk Reporting Disclosures? 
Different strands of theory have been proposed to explain why companies disclose risk 
information (Linsley & Shrives, 2000). These strands contemplate two theoretical 
approaches that have guided existing research: an economic theory approach; and a 
social and political theory approach. However, there has been a tendency to combine 
these two theoretical approaches. 
 Economic theory approaches rely on positive accounting theory, which is based 
on the self-interest and profit maximization of economic agents. Under this approach, 
the theoretical frameworks used commonly to explain motivations for RRD are agency 
theory, political costs theory, signalling theory, and proprietary costs theory. 
 The social and political theory approach argues that to obtain insights to the 
motivations for RRD, it is necessary to consider the political and social relationships 
between company and society. Knowledge of such relationships is crucial to 
understanding what influences managers to adopt specific disclosure strategies to 
communicate risk information. Under this approach, the theoretical frameworks used 
more often to examine the determinants for RRD are stakeholder theory and legitimacy 
theory. 
 
1.4.1 Economic theory approach 
Companies that disclose RRD are expected to have higher information asymmetries. In 
addition, stronger corporate governance structures are expected to be associated with 
risk reporting. Table 1.6 shows that research drawing on economic theories can be 
divided into studies about the motivations for RRD (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Hill & 
Short, 2009; Kajüter, 2006); risk management and internal control disclosures (Deumes 
& Knechel, 2008; Haron et al., 2010; Kajüter & Barth, 2007; Lajili, 2007;); financial 
risk management disclosures (Dunne et al., 2010; Taylor et al., 2010); and operational 
risk disclosures (Helbok & Wagner, 2006). 
Table 1.6 (Panel A) indicates that larger and riskier listed companies, with more 
diffuse ownership structures, and with a greater number of independent non-executive 
directors, are more prone to report RRD in annual reports (Abraham & 
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Cox, 2007; Kajüter, 2006). Larger director shareholdings have been found by Hill and 
Short (2009) to reduce the quantity of RRD in IPOs prospectuses of UK companies; and 
to reduce the amount of disclosure to avoid passing information on to competitors. They 
also found that voluntary RRD is more probable in companies with greater information 
asymmetries, but that risk disclosure is not preferred by all firms as a means of reducing 
information asymmetries. Kajüter (2006) also used political costs theory and proprietary 
cost arguments to explain the motivations for RRD. But the results show the need for 
further empirical evidence. 
 Table 1.6 (Panel B) demonstrates that larger, leveraged, and cross-listed 
companies are more prone to make risk management and internal risk disclosures. The 
number of independent outside directors, Chief-Executive Officier [CEO] compensation 
schemes, and diffuse ownership structures are all corporate governance mechanisms 
that encourage these disclosures (Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Lajili, 2007). Kajüter & 
Barth (2007) studied the motivations for managerial control systems and key 
performance indicators [KPI] disclosures. They found that only size and industry were 
associated positively with disclosures, consistent with agency theory. No evidence was 
found for signalling theory. However, Haron et al. (2010) found that well performing 
companies disclose their internal controls voluntarily, and that there is a high level of 
risk management among companies with mandatory internal control disclosures. 
 Table 1.6 (Panel C) reports that financial risk management disclosures by 
Australian mining companies are motivated by the strength of corporate governance 
arrangements, capital raising events, size and leverage (Taylor et al., 2010). However, 
no association was found between financial risk management disclosures and ownership 
structure or profitability. Among UK listed companies, reputational costs (assessed by 
size) and financial factors are the most important reasons for disclosing financial risk 
information related to the use of derivatives (Dunne et al., 2010). A proprietary costs 
argument (assessed by managerial ownership) is not supported. 
 Table 1.6 (Panel D) shows that, based on a theoretical framework of agency 
theory, signalling theory and political costs theory, banks with a lower equity ratio and 
lower profitability accorded greater importance to disclosing their assessment and 
management of operational risks. In contrast, those with higher ratios chose a lower 
disclosure profile (Helbok & Wagner, 2006). 
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1.4.2 Social and political theory approach  
Social and political theories (such as stakeholder and legitimacy theory) seek to explain 
RRD and other aspects of the business-society relationship in other than a simple 
economic perspective. Table 1.7 shows that according to stakeholder theory larger 
companies disclose more RRD to satisfy the information needs of stakeholders (Amran 
et al., 2009). However, in terms of legitimacy theory, Hassan (2009) found opposing 
results. RRD was not associated with size, but with leverage.  
 Based on legitimacy theory, Linsley & Kajüter (2008) found that RRD by Allied 
Irish Bank were not fully effective in re-establishing legitimacy after the discovery of a 
major fraud at its US subsidiary, Allfirst, in 2002. There was a need for effective 
internal control and risk management systems to reduce the likelihood of risk events. 
 
1.4.3 Economic theory and social and political theory approach 
The combination of economic theories with social and political theories has the ability 
to provide a holistic explanation of the motivation for RRD. 
Table 1.8 shows that according to legitimacy theory and resources-based 
perspectives, the motivations for voluntary RRD by banks can be explained by the 
perceived level of stakeholder monitoring, and by perceptions of a bank’s reputation 
(Oliveira et al., 2011b). Therefore, publicly visible older banks with higher levels of 
depositor confidence and with a greater ability to manage risk, disclose more risk 
information voluntarily. 
 
1.4.4 Discussion and avenues for future research 
Literature about motivations for RRD reveals that the theoretical framework used most 
commonly is agency theory. Agency theory explains how information asymmetry 
between shareholders and managers can be reduced through the implementation of 
monitoring mechanisms that are capable of inducing higher levels of disclosure (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). As outsiders, investors are not active in the management of a 
company. Managers have incentives to behave opportunistically. Thus, information 
about risk would reduce investors’ uncertainties. One way to foster transparency is to 
implement risk management systems (Heap, 2008). Such systems help to monitor the 
attitudes of managers towards risk and to assure appropriate flows of risk reporting 
information (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Linsley & Shrives, 2003). Without proper 
monitoring mechanisms, managers have incentives to conceal or manipulate
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information by making misleading disclosures (Latham & Jacobs, 2000). On the other 
hand, risk reporting is intertwined intrinsically with corporate governance. Linsley and 
Shrives (2005a, p. 293)  state  that  “those  in  favour  of  greater  risk-related  
disclosures argue that good corporate governance requires directors to be accountable to 
shareholders for the risk the company faces and improved risk disclosure facilitates 
greater understanding of the company risk profile.”  
Corporate governance characteristics can be considered true monitoring 
mechanisms that are capable of compelling risk reporting. Risk reporting research has 
studied the relationships between RRD and ownership structure (Abraham & Cox, 
2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Kajüter, 2006; Lajíli, 2007); independent non-
executive directors (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Lajili, 2007); 
and auditor type (Deumes & Knechel, 2008). However, future research should strive to 
elicit a broader understanding of the relationships between RRD and corporate 
governance in other monitoring mechanisms (such as an audit committee or risk 
committee, the level of independence of those audit committees, CEO/chairman duality, 
and compensation schemes).   
Other theories such as signalling theory, political cost theory and proprietary 
cost theory have been used to explain motivations for RRD. Signalling theory argues 
that managers in well performing companies will use voluntary RRD to signal best risk 
management practices, thereby promoting transparency and attracting more investment 
(Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). Helbok and Wagner (2006) have used this theory to 
predict the opposite relationship: that managers in poor performing banking companies 
have incentives to use disclosure to signal their risk management abilities related to 
operational risk. Other studies (except for Haron et al., 2010) did not find significant 
results supporting signalling arguments.  Therefore, future research is needed to test the 
suitability of signalling theory in explaining risk reporting. 
Political costs theory contends that to mitigate potential political costs, highly 
visible companies will increase disclosures so as to manipulate their image positively 
and to distract attention (Birt et al., 2006; Deegan & Gordon 1996). Political costs 
theory also posits that companies subject to deep scrutiny from regulatory authorities 
have incentives to increase disclosures to avoid regulatory interventions (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986). This is particularly important in highly regulated sectors such as 
banking. Most RRD research focuses on risk reporting practices holistically. More fine-
grained research is needed to understand industry-specific risk reporting practices. Such 
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research would be insightful in developing better understanding of managers’ 
motivations to disclose risk information. Environmentally sensitive industries (such as 
mining) and publicly visible sectors (such as banking and insurance) are growing fields 
of research. 
Proprietary costs theory highlights the competitive disadvantages of additional 
disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983). Proprietary costs vary according to industry. However, 
companies in the same industry are subject to competitive pressures to produce the same 
level of disclosure as their industry competitors, to avoid being perceived negatively. 
Consequently, companies in the same industry will attempt to disclose at least the same 
level of information as their industry peers so that they will not be undervalued by the 
market. Proprietary cost perspective argues that the incentive to disclose information is 
a decreasing function of the potential proprietary costs attached to a disclosure; and that 
it is an increasing function of the favourableness of the news in a disclosure 
(Verrecchia, 1983). When proprietary costs are higher than the benefits of full 
disclosure, managers will have incentives not to disclose, unless the news is value-
relevant (Prencipe, 2004). Consequently, companies will be mindful of their 
competitive position. Those companies operating in a low-competition environment will 
have less incentive to disclose private information than those operating in a high-
competition environment (Birt et al., 2006).  
Kajüter (2006) found evidence about the influence of proprietary costs on the 
quantity of private risk information disclosed by comparing the differences between the 
external risks and internal risks disclosed. His argument was based on the contestable 
assumption that proprietary costs were probably lower for external risk than for internal 
risks. Dunne et al. (2010) suggest that a negative association between financial risk 
disclosure and managerial holdings is supported by proprietary costs arguments. 
However, their study did not show sufficient empirical evidence to corroborate this 
hypothesis.  Moreover, other studies have found empirical evidence that confirms the 
above relationship (Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Hill & Short, 2009). But they are 
supported by agency theory arguments related to the reduction of information 
asymmetries. Further research is needed to analyse relationships between risk reporting 
and other feasible proxies for proprietary costs. 
The results of RRD studies based on stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory 
conflict with findings of studies that have used agency theory. Most studies find a 
positive association between RRD and size, based on argument that larger companies 
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face greater information asymmetries. Thus, RRD can serve as a way of reducing those 
asymmetries (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2007; Kajüter, 2006; Kajüter 
& Barth, 2007; Lajili, 2007; Taylor et al., 2010;). However, Amran et al. (2009) explain 
this relationship through the use of stakeholder theory. Companies disclose RRD to 
satisfy relevant stakeholders’ expectations about company performance, not to reduce 
information asymmetries. 
Based on legitimacy theory, Hassan (2009) explains the positive association 
between RRD and leverage by assuming that managers have personal interests in 
disclosing RRD so as to signal to stakeholders how they manage these risks efficiently. 
This theoretical explanation is intriguing since the relationship between RRD and 
leverage is underpinned by the existence of information asymmetries between 
managers/shareholders and debt-holders. Thus, agency theory provides a more feasible 
explanation of the results than legitimacy theory. 
Many economic theories rely only on what managers are trying to avoid 
happening (Hasseldine et al., 2005). Dunne et al. (2010) based their hypotheses on the 
importance of corporate reputation in RRD. This theoretical perspective extends the 
economic theory approach beyond positive accounting theory by focusing on what 
managers are doing to manage strategic resources (such as corporate reputation), and 
what communication strategies they are adopting to influence the external perception of 
reputation (Hasseldine et al., 2005; Toms, 2002). This could be the missing link that is 
capable of answering Linsley and Shrives’s (2006, p. 400) appeal for the adoption of 
“multi-disciplinary approaches as insights drawn from areas such as sociology (...) to 
assist future risk disclosure research”; and to Roberts et al.’s (2005, p. 6) call “for 
greater theoretical pluralism and more detailed attention to board processes and 
dynamics.” 
 The positive view of stakeholder theory adopts a socio-economic perspective. It 
posits the importance of managing a company’s relationships with the relevant 
stakeholders who supply crucial resources, and are able to affect firm’s performance 
(Post et al., 2002). The organizational view of legitimacy theory contends that 
companies that are more publicly visible through scrutiny and monitoring by relevant 
stakeholders (such as larger companies or environmentally sensitive industries) and who 
rely intensively on social, political and economic support, will require a greater level of 
legitimacy. According to this perspective, “legitimacy [is an intangible] resource (…) 
 74                                                                   
 
that organizations extract – often competitively – from their cultural environments and 
they employ in pursuit of their goals” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576). 
The resources-based view of the firm explains competitive advantages in terms 
of intangible assets with inimitable qualities – such as corporate reputation – and the 
importance of adopting reputation-building/maintenance strategies to improve a firm’s 
performance (Toms, 2002). Reputation and legitimacy, things that must be built, 
maintained or restored, rest heavily on disclosure (Toms, 2002; Suchman, 1995). 
Stakeholders “will come to the firm attracted by the information content of its 
reputation” (Sabaté & Puente, 2003, p. 281). Thus, managers of companies with a 
higher degree of public visibility have incentives (through a legitimation process) to 
increase transparency of RRD in order to build a good reputation with relevant 
stakeholders. This legitimation process reduces information asymmetries, reduces 
litigation and reputational costs, attracts crucial resources, and reinforces the confidence 
of relevant stakeholders. 
Self-interest and wealth maximization assumptions form the basis of economic 
theories. They cannot be excluded from the analysis by social and political theories. 
Previous literature has indicated that factors associated with corporate governance 
structures, agency, proprietary, litigation and reputational costs can be important drivers 
of RRD. Thus, research about the motivations of RRD by non-finance and finance 
companies, through the use of multi-theoretical frameworks grounded on agency theory, 
resources-based perspectives and legitimacy theory, seems likely to be fertile and to 
produce insights beyond those revealed in literature so far. 
 Prior literature has focused on small samples of predominantly Anglo-Saxon and 
German companies using analysis periods that have been principally prior to the GFC. 
Longitudinal studies, containing larger samples, are needed. These should incorporate 
the periods before and after the GFC and relate to other settings with different agency 
conflicts.  
Bebbington et al. (2008, p. 338) argue that disclosure can be “conceived as both 
an outcome of and part of reputation risk management process.” In this reputation 
building process, mainly in a period of potential reputational damages, managers adopt 
legitimacy strategies to gain, maintain or restore their reputation through disclosure. 
These strategies include impression management techniques to strategically manipulate 
the perceptions and decisions of stakeholders (Linsley & Kajüter, 2008). In periods of 
distress, such as the GFC, the use of these impression management techniques can be 
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intensified and included in annual reports. The proximity of the auditor’s report gives 
them credibility (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). Impression management techniques 
involve self-serving behaviour to mislead some stakeholders. Therefore, it is urgent to 
investigate whether, during the GFC, managers had incentives to adopt those kinds of 
strategies. Moreover, after the GFC some finance companies around the world were 
bailed-out. Thus, another interesting and potentially insightful field of research that 
could offer knowledge about how these finance companies managed stakeholders’ 
perceptions of corporate reputation seems to be case-studies of adoption of legitimacy-
restoring strategies. 
 
1.5 Conclusions 
The present review of the academic literature on RRD has pinpointed several research 
gaps and indicated future avenues for research. Prior literature indicates that RRD are 
value-relevant to investors. Risk information is communicated to investors with several 
inadequacies that can endanger investment decision making. 
 Compared to non-finance companies, research about RRD by finance companies 
continues to be under-researched. For finance companies, most of the damage of the 
GFC has affected structured finance activities and products. Regulators have 
acknowledged the lack of transparency surrounding these OBS arrangements. From a 
user perspective, the ability to detect disclosures of structured finance activities and 
related products is restricted because: (a) structured finance activities are included in 
disclosures of other financial products; and (b) structured finance products are linked 
frequently to wider transactions and explanations in the context of the whole transaction 
may be missing (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008). Since the GFC (and as a result of the 
G20 agenda of regulatory reform) the FSB, the BIS, the EU, the IASB, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, and the US SEC, have announced their intention to 
improve disclosure transparency. How have the disclosure practices of these structured 
finance activities and products evolved? Have the regulatory reforms improved their 
transparency? Were these reforms enough to achieve the appropriate level of 
transparency? Are investors and readers capturing the appropriate picture of each 
company risk profile? Are other regulatory measures needed? We believe this would be 
another challenging future field of research that could yield additional insights to RRD 
practices. 
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2.1 Introduction 
There have been many calls to reduce asymmetries of access to corporate information 
and to improve the measurement and disclosure of risk-related matters (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Mohobbot, 2005; Szegö, 2002). Such calls have been prompted by the 
inadequacy of risk reporting practices (Solomon et al., 2000).  
Most existing studies of RRD are based on empirical evidence from Anglo-
Saxon, Dutch and Germanic countries (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Carlon et al., 2003; 
Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Kajüter, 2006; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; Lajili, 2007; Linsley & 
Shrives, 2006); French and Latin countries (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Combes-Thuélin 
et al., 2006); Asia-Pacific countries (Amran et al., 2009; Mohobbot, 2005); and Arab 
countries (Hassan, 2009). Generally, these prior studies have found that RRD are vague, 
generic, qualitative, backward looking, and inadequate for the information needs of 
stakeholders.  
Previous literature has focused mainly on explaining RRD in terms of 
stakeholder theory (Amran et al., 2009), institutional theory (Hassan, 2009) or agency 
theory (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Lajili, 2007). The present 
essay is a response to the call by Roberts et al., (2005, p. 6) “for greater theoretical 
pluralism and more detailed attention to board processes and dynamics.” It proceeds by 
proposing a theoretical framework based on a confluence of agency theory, legitimacy 
theory and resources-based perspectives. Such a framework was suggested by Roberts 
et al. (2005) and Aguilera (2005) but has not been used hitherto. This essay uses this 
framework to address the thinness of empirical evidence by analysing disclosures of 
risk exposures and risk management practices in the annual reports for 2005 of non-
finance companies registered by the Portuguese Stock Exchange regulator, Comissão do 
Mercado de Valores Mobiliários [CMVM]. Thus, it aims to ameliorate the 
incompleteness of prior research studies, and do so in the context of a different (and 
under-researched) European Latin country, Portugal. 
In the accounting regulatory setting in Portugal in 2005, Portuguese listed 
companies became obliged to comply with IAS/IFRS and the Modernisation Directive 
(Directive 2003/51/EC) of the European Parliament and Council (enacted into 
Portuguese law by Decree-law 35/2005). These two regulatory initiatives demanded 
extra RRD. A setting of regulatory change such as this has not featured previously in 
descriptive RRD studies of non-finance companies. Findings reported in previous 
 82                                                                   
 
literature relate to periods prior the implementation of IAS/IFRS or the Modernisation 
Directive in 2005. The timing of the present study included in this essay will help to 
determine whether the adoption of these two regulatory initiatives affected the quantity 
and quality of RRD positively. 
The results reveal that the adoption of IAS/IFRS and the Modernisation 
Directive did not affect the quantity and quality of RRD positively. Risk information 
disclosures were mainly vague, generic, qualitative, backward-looking, dispersed 
throughout the annual report, and inadequate for the information needs of stakeholders. 
They confirm the results of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Carlon et al. (2003), Combes-
Thuélin et al. (2006), Kajüter (2006), Lajili and Zéghal (2005), and Linsley and Shrives 
(2006). Important influences on RRD are found to be reputation and litigation costs in 
companies with high public visibility (typically large companies in environmentally 
sensitive industries) and often with high levels of leverage. Agency costs were found 
likely to be reduced by the engagement of a Big4 auditing firm. When considering the 
sub-sample composed only of the 42 listed companies, the monitoring provided by 
independent directors also appeared to reduce agency costs.  
The following section develops an analytical framework to contextualise the 
regulatory setting in Portugal, reviews previous literature, and develops hypotheses for 
testing. Thereafter, this essay outlines the research method, reports the results, and 
presents the conclusions.  
 
2.2 Analytical Framework 
2.2.1 Regulatory background 
For financial years starting on January 1, 2005, Regulation 1606/2002 of the European 
Commission required companies with securities traded on a regulated market to prepare 
consolidated accounts in accord with IAS/IFRS. Accounting treatments for financial 
risks were established by such standards as IAS 1 (Presentation of Financial 
Statements), IAS 32 (Financial Instruments: Presentation) and IAS 39 (Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement). These standards focused mainly on 
financial risk exposures and financial risk management policies. Other risk factors 
which could arise from contingent liabilities or contingent assets were dealt with by IAS 
37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets). IFRS 7 (Financial 
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Instruments: Disclosures) became obligatory after January, 2007, although its adoption 
before 2007 was recommended. 
 In 2005, companies not having securities traded on the Portuguese capital 
market were required to prepare their annual accounts in accord with the Portuguese 
Accounting Plan [PAP]. Additional mandatory RRD were required by Accounting 
Directives [AD] such as AD 17 (Future Contracts), AD 27 (Segmental Reporting), and 
AD 29 (Environmental Issues). Non-finance companies were also required to comply 
with some RRD demanded by corporate governance practice recommendations issued 
by the CMVM.2 Further, in 2005 the enactment into Portuguese law of the 
Modernisation Directive of the European Parliament and Council required companies to 
describe their main risks and uncertainties in the management report. In respect of 
financial instruments companies were required also to describe their financial risk 
exposures and risk management activities related to financial risks.  
In this essay, risk information disclosures are classified as mandatory if they are 
provided as a consequence of an explicit accounting rule or security exchange 
requirement. If the disclosed item involves management’s judgment or discretion in 
terms of materiality and significance, it is classified as voluntary.3  
 
2.2.2 Prior literature on risk-related disclosures 
Several studies have noted the inadequacy and vagueness of RRD. Carlon et al. (2003) 
found that the application of risk reporting requirements related to financial instruments 
was diverse, and that there was a large variation in the content and detail of voluntary 
risk reporting by Australian mining companies. In Italian and Canadian listed 
companies, voluntary RRD were mainly qualitative and focused on past and present 
risks rather than future risks (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005). Linsley 
and Shrives (2006) found that RRD by UK listed companies were mainly qualitative, 
but that they were prone to report forward-looking risk information. Kajüter (2006) 
found that mandatory RRD of German companies in management reports were vague; 
few RRD were precise and detailed; most risks were described insufficiently; and it was 
difficult to distinguish risks in terms of criticality. Some other studies have commented 
                                                 
2 Recommendation 3/2005 requires management to describe the existing internal control system. 
3 The mandatory disclosure requirement in the Modernisation Directive is vague and permits management’s discretion. To 
overcome potential classification problems we considered the disclosures mandatory if they were made in sections of the 
management report specifically devoted to risk management. 
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on the difficulty of assessing company risk profiles because of unstandardized 
presentation of risk in annual reports and because of the dispersal of RRD throughout 
the annual report (Combes-Thuélin et al., 2006; Linsley & Shrives, 2006). 
Studies of motivations for RRD have focused mainly on exploring voluntary 
disclosures of internal controls (Deumes & Knechel, 2008); voluntary RRD in annual 
reports and in Management, Discussion & Analysis [MD&A] sections (Mohobbot, 
2005; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004); mandatory RRD in the management report (Kajüter, 
2006); and voluntary and mandatory RRD in annual reports (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Amram et al., 2009; Hassan, 2009; Lajili, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2006).  
A broad concept of risk is adopted (including downside risk and upside risk) by 
considering whether risk is perceived as a threat (bad news) or as an opportunity to 
mitigate risk (good news). The risk concept includes any opportunity or prospect (or 
any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure) that has affected the economic and 
financial situation of a company or may affect it in the future. Risk is regarded to 
include actions taken to manage, mitigate or deal with any opportunity, prospect, 
hazard, harm, threat, or exposure; and the description and evaluation of internal control 
system effectiveness. Literature indicates that companies make more risk management 
disclosures than risk disclosures in an attempt to promote an image of pro-active 
management (Combes-Thuélin et al., 2006), 
Literature on RRD can be divided into three major groups, according to how the 
dependent variable is measured. As shown in Table 2.1, prior studies have used content 
analysis to build the dependent variable using sentences as the recording unit (Amran et 
al., 2009; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Kajüter, 2006; Lajili, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 
2006; Mohobbot, 2005), or words (Abraham & Cox, 2007), or disclosure indexes 
(Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Hassan, 2009). The present essay uses sentence counts. 
 Motives for RRD have been explained by agency theory, political costs theory, 
stakeholder theory, signalling theory, institutional theory, and a proprietary costs 
perspective (Kajüter, 2006; Mohobbot, 2005). Hassan (2009) used the institutional 
theory notion of social legitimacy; Amran et al., (2009) drew upon stakeholder theory; 
and Abraham and Cox (2007), Deumes and Knechel (2008), and Lajili (2007) used 
agency assumptions to explain motivations for RRD. Table 2.1 presents the explanatory 
variables and empirical findings of each of the major studies. Some conflicting results 
are  revealed.  The  studies  explain  several  identical relationships between explanatory 
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Table 2.1 - Prior literature on determinants of risk-related disclosures based on   
firm’s characteristics 
Words
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(2
00
8)
H
as
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n 
(2
00
9)
Size:
   Total sales + + + + + 0
   Total assets 0 + +
   Market capitalization +
   Total revenues + 0
   Sum of market value of equity and book value of debt +
Leverage/Level of risk:
   Product and geographic diversification 0
   Debt to equity ratio 0 0 0 0 + +
   Asset cover 0
   Beta factor 0 0
   Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity 0 0
   Quiscore 0
   BiE index +
   Innovest EcoValue’21 TM +
   Variance of 60 month stock returns +
Board composition:
   Number of independent non-executive directors + +
 Independent outside directors/total directors +
   Number of non-executive dependent directors 0
   Number of executive directors 0
   Total number of directors +
Ownership structure:
   Minority controlling votes −
   Free-floats +
   In-house managed pension funds −
   Outside managed pension funds 0
   Life assurance funds +
Top 10 shareholder’s holdings, and holdings of 
individuals/foreigners 0
   Shareholdings of non-managers greater than 5% −
   Shareholdings of managers greater than 5% −
Profitability
   Return on assets 0
   Return on equity 0 +
CEO base salary and stock/options 0
Reserves 0
Dual Listing Y Y
Industry Y 0 Y 0 Y Y Y
Foreign subsidiaries/total subsidiaries +
Sales growth per year 0
Book value of inventory/total assets 0
Book value of receivables/total asstes 0
Auditor quality (Big6/5) 0
Explanatory variables
Dependent variable
Sentences Disclosure index
(Y): statistically significant; (+): positive and statistically significant relation; (−): negative and statistically significant relation; (0): no
relation found  
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variables and the dependent variable, but by recourse to different theories. The present 
essay conciliates this theoretical conflict by proposing a theoretical framework that has 
been suggested in prior literature, but not tested: that is, by explaining RRD as being 
grounded in agency theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective (Roberts 
et al., 2005; Aguilera, 2005). 
 
2.2.3 Development of hypotheses 
2.2.3.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory explains how information asymmetry between shareholders, managers 
and creditors can be reduced by monitoring the opportunistic attitudes of managers. 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). If shareholders and creditors do not observe companies’ 
risk management activities directly, they will tend to institute monitoring systems to 
increase the flow of information about those activities, and to reduce uncertainty 
(Linsmeier et al., 2002). In the absence of such monitoring mechanisms, managers seem 
more likely to perform opportunistically by withholding relevant information or by 
manipulating reporting to their advantage by making misleading disclosures (Latham & 
Jacobs, 2000). Four monitoring mechanisms (discussed below) are: the nature of the 
specific ownership structures (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2009; 
Kajüter, 2006; Lajili, 2007); the way the board of directors is composed (especially in 
terms of the number of independent non-executive directors) (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Lajili, 2007; Deumes & Knechel, 2008); the independence  of audit committees (Fraser 
& Henry, 2007), and the type of external auditor appointed (Oliveira et al., 2006).  
 
Ownership Structure 
In more concentrated ownership structures, agency costs are usually lower than in more 
diffuse structures involving outside ownership (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ball et al., 
2000; Deumes & Knechel, 2008). Because larger shareholders play an active role in 
monitoring and controlling a firm, and are more willing to discipline poorly performing 
management, they can mitigate agency costs by intervening actively (Birt et al., 2006). 
Thus, there is less need for RRD. In more diffuse structures, agency problems increase 
because small shareholders find it more difficult to monitor the activities of 
management (Barako et al., 2006), and so greater levels of disclosure are expected. 
However, the literature offers two opposing views of the relationship between 
ownership structure and voluntary disclosure: convergence of interests and management 
87 
 
 
entrenchment.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that when the shareholding of the 
largest shareholder is high, and outside investors perceive that he/she behaves to 
maximize firm value, convergence of interests between them can occur. Outside 
investors will impose fewer contractual constraints on the firm, reducing agency costs. 
Since agency costs are lower there will be weaker incentives for the largest shareholder 
to manipulate or withhold information. There will be incentives to maintain levels of 
disclosure consistent with the maximization of firm value. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is expected between owners’ holdings and disclosure.  
In the case of management entrenchment, Morck et al. (1988) argue that moral 
hazard problems will occur and information asymmetries increase, so that consequently, 
a negative relation between insider holdings and disclosure should be expected.  
Furthermore, Jung and Kwon (2002) present opposing views of the role of 
institutional holders/blockholders: active monitoring and strategic alignment. If 
institutional holders/blockholders are seen as long-term investors they can work as 
effective devices of monitoring management. Thus, a positive relation between their 
shareholdings and disclosure is expected. But under the strategic alignment hypothesis, 
institutional holders/blockholders and owners cooperate, thereby reducing monitoring, 
such that a negative relationship is expected between their holdings and disclosure. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) contend that the relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
ownership structure depends on the investment planning strategies of institutional 
investors. 
  Previous RRD literature has found divergent results. Lajili (2007) and Kajüter 
(2006) found negative relations. Abraham and Cox (2007) found negative and positive 
relations, and Mohobbot (2005) did not find any relation at all.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is an association between concentrated ownership structures 
and the volume of RRD in an annual report. 
 
Independent Non-Executive Directors 
Theoretically, independent non-executive directors monitor the activities of executive 
directors indirectly (Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008). But non-executive directors are 
exposed to higher levels of risk, personally. This is because, by acting as corporate 
outsiders, they usually have little involvement in a company’s daily management (Lim 
et al., 2007). They have incentives to demand the disclosure of more information to 
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balance the levels of risk to their personal reputation. In theory, independent non-
executive directors are not influenced by corporate insiders. Thus, a higher level of 
disclosure can be expected from companies with a higher proportion of independent 
directors (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Consequently, to reduce agency costs, companies 
with a higher percentage of independent directors will be prone to disclose more 
information.  
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between the proportion of 
independent (non-executive directors) on the board and the volume 
of RRD in an annual report. 
 
Audit Committee Independence 
As companies become larger, complex and diversified, it becomes more difficult for 
boards to retain effective control and to manage risks. As a consequence, responsibility 
for control is often delegated to employees. Where such delegation occurs, it is 
understandable that boards would require support from organization-wide monitoring 
mechanisms, such as audit committees (Fraser & Henry, 2007). However, for an audit 
committee to be effective it should be independent and include non-executive directors 
(Turley & Zaman, 2004). Therefore, companies with a higher proportion of non-
executive directors serving on their audit committee are likely to attach greater 
importance to RRD and to the reduction of agency costs.  
 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive association between audit committee 
independence and the volume of RRD in an annual report. 
 
Auditor Type 
Companies with high agency costs tend to contract higher quality auditing firms — the 
Big4 international auditing firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To avoid reputational 
costs to them these larger and well-known auditing firms tend to encourage companies 
to disclose more information (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004). 
 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive association between the engagement of a Big4 
international auditing firm and the volume of RRD in an annual 
report. 
89 
 
 
Leverage 
Companies with high levels of debt tend to be highly leveraged, more speculative and 
riskier. Debt-holders have greater power over the financial structure of such companies. 
From an agency theory perspective, creditors of highly leveraged companies have 
strong incentives to encourage management to disclose more information (Amran et al., 
2009). Most prior literature has not found any significant relationship between RRD and 
leverage (Abraham & Cox, 2005; Amran et al., 2009; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Mohoboot, 2005). A possible explanation is that monitoring information can be 
furnished by means other than in the annual report (Leuz et al., 2004). 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is an association between leverage and the volume of RRD in 
an annual report. 
 
2.2.3.2 Legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective 
 Managers have incentives to increase the transparency of RRD by conforming to rules 
and stakeholder expectations. Relevant stakeholders are interested in RRD because they 
“supply critical resources, place something of value ‘at risk’, and have sufficient power 
to affect the performance of the enterprise” (Post et al., 2002, p. 8, italics applied).  
Resources-based perspectives address the link between a firm’s valuable 
resources and its performance (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006a). To be valuable, resources 
should be difficult to imitate and, therefore, help in developing competitive advantages. 
One such valuable resource is corporate reputation— an intangible asset that is nurtured 
to fulfil stakeholders’ expectations and attract investors and resources (Galbreath, 
2005). Stakeholders “will come to the firm attracted by the information content of its 
reputation” (Sabaté & Puente, 2003, p. 281). Therefore, the economic rationale for 
building corporate reputation is to “reflect the extent to which external stakeholders see 
a firm as ‘good’ and not ‘bad’” (Roberts & Dowling, 2002, p. 1078). 
Like legitimacy, reputation must be gained, maintained or restored (Suchman, 
1995). Greater levels of public visibility imply a greater level of stakeholders’ interest. 
Consequently, greater levels of legitimacy and corporate reputation will be required to 
manage the crucial stakeholders who provide resources to organizations and affect their 
ability to operate (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009). This legitimation process rests 
strongly on the influential perceptions of crucial stakeholders of the firm’s actions and 
activities, based on a specified level of public disclosure (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 
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2009). Disclosure of risk information will help to ameliorate litigation risks and 
potential reputational damages. Thus, legitimacy is maintained through a legitimation 
process to manage corporate reputation and achieve the best interests of stakeholders by 
disclosure (Bebbington et al., 2008). Commonly, proxies for public visibility have 
included size, and industry variables (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a, 2008b).  
 
Size 
Brammer and Pavlin (2008, p. 124) argue that “larger firms (...) tend to be more visible 
to relevant publics [crucial stakeholders].” It is likely that larger companies will 
consider RRD as a way to enhance corporate reputation through disclosure. This is 
because greater levels of public visibility imply a closer scrutiny from stakeholders 
(Amram et al., 2009; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a).  
 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive association between company size and the volume 
of RRD in a company annual report. 
 
Environmental Sensitivity 
Risks are firm-specific (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004). Manufacturing industries and 
politically and environmentally sensitive industries (such as oil, gas, or high 
technology) are prone to disclose more information (Brammer & Pavlin, 2008; Cooke, 
1992; Hannifa & Cooke, 2002). Environmentally sensitive companies have greater 
social pressures in terms of stakeholder scrutiny. Managers of such companies have 
incentives to make more RRD to influence stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate 
reputation and management skills. 
 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive association between the level of environmental 
sensitivity in an industry and the volume of RRD in the annual 
reports of companies in that industry. 
 
2.2.3.3 Control variables 
Company Listing Status 
Company listing status has been used as a proxy for public visibility (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006b; Leventis & Weetman, 2004). Listed companies are considered to be 
more visible than other companies, they tend to receive more attention from the general 
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public and are subject to more extensive media coverage (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006b). 
But, listed companies usually have greater agency costs (Oliveira et al., 2006; Lopes & 
Rodrigues, 2007). Thus, greater levels of RRD are expected.  
 
Accounting Standards 
The accounting standards adopted can generate different levels of disclosure. Some 
companies included in the sample adopted the PAP, and others adopted IAS/IFRS for 
the first time.  
 
2.3 Research Method 
2.3.1 Sample 
This essay analyses RRD in the consolidated annual reports for 2005 of a sample of 81 
Portuguese companies registered by the CMVM.4 The sample comprised all 42 non-
finance companies listed on the regulated Euronext Lisbon market as at December 31, 
2005, together with 39 non-finance companies not listed on any regulated market. When 
considering corporate governance effects, the sample was reduced to the 42 listed 
companies, since only listed companies are required to disclose a corporate governance 
report.  
 
2.3.2 Dependent variables  
This essay uses content analysis to quantify RRD. This specific measure was formulated 
from categories used by Abraham and Cox (2007) and Lajili and Zéghal (2005). Three 
risk exposure categories were developed: financial risk [FR], non-financial [NFR], and 
risk management framework [RMFW] (Appendix 2.1). These categories were used to 
calculate the dependent variable: RRD level.  
Four semantic properties of the information disclosed were used in the content 
analysis:  
• economic sign (monetary/non-monetary);  
• type of measure (past/future);  
• outlook (good/bad/neutral); and  
• type of disclosure (voluntary/mandatory) (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006).  
                                                 
4 In a few cases, when consolidated accounts were not available, we used annual reports. 
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Abraham and Cox (2007) used words as the recording unit and only analysed the 
narrative content. The present essay assesses the narrative content of the annual reports 
using sentences as the recording unit, in view of the findings of Milne and Adler (1999) 
that sentences are more reliable than words and pages in capturing thematic approaches. 
Information in graphs and tables was coded after establishing specific decision rules 
based on methods used by Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Beattie and Thomson (2007) 
(Appendix 2.2). The RRD level for the jth company was calculated as: 
RRDj = ∑
=
sa
i
ijfr
0
 + ∑
=
sa
i
ijnfr
0
 + ∑
=
sa
i
ijrmfw
0
 
where  
frij = number of financial risk sentences for the sentence attribute i in the jth company;  
nfrij = number of non-financial risk sentences for the sentence attribute i in the jth    
company;  
rmfwij = number of risk management framework sentences for the sentence attribute i in 
the jth company; and 
sa = number of sentence attributes (sa = 24). 
 
To assure the reliability of the content analysis, the methods outlined by 
Krippendorf (2004) were followed. The coding drew upon procedures used by Lajili 
and Zéghal (2005), and Linsley and Shrives (2006). Content analysis of the entire 
sample was performed, informed by his prior coding of an initial sample of five annual 
reports with another (independently operating) coder. The prior coding helped refine a 
set of pre-established decision rules which were then applied to another sample of five 
annual reports that were coded independently by the two coders. Scott’s pi measure of 
inter-rater reliability was 0.81 — a level considered acceptable in analysis of corporate 
report disclosures (Hackston & Milne, 1996).  
  
2.3.3 Independent and control variables  
Table 2.2 presents definitions of independent variables and control variables, together 
with the signs of these variables that are likely to be predicted by agency theory, 
legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective. 
Consistent with Deumes and Knechel (2008), and Lajili (2007) the variables 
shareholdings greater than 10 per cent [TOP10], and minority controlling votes [MCV] 
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Table 2.2 - Definition and predicted signs for independent and control variables 
Variables Definition Predicted 
Sign
Ownership Structure Shareholdings greater than 10%.  ?
Minority controlling votes assessed by the highest proportion of 
voting rights that belong to a single shareholder
?
Independent Non-Executive 
Directorsa
Proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board. +
Audit Committee 
Independence
Proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee. +
External Auditor Quality Dummy variable =1 if auditing firm is a Big 4 firm; 0 otherwise. +
Leverage Debt ratio = total debt to total assets ?
Size Total assets (1003 Euros) +
Total sales (1003 Euros) +
Number of employees +
Environmental Sensitivity Dummy variable = 1 if company belongs to an environmentally 
sensitive industry; 0 otherwise
+
Company Listing Status Dummy variable = 1 if company is listed on one or more regulated
stock exchange markets; 0 otherwise.
+
Accounting Standards Dummy variable = 1 if company adopted IAS/IFRS; 0 otherwise. ?
Panel A: Independent Variables
Agency theory
Legitimacy theory and resources-based prespective
Panel B: Control Variables
a Our definition of independent directors is consistent with Regulation 7/2001, article 1, from CMVM, which does not
permit family members (Regulation 7/2001 from the CMVM, amended by the Regulation 3/2006, states in its 1st article, nº
2, al. (f) that these members must not have any relation, whatsoever, with the owning family).
 
 
are used (assessed by the highest proportion of voting rights that belong to a single 
shareholder) as proxies for ownership structures. These two proxies were highly 
correlated. A principal component analysis was applied and an ownership structure 
index was computed to overcome potential collinearity. Only one component, 
explaining 87 per cent of the total variance, was extracted (Eigenvalue>1). The 
principal components analysis was validated by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy (KMO = 0.50) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2 = 58.67; p ≤ 
0.01). Internal consistency was corroborated by the high level of Cronbach’s Alpha 
(0.85). The component extracted represents a unique composite ownership structure 
index for the jth company:  
OWNERSHIP STRUCTUREj = 0.931*TOP10j + 0.931*MCVj  
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The variable “independent non-executive directors” was proxied by the 
proportion of independent non-executive directors on the board (Deumes & Knechel, 
2008).  
The variable “audit committee independence” was proxied by the proportion of 
non-executive directors to total board members. 
The variable “auditor type” was measured by a dummy variable that was 
assigned 1 if the auditing firm was a Big 4 firm, and 0 otherwise (Deumes & Knechel, 
2008; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Oliveira et al., 2006).  
“Leverage” was measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets (Abraham & 
Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009; Deumes & Knechel, 2008; Hassan, 2009).  
“Size” was assessed using the variables total assets [TA], total sales [TS] and 
number of employees [NE] (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a, 2008b). These size variables 
were highly correlated. Principal component analysis was applied to generate an index 
for size. Only one component, explaining 88 per cent of the total variance, was 
extracted (Eigenvalue > 1). The principal components analysis was validated by the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO = 0.73) and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity (χ2 = 208.03; p ≤ 0.01). Internal consistency was corroborated by the high 
level of Cronbach’s Alpha (0.93). The component extracted represented a unique 
composite size index for the jth company: 
SIZEj = 0.928*TAj + 0.963*TSj + 0.929*NEj 
“Environmental sensitivity” was measured by assigning 1 if the company 
belonged to an environmentally sensitive industry (such mining, oil and gas, chemicals, 
construction and building materials, forestry and paper, steel and other metals, 
electricity, gas distribution and water), and 0 otherwise (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008b). 
A “company’s listing status” was assigned 1 if the company was listed on one or 
more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise. 
“Accounting Standards” was measured by considering the accounting frame of 
reference adopted by each company in 2005. Companies which adopted IAS/IFRS were 
assigned 1, and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
2.3.4 Empirical model 
The estimation models test whether factors associated with agency theory [A] and 
legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective [LRb] affect the volume of RRD in 
company j after controlling for other company-level drivers of disclosure [C]. 
RRDj = f (Aj, LRbj, Cj) + ߭j 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 2.3 (Panel A) identified 3,582 sentences containing RRD: 1,323 were of FR 
factors, 1,860 were of NFR factors, and 399 were of RMFW factors.  
RMFW disclosures included descriptions of risk management systems (usually 
provided in corporate governance reports). Although this type of information is 
important from a legitimacy perspective (Bhimani, 2009) it is unlikely to help readers 
understand whether the internal control system is effective, since it was descriptive, 
generic and often vague. 
The top band of Table 2.3 (Panel A) shows that the total number of sentences of 
bad news disclosure (n=1,548) and good news disclosure (n=1,611) are almost equal. 
These results are at odds with prior findings of higher levels of good news disclosures 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2006). However, they are consistent with agency theory, legitimacy 
theory and resources-based perspectives: that is, managers promote an image of pro-
activity by disclosing almost the same levels of risk and risk management information 
in order to reduce asymmetries (Combes-Thuélin et al., 2006). 
About one third of risk disclosures were followed by discussion of how those 
risks are managed. If markets believe implicitly that “no news is bad news”, and if 
companies did not disclose bad news, this would be interpreted as hiding some 
problems (Lundholm & Winkle, 2006). Therefore, in accord with legitimacy theory and 
resource-based perspectives, managers decrease reputation costs by disclosing bad news 
to increase the credibility of their reporting (Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Skinner, 1994).  
The second band of Table 2.3 (Panel A) shows that backward-looking RRD are 
much more frequent than forward-looking disclosures. These results are consistent with 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) and Lajili and Zéghal (2005), but are inconsistent with 
Linsley  and  Shrives  (2006). These findings are also consistent with legitimacy theory  
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Table 2.3 - Frequencies and differences in the means (medians) of risk-related 
sentence attributes 
Bad News 1,548 751 795 2
Good News 1,611 452 1,009 150
Neutral News 423 120 56 247
Past 3,335 1,205 1,732 398
Future 247 118 128 1
Non-Monetary 2,701 641 1,661 399
Monetary 881 682 199 0
Voluntary 2,189 325 1,695 169
Mandatory 1,393 998 165 230
Total        3,582 1,323 1,860 399
Panel B: Differences in means (medians) of risk-related sentence attributes
Bad news − Good news -0.78 3.69 *** -2.64 -1.83 ***
(3.00) (4.00) *** -(1.00) (0.00) ***
Past − Future 38.12 *** 13.42 *** 19.78 *** 4.90 ***
(32.00) *** (11.00) *** (17.00) *** (2.00) ***
Non-monetary − Monetary 22.47 *** -.51 18.05 *** 4.93 ***
(16.00) *** (0.00) (15.00) *** (2.00) ***
Voluntary − Mandatory 9.83 *** -8.31 *** 18.89 *** -.75
(9.00) *** -(7.00) *** (16.00) *** (1.00)
Paired sample t -tests (Wilcoxon rank tests) are used to test the difference in means (medians).
Difference statistically significant at a: ***0.01 level (two-tailed); **0.05 level (two-tailed); *0.1 level (two-tailed).
Risk -related 
disclosures Financial risk
Non-financial 
risk
Panel A: Frequencies of risk-related categories for each sentence attributes
Risk 
management 
framework
 
 
and resources-based perspectives incentives: backward-looking information usually is 
more reliable and has less potential to harm reputation. 
The third band of Table 2.3 (Panel A) shows a much greater frequency of non-
monetary RRD than monetary disclosures, consistent with Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), 
Lajili and Zéghal (2005), and Linsley and Shrives (2006). About a quarter of all RRD 
are quantitative, divided equally between tabular and narrative disclosures. About three 
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quarters of the tabular information disclosed liquidity difficulties and provided details of 
counterparty default. The desire of managers to engage in non-monetary disclosures 
helps convey understanding of their performance, aids legitimation, and promotes a 
good reputation and image − all in accord with legitimacy theory and resources-based 
perspectives. 
The fourth and bottom band of Table 2.3 (Panel A) shows that voluntary NFR 
disclosures are much greater than mandatory disclosures. From a legitimacy and 
resources-based perspective, NFR disclosures are important: they provide information 
about business risks such as strategic, operational, and environmental risk. This is 
helpful to stakeholders in assessing whether a business is performing according to their 
expectations. Mandatory FR disclosures are significantly greater than voluntary 
disclosures.   
Table 2.3 (Panel B) presents the tests of the differences in the means (medians) 
of risk-related sentence attributes for each risk-related category, and confirms previous 
discussion. 
Table 2.4 shows the mean number of RRD sentences was 44.22 (range 4 to 143, 
s.d. 30.79). Some companies made very few disclosures. Of the 81 company annual 
reports analysed, only two disclosed principal risks and uncertainties clearly. Only 15 
aligned strategy with risk disclosure.  
Generally, most companies did not distinguish between company-specific risks, 
industry-specific risks, and general risks. Only one third of companies discussed risk 
matters in a special section of the management report or in the notes. Only two 
companies included information about negative changes on external ratings; and only 
four entered clear conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal control systems. 
Two companies identified the models used to measure risk (internal scorings, stress 
scenarios, repricing gap and liquidity gap). Three companies disclosed the use of VaR 
(or similar) statistics (Earnings-at-Risk, Cash flow-at-Risk) to measure risk and 
discussed the statistical method used (Monte Carlo simulation or Risk Metrics), the 
range of confidence (95 or 99 per cent), and the holding period (5 days, 10 days or 3 
months). One company disclosed a quantitative VaR threshold. Two companies 
disclosed the results of sensitivity analysis related to foreign currency and interest rate 
risks, but did not explain the methods and assumptions used. In general, the RRD 
seemed perfunctory. They were probably unhelpful in informing investors about the 
impact of each risk factor on company performance. 
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Table 2.4 - Descriptive statistics for the sample firms 
 Unit of measurement N Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation
Mean Skewness
Continuous variables
Risk-related disclosures Number of sentences 81 4.00 143.00 30.79 44.22 1.39
Shareholdings greater than 10% Percentage 81 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.74 -0.93
Minority controlling votes Percentage 79 0.10 1.00 0.29 0.57 0.09
Independent non-executive directors Percentage 42 0.00 0.44 0.17 0.14 0.57
Audit committee independence Percentage 42 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.36 0.59
Leverage Debt ratio 81 0.15 9.47 1.03 0.83 7.70
Total assets 1003 Euros 81 3.57 44,536.12 6,298.35 2,350.27 4.88
Total sales 1003 Euros 81 0.00 22,800.00 3,105.02 1,102.76 5.19
Number of employees Count 81 0.00 68,218.00 9,134.47 3,327.23 5.40
Dummy variables
Frequency Per cent
Auditor type Dummy = 1 81 46 57%
             = 0 35 43%
Environmental sensitivity Dummy = 1 81 44 54%
             = 0 37 46%
Company listing status Dummy = 1 81 42 52%
             = 0 39 48%
Accounting standards Dummy = 1 81 53 65%
             = 0 28 35%
Total 81 100%
Definition of variables:
Shareholdings greater than 10% = percentage of qualified shareholdings greater than 10%; Minority controlling votes = highest
percentage of voting rights that belong to a single shareholder; Independent non-executive director = percentage of independent
non-executive directors in the board; Audit committee independence = percentage of non-executive directors in the audit
committee; Auditor type = 1 if the auditing firm is a Big4 firm, and 0 otherwise; Leverage = ratio of total debt to total assets;
Environmental sensitivity = 1 if the company belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry, and 0 otherwise; Company listing
status = 1 if the company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Accounting standards = 1
if the company adopted IAS/IFRS, and 0 otherwise).
 
Table 2.4 shows that the proportion of independent directors (mean = 0.14) on 
the board is very low compared to the proportion recommended by the CMVM of 0.25. 
The independence of the audit committee (mean = 0.36) is also low, possibly impairing 
RRD. The mean values for ownership structure confirm that Portugal has many family-
dominated companies with a complex network of ownership, and a substantial number 
of shares owned by other companies or one single shareholder (mean = 0.57) (Mota, 
2003). The variables for proportion of independent directors and for audit committee 
independence were only computed for listed companies (N = 42) because only listed 
companies disclose this information in their corporate governance reports.  
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2.4.2 Bivariate analysis 
Pearson correlation coefficients were determined among continuous variables and 
Spearman correlation coefficients were determined between categorical and continuous 
variables, as presented in Table 2.5. The magnitude of the correlation coefficients and 
value inflated factors suggests that multicollinearity is minimal (Table 2.5).  
Correlations between independent variables and RRD are significant (p-value < 
0.01) for independent non-executive directors, audit committee independence, size, 
auditor type, (p-value < 0.05) environmental sensitivity, (p-value < 0.1) ownership 
structure, and leverage, all with signs as predicted. Positive and significant (correlations 
p-value < 0.01) were found between the control variables and RRD.  
 
2.4.3 Multiple regressions 
OLS multiple regressions were used to test the interrelationship between the various 
independent and control variables and RRD. The assumptions underlying the regression 
models were tested for autocorrelation, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, outliers and 
influential observations, and the normality of residuals. Four influential observations 
were removed from the analysis. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lilliefors test suggested 
that the raw dependent variables and the continuous independent variables were not 
distributed normally (Table 2.6). Therefore, before running the regression models, 
dependent variables and continuous independent variables were transformed to normal 
scores using Blom’s transformation (Cooke, 1998).  
Table 2.7 shows that the regression model for listed and unlisted companies is 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) for RRD (adj. R2 = 0.26).5  
RRD is associated positively with size (p-value < 0.01), environmental 
sensitivity (p-value < 0.05), auditor type (p-value < 0.1), leverage (p-value < 0.1), and 
company listing status (p-value < 0.1). Hypotheses H4, H5, H6 and H7 are supported. 
According to legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective, larger companies, and 
companies with higher levels of environmental sensitivity, disclose more risk-related 
information to manage stakeholders’ perceptions about how well corporate reputation 
has been managed. 
 
                                                 
5 The exclusion of outliers and influential observations improved the explanatory power of the regression model. 
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Table 2.6 - Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Lilliefors) tests of normality 
K-S statistic p-value K-S statistic p-value
Risk-related disclosures 81 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.20
Ownership structure 42 0.10 0.20 0.07 0.20
Independent non-executive directors 42 0.36 0.00 0.35 0.00
Audit committee independence 42 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.00
Leverage 81 0.36 0.00 0.01 0.20
Size 81 0.35 0.00 0.01 0.20
df Tansformed data Untransformed data
 
According to agency theory, leveraged companies, and companies audited by Big4 
auditing firms, disclose more risk-related information to reduce agency costs. Listed 
companies disclose more risk-related information than unlisted companies — this can 
be explained either by legitimacy theory or agency theory.  
The variable, accounting standards, is not statistically significant. The adoption 
of IAS/IFRS did not affect levels of RRD positively. 
Prior literature has found positive and significant associations between RRD and 
independent non-executive directors (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Lajili, 2007). Using the 
sub-sample of the 42 listed companies, Table 2.7 shows that the regression model is 
significant (p-value < 0.01) for RRD (adj. R2 = 0.32). RRD is associated positively with 
independent non-executive directors (p-value < 0.05). This supports H2. According to 
agency theory, independent non-executive directors are important in reducing agency 
costs. This may be the reason why H1 is not supported. In an encouraging sign, it 
appears they are pressing for disclosure even in companies with concentrated 
ownership. H3 (audit committee independence) was not supported. But, in most cases, 
the non-executive director members of the audit committee were independent.  
Table 2.8 summarises the results of the hypothesis testing. Public visibility (size 
and environmental sensitivity) is associated positively with total RRD, consistent with 
the legitimacy and resources-based perspectives adopted in this paper. The variables 
leverage and auditor type are positively associated with total RRD, as is independent 
non-executive directors, but in listed companies only. This result is consistent with 
agency theory. 
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Table 2.7 - Results of regression model for risk-related disclosures 
Intercept -0.59 -(2.60) ††† -0.11 -(0.32)
Ownership structure ? -0.04 -(0.31) 0.17 (0.79)
Independent non-executive directors + 0.43 (1.13) **
Audit committee independence + 0.34 (2.57)
Auditor type + 0.35 (1.48) * 0.32 (0.88)
Leverage ? 0.19 (1.89) † -0.01 -(0.03)
Size + 0.31 (2.53) *** 0.10 (0.34)
Environmental sensitivity + 0.42 (2.06) ** 0.43 (1.56)
Company listing status + 0.54 (1.65) *
Accounting standards ? -0.19 -(0.57)
R 2 (F-stat) 0.33 (4.90) ††† 0.44 (3.62) †††
Adj. R 2 0.26 0.32
Durbin-Watson 2.32 2.05
Max. VIF 2.88 3.71
N 77 40
Regression models: RRDj  = f  (Aj , LRbj , Cj ) + υj
Definition of variables:
Significant at the: ***0.01 level (one-tailed); **0.05 level (one-tailed); *0.1 level (one-tailed)
Significant at the: †††0.01 level (two-tailed); ††0.05 level (two-tailed); †0.1 level (two-tailed)
Dependent and independent continuous variables were normalised using Blom's transformation. Figures in
parentheses are t -satistics. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, when necessary. 
Ownership structure = principal components analysis (Shareholdings greater than 10%; Minority controlling
votes); Independent non-executive director = percentage of independent non-executive directors in the board;
Audit committee independence = percentage of non-executive directors in the audit committee; Auditor type = 1 if
the auditing firm is a Big4 firm, and 0 otherwise; Leverage = ratio of total debt to total assets; Size = principal
components analysis (Total assets; Total sales; Number of employees); Environmental sensitivity = 1 if the
company belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry, and 0 otherwise; Company listing status = 1 if the
company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Accounting standards = 1 if
the company adopted IAS/IFRS, and 0 otherwise).
Variables
Pred. 
Sign Listed and unlisted 
companies
Listed companies
Risk-related disclosures
  
 
Results for ownership structure are consistent with Abraham and Cox (2007), 
Bushee and Noe (2000), and Mohobbot (2005), all of whom did not find any relation 
between ownership structure and RRD. Abraham and Cox (2007) and Bushee and Noe 
(2000) conclude that non-significant results are related to the investment planning 
strategies of institutional investors.  
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Table 2.8 - Summary of the results from the hypotheses testing  
Variables Predicted signal Risk-related disclosures
Ownership structure ? Not significant
Independent non-executive directors + Significanta
Audit committee independence + Not significantb
Auditor type + Significant
Leverage ? Significant and positive
Size + Significant
Environmental sensitivity + Significant
a, b These significant relations have been found in listed companies. Only these companies disclosed information
about the number of independent non-executive directors and composition of audit committees in their corporate
governance reports.  
 
The non-significant relation between RRD and audit committee independence is 
consistent with Turley and Zaman (2004) who report that the effect of audit committee 
in controlling agency costs associated with high leverage is inconclusive. From the 
viewpoint of Fraser and Henry (2007) the contribution of audit committee independence 
to enterprise risk management is unclear. This corroborates Spira’s (2003) call for more 
research to investigate the benefits of audit committees.  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
The results support explanations of RRD that are based on a combination of agency 
theory, legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives. Public visibility, assessed 
by size and environmental sensitivity, is a crucial part of company strategy to enhance 
legitimacy and manage corporate reputation through disclosure of risk-related 
information. Additionally, agency costs associated with leverage and the engagement of 
a Big4 international auditing firm are also important in explaining RRD. Based on an 
analysis of 42 listed companies, it is concluded that independent non-executive directors 
are important in reducing agency costs in terms of RRD. 
The results also confirm that the adoption of high quality accounting standards 
(IAS/IFRS) did not improve the quantity of RRD. Similarly, the adoption of the EU 
Modernisation Directive did not improve the quality of RRD. The study included in this 
essay reveals Portuguese companies in the non-finance sector adopted generic RRD 
practices lacking in comparability and transparency. Consequently, reader usefulness is 
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impaired. This is consistent with prior research that has found a special focus on 
qualitative RRD (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 
2006) and backward-looking RRD (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005). 
However, the results differ from Linsley and Shrives (2006). In a UK context, they 
found RRD focused on forward-looking and good news information. The difference can 
be attributed to the divergent environmental contexts of the studies: there is far less 
emphasis on investors’ interests and the information needs of securities markets in 
Portugal than in the UK. 
By reporting mainly qualitative and backward-looking RRD, Portuguese 
managers reduce exposure to litigation costs. Although quantitative and forward-
looking information would be more relevant to decision needs, such disclosure is less 
common because of potential inaccuracy and exposure to litigation costs.  
The results reported should be useful to accounting and risk regulators by 
providing information about the inadequacies of RRD in Portugal and yield a more 
complete picture of risk components and determinants. In thinking about risk in global 
terms, not only should agency variables be considered but factors associated with 
visibility, legitimacy and reputation as well. 
Several limitations should be noted. First, subjectivity in the coding instrument 
is likely to affect reliability. Second, it would be useful to supplement results with 
results obtained using a qualitative research method (such as interviews). Third, 
information about risk can be provided in sources other than annual reports, such as 
interim reports, press-releases, web sites, or prospectuses. Fourth, this essay is confined 
to a year/one country analysis, and it pre-dates the global financial crisis [GFC] of 2008 
and the operationalization of IFRS 7 in January, 2007. Future research should analyse 
the years before, during and after the turmoil caused by the GFC.  
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Appendix 2.1 – Risk-related disclosure categories 
Financial risk-related categories: 
 − Solvency risk 
− Market and liquidity risks 
− Credit risk 
  
Non-financial risk-related categories: 
 − Strategic risk 
− Environmental risk 
− Government regulation risk 
− Operational risk 
− Political risk 
− Technology risk 
− Accounting risk 
  
Risk management framework categories: 
 − Risk identification and definitions 
− Risk management policies and objectives 
− Description of internal control structure 
Definition of risk-related categories: 
Solvency risk: potencial for bankruptcy. Market and liquidity risks: changes in interest rates and in currency rates, 
liquidity difficulties, and changes in financial instruments value. Credit risk: credit risk exposure, past due and 
impaired assets. Strategic risk: changes in competition, number of products sold by customer, loss of market share. 
Environmental risk: environmental incidents, environment laws and regulations. Government regulation: changes in 
government control, regulation and taxation. Operational risk: technical failures, accidents, human error, loss of key 
employees. Political risk: conducting business internationally. Technology risk: rapid technological change. 
Accounting risk: application of accounting rules. 
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Appendix 2.2 – Decision rules 
 
− The recording unit is the sentence, but the context unit is the paragraph. 
− To identify risk disclosures a broad definition of risk shall be adopted, as explained below. 
− Sentences are to be coded as RRD if the reader is: a) informed of any opportunity or 
prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has already affected the 
economic and financial situation of the company or may affect it in the future; b) informed 
of any action to manage, mitigate or deal with any opportunity, prospect, hazard, harm, 
threat, or exposure, or to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal controls systems; 
− The risk definition just stated shall be interpreted such that “good” and “bad” risks and 
uncertainties will be deemed to be contained within the definition. 
− Disclosures must be stated specifically, not implied. 
− Risk disclosures shall be classified according to categories established. 
− Sentences of general policy concerning definitions of risk, internal control and risk 
management systems (such as those mandated by the Corporate Governance requirement of 
CMVM) shall be classified as “non-monetary/neutral/ (…).” 
− Sentences of general policy concerning other risk management activities shall be classified 
as “non-monetary/neutral/ (…).” 
− Sentences shall be classified as “past” if they relate to past/present events or circumstances 
in relation to the balance sheet date. Otherwise, they shall be classified as “future” if they 
relate to future events or circumstances. 
− Monetary risk disclosures either disclose directly the financial impact of a risk or disclose 
sufficient information to enable the reader to calculate the financial impact of a risk. 
− Sentences with more than one possible classification shall be split into text units, according 
to specific context, and classified independently (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). 
− If a sentence has more than one possible classification, but cannot be split, the classification 
shall be made according to the category/attribute most emphasised within the sentence. 
− Tables (quantitative and qualitative) that provide risk information should be interpreted as 
one sentence per line and classified accordingly (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). 
− Any disclosure that is repeated shall be recorded as a risk disclosure sentence each time it is 
disclosed. 
− If a disclosure is too vague in its reference to risk, then it shall not be recorded as a risk 
disclosure. 
− Figures, graphs and reports from external entities (inserted in specific boxes), related to risk 
information, shall be recorded as a risk disclosure sentence (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). 
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Appendix 2.3 – Companies in the sample 
 
A. Silva & Silva, SGPS, SA           
Altri, SGPS, SA                      
Auto Industrial, SA           
Brisa - Auto-estradas de Portugal, SA                      
Celulose do Caima, SGPS, SA                      
Cimpor - Cimentos de Portugal, SGPS, SA                     
Cin - Companhia Industrial do Norte, SA                        
Cipan - Companhia Industrial Produtora de Antibióticos, SA       
CMP - Cimentos Maceira e Pataias, SA 
Cofaco - Comercial e Fabril de Conservas, SA                     
Cofina, SGPS, SA                     
Companhia Industrial de Resinas Sintécticas, CIRES, SA                      
Companhia Nacional de Fiação e Tecidos de Torres Novas, SA           
Compta - Equipamentos e Serviços, SA                     
Conduril - Construtora Duriense, SA                   
Copan - Companhia Portuguesa de Amidos, SA                      
Corticeira Amorim, SGPS, SA          
EDP, SA                        
Efacec Capital, SGPS, SA             
Electricidade dos Açores, SA                        
Estoril Sol, SGPS, SA                
F.Ramada - Aços e Indústrias, SA 
Fenalu - Gestão de Investimentos e Participações, SA 
Fisipe - Fibras Sintécticas de Portugal, SA                     
Futebol Clube do Porto - Futebol, SAD                       
Galp Energia, SGPS, SA               
GDP - Gás de Portugal, SGPS, SA            
Gescartão, SGPS, SA                  
Gestnave - Prestação de Serviços, SA                   
Grupo Media Capital, SGPS, SA        
Grupo Soares da Costa, SGPS, SA            
Ibersol, SGPS, SA                    
Imobiliária Construtora Grão Pará, SA              
Impresa, SGPS, SA                    
Inapa - Investimentos, Participações e Gestão, SA                      
Jerónimo Martins, SGPS, SA           
Lisboagás - Sociedade Distribuidora de Gás Natural de Lisboa, SA                  
Lisgráfica - Impressão e Artes Gráficas, SA                 
Lithoformas Portuguesa, SA            
Modelo Continente, SGPS, SA          
Mota-Engil, SGPS, SA                 
Nova Base, SGPS, SA                  
Oliveira & Irmão, SA         
Papelaria Fernandes - Indústria e Comércio, SA        
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Pararede, SGPS, SA                   
Parpública - Participações Públicas, SGPS, SA                 
Parque Expo 98, SA             
Portucel - Empresa Produtora de Pasta e Papel, SA                   
Portugal Telecom, SGPS, SA           
PT Multimédia - Serviços de Telecomunicações e Multimédia, SGPS, SA              
Rações Progado Centro Sul, SA 
RAR - Sociedade de Controle, SA                        
Reditus, SGPS, SA                    
Refer - Rede Ferroviária Nacional, EPE                      
SAG - Soluções Automóveis Globais, SGPS, SA                        
Salvador Caetano - Indústrias Metalúrgicas e Veículos de Transporte, SA           
Secil - Companhia Geral de Cal e Cimentos, SA                      
Semapa - Sociedade de Investimento e Gestão, SGPS, SA                     
Sociedade Águas da Curia, SA 
Sociedade Comercial Orey Antunes, SA       
Sociedade Figueira Praia, SA 
Sociedade Turística da Penina, SA   
Sodim, SGPS, SA                      
Solverde, SA                   
Sonae Industria, SGPS, SA            
Sonae Sierra, SGPS, SA               
Sonae, SGPS, SA                      
SonaeCom, SGPS, SA                   
Sotave - Sociedade Têxtil dos Amieiros Verdes, SA                     
Sport Lisboa e Benfica - Futebol, SAD    
Sporting - Sociedade Desportiva de Futebol, SAD                  
STCP - Sociedade de Transportes Colectivos do Porto, SA                       
Sumolis - Companhia Industrial de Frutas e Bebidas, SA                    
Teixeira Duarte - Engenharia e Construções, SA            
Tertir - Terminais de Portugal, SA                     
Transinsular - Transportes Marítimos Insulares, SA               
Transtejo - Transportes do Tejo, SA 
Unicer - Bebidas de Portugal, SGPS, SA                     
Vista Alegre Atlantis, SGPS, SA      
Vista Alegre Participações, SA 
Vodafone Portugal - Comunicações Pessoais, SA                   
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Essay 3 
 
Risk-related disclosure practices in the annual reports of 
Portuguese credit-granting institutions: an exploratory study 
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3.1 Introduction  
The GFC of 2008 has reinforced the importance for investors and regulators to subject 
the quality of RRD in the banking sector to close scrutiny. Even before the GFC, the 
inadequacies of RRD in annual reports had been a matter of public debate. In 2007, 
Woods (2007) drew attention to variations in the level and usefulness of risk-related 
information disclosed by companies. In 2008, the Financial Stability Forum [FSF] 
emphasised that the banking sector often failed to disclose the magnitude of risk 
associated with bank products in a clear and easily accessible way (Financial Stability 
Forum, 2008), prompting observations that there was “a failure in confidence” in the 
financial system (Heap, 2008, p. 34). 
Although new breadth has been brought to risk reporting practices by IFRS 7 
(Financial Instruments: Disclosures), the lack of transparency in risk reporting 
disclosures of banks, found in periods before to the adoption of  IFRS 7 (Avram & 
Skully, 2007; Boussanni et al., 2008; Chipalkatti & Datar, 2006; Frolov, 2006; Hirtle, 
2007; Linsley et al., 2006; Pérignon et al., 2008; Pérignon & Smith, 2010; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006; Woods et al., 2008a, 2008b; Woods & Marginson, 
2004; Yong et al., 2005) has persisted in studies conducted after the adoption of IFRS 7 
(Bischof, 2009; Ernst & Young, 2008a; KPMG, 2008, 2009; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2008). However, in these studies, the sample sizes analyzed are usually small, and  only 
a part of the broad array of financial institutions affected by the GFC (that is, banks) are 
studied. To address this, this essay analyzes 190 PCIs, including banks.6  
Market-based measures (such as market capitalization or total assets) are an 
inappropriate means for evaluating the visibility of credit-granting institutions. 
Although  the subprime crisis of 2007 resulted in widespread increases in the total 
assets of financial intitutions (Bischof, 2009), in the aftermath of the GFC many  
reported that their loan books were worth much less than book value, even though 
governments continued to classify them as “well capitalized” (Weil, 2009). On the other 
hand, market “prices may not always reflect true fundamental values. (...) [and] a 
liquidity crunch can affect market prices” (Laux & Leuz, 2009, p. 828). In addition, 
market prices only incorporate “investors’ viewpoints on company performance, thus 
                                                 
6 Three quarters of our sample is composed by banks. They are special because of their interconnectedness. A collapse of one 
institution creates a wave of uncertainty among the others (The Economist, 2008). Consequently, other entities that are not 
classifiable as banks (but which pursue similar activities) were affected also by the GFC. The present study seeks to understand the 
RRD practices of credit-granting institutions as a whole. 
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ignoring other crucial stakeholder groups”, such as depositors, borrowers and regulators 
(Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a, p. 167).   
The present essay uses the number of branches to proxy for the visibility of 
PCIs. The choice of this proxy is influenced by data showing that, since 2006, the 
number of branches of credit-granting institutions per 100,000 inhabitants has been 
almost three times greater in Portugal than in European Common Law countries (UK, 
Ireland and Netherlands). Further, among European Latin countries, Portugal has the 
highest growth rate in number of bank branches (European Central Bank, 2010). The 
“consumer-oriented” nature of PCIs implies an inherent coupling between their business 
practices and public interest. Greater levels of public visibility imply a greater level of 
stakeholders’ interest, and a greater need to heed stakeholders’ expectations (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008a). Therefore, one way to proxy these interactions (and the public 
visibility of these institutions) is through the number of branches they operate. 
This essay focuses on the usefulness of mandatory and voluntary RRD in the 
individual annual reports for 2006 of 190 credit-granting institutions (not only banks) 
registered by the Portuguese Central Bank. The four qualitative characteristics of 
financial statements, enunciated in the IASB’s conceptual framework for accounting, 
are invoked to assess usefulness: relevance, reliability, understandability and 
comparability.7 The first focal aspect of the essay is RRD required in IFRS 7. The 
second focal aspect is operational risk, capital structure and adequacy disclosures, and 
levels of adherence to Basel II (Pillar III) requirements prior to the legal enactment of 
those requirements.   
Results reveal that the adoption of IAS/IFRS in Portugal has led to more risk-
related information being disclosed than is required by the Portuguese Accounting Plan 
for the Banking Sector [PAPBS]. Transparency across the sampled companies was 
impaired by comparability difficulties, inability to understand narratives, failure of 
narratives to explain numerical disclosures, and lack of disclosure of all mandated risk-
related matters in annual reports. The transparency problems in PCIs in the pre-GFC 
period were very similar to those found in Anglo-Saxon studies (Avram & Skully, 
                                                 
7 Information is relevant if it has predictive and confirmatory values. Reliable information must be free from material error and bias 
and faithfully represent reality. Information is understandable if complex and relevant matters are not excluded from financial 
statements because they are too difficult for readers to understand. Therefore, efforts to include definitions, glossaries or other forms 
of detail would improve understandability. Comparability can be assessed over time or across different companies in terms of 
relative financial position, performance, and risk profiles (such as the amount of disclosure, the maturity profile of assets, 
measurement models, and risk management policies). 
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2007; Chipalkatti & Datar, 2006; Hirtle, 2007; Linsley et al., 2006; Pérignon et al., 
2008; Pérignon & Smith, 2010; Woods & Marginon, 2004). 
Findings indicate that there is a possibility that sub-optimal levels of mandatory 
RRD will persist after the adoption of IFRS 7 and its recent amendments focusing on 
fair value and liquidity risk. Consequently, findings should inform future attempts to 
improve accounting regulation. This essay argues that accounting, banking and financial 
market regulators should collaborate to require a consistent disclosure model that 
improves comparative financial information. Further, the persistence of RRD 
deficiencies reported after the adoption of IFRS 7 suggests that the G20 
recommendations (that led to the Basel II Accord reforms, the Capital Requirements 
Directive [CRD], and IFRS 7 amendments) will lead to a “socially desirable” flow of 
information only if appropriate enforcement mechanisms are instituted to assure 
compliance with minimum disclosure requirements.  
The following section develops an analytical framework and briefly 
contextualises the regulatory setting in Portugal. Thereafter, the essay explains the 
research method, describes the sample, and reports the results, conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
3.2 Analytical Framework 
3.2.1 Regulatory background 
PCIs are supervised by accounting rules and reporting requirements issued by the 
Portuguese Central Bank. For listed companies, some risk-related corporate governance 
disclosures are required by the CMVM. In addition, Article 66 of the Portuguese 
Companies’ Code (Código das Sociedades Comerciais) requires companies to disclose 
their main risks and uncertainties in the management report. Although Article 66 
focuses on financial risks, it also requires disclosure of information about environmental 
risks, operational risks and risk management activities related to financial risks. 
For financial years starting on January 1, 2005, Regulation 1606/2002 of the 
European Commission requires companies whose securities are traded on a regulated 
market to prepare consolidated accounts in accord with IAS/IFRS. From 2005, the 
Portuguese Central Bank supervised the application of Regulation 1606/2002 in the 
banking sector. The accounting frame of reference from 2005 onwards was as follows: 
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a) In 2005, listed and non-listed companies (except for Mutual Agricultural Credit 
banks [MACBs]) in a regulated market were required to adopt adjusted 
IAS/IFRS or Instruction 4/96 (PAPBS) in their individual accounts. After 
January, 2006, they were required to adopt adjusted IAS/IFRS. 
b) In 2005, MACBs were required to adopt Instruction 4/96 (PAPBS) in their 
individual accounts. In 2006, they were required to adopt Instruction 4/96 
(PAPBS) or adjusted IAS/IFRS; and after January, 2007 they were required to 
adopt adjusted IAS/IFRS. 
 
Therefore, in reporting risk-related information in 2006, PCIs (with the 
exception of MACBs) were required to adopt adjusted IAS/IFRS in their individual 
accounts and to comply with the following standards:  
• IAS 1 (Presentation of Financial Statements).8  
• IAS 30 (Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial 
Institutions). 
• IAS 32 (Financial Instruments: Presentation).9  
• IAS 39 (Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement).10  
• IAS 37 (Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets). 
IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures) became obligatory after January, 
2007, although its adoption before 2007 was recommended.  
 
3.2.2 Minimum disclosure requirements 
Under the PAPBS the few disclosure requirements for risk matters relate to accounting 
policies (principally about impaired assets and provisions), credit risk (ageing of assets 
according to maturity dates, details of impaired loans and advances), and liquidity risk 
(maturity analysis of current assets and liabilities). There is no requirement to disclose 
risk management information relating to objectives, policies and control structure. 
                                                 
8 The amendment to IAS 1, adopted by Regulation 108/2006 of the European Parliament (concerning disclosure of information 
necessary to evaluate an entity’s objectives, policies and processes for managing capital), was mandatory  for periods beginning on 
or after 1 January 2007. Earlier application was encouraged. 
9 In 2006, IAS 32 included disclosure requirements about financial risks. IFRS 7 superseded IAS 30 and amended IAS 32 
concerning disclosures of risk-related issues. IFRS 7 relates only to financial risks and requires a deeper level of disclosure than in 
the previous IAS 30 and IAS 32. 
10 IAS 39 was not considered because this study only explores international accounting requirements related to disclosure. 
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Under IAS/IFRS the RRD requirements, described in Table 3.1, are more 
extensive and demanding. 
 
Table 3.1 - Minimum disclosure requirements before and after the adoption of 
IFRS 7  
 
Risk 
Categorya 
Before adoption of IFRS 7  
(IAS 1, IAS 30 and IAS 32) 
After adoption of IFRS 7  
(IAS 1, IFRS 7) 
Genericb Basis of preparation of financial 
statements. 
Specific accounting policies used (such 
as the basis of measurement). 
Description of financial risk 
management objectives and policies. 
Basis of preparation of financial 
statements. 
Specific accounting policies used (such as 
the basis of measurement). 
Description of financial risk management 
objectives and policies. 
Credit Details of movements in any allowance 
for impairment losses and advances 
during the period. 
Aggregate amount of impairment 
losses. 
Maximum credit risk exposures. 
Potential risk concentrations (e.g. by 
industry type). 
Total credit risk exposure and quality. 
Analysis of aged, past due, non-impaired 
assets. 
Analysis of individual impaired financial 
assets. 
Collateral held or repossessed. 
Carrying amounts of renegotiated assets. 
Marketc Interest risk exposure detailed by 
contractual repricing or maturity dates. 
Nature and extent of off-balance sheet 
instruments exposed to interest rate 
risk. 
Repricing gap analysis. 
Sensitivity analysis of how risk 
exposures are managed and controlled. 
Detailed information about VaR models 
(assumptions, parameters and 
limitations). 
Sensitivity analysis for each type of 
market risk. Description of the method, 
assumptions and parameters used. 
Liquidity  Liquidity gap analysis of assets and 
liabilities according to their maturity. 
Maturity analysis for financial liabilities. 
Qualitative disclosures about how 
liquidity risk is managed. 
Capital 
structure and 
adequacy 
 Description of what is managed as 
capital. 
Nature of capital requirements imposed 
externally. 
Description of how capital requirements 
are incorporated into management of 
capital. 
Description of how managing capital 
objectives are met. 
a Disclosures for operational risks are voluntary. IAS/IFRS only regulate financial risks. There are no specific 
disclosure requirements for operational risks. 
b Article 66 of the Portuguese Companies Code requires companies to disclose in the management report their 
financial risk exposures and financial risk management objectives and policies. Therefore, if specific RRD were 
found in the management report sections, these disclosures were considered mandatory. 
c Market risks include interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, equity risk and commodities risk. 
 
Although disclosures are to be provided in the notes, there are instances of cross-
referenced information being provided in the management report, in accord with § B6 
(IFRS 7). Narrative information about financial risk management objectives and 
policies is to be presented in the notes in self-contained risk management sections (IAS 
1.104-5). PCIs adopting either PASBS or IAS/IFRS have to disclose this kind of 
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information in a self-contained section of the management report, as required by Article 
66 of the Portuguese Companies’ Code. 
 
3.2.3 Literature review 
Risk disclosure in corporate annual reports in the banking sector is under-researched 
(Woods et al., 2008a). However, some studies have examined the importance of risk 
disclosure on the market discipline of risk taking in the banking industry. These studies 
confirm that greater disclosure enhances market discipline and that better risk 
management systems attract investors (Nier & Baumann, 2004, 2006; Sensarma & 
Jayadev, 2009). Market discipline is defined as the “actions of shareholders, creditors 
and counterparties of banking companies [stakeholders] that can influence the 
investment, operational and risk-taking decisions of bank managers” (Hirtle, 2007, p. 
2).  
Owing to the increasing complexity of the financial activities pursued by banks, 
and the consequent difficulties in properly monitoring and controlling finance 
companies, supervisory entities have relied on market discipline to assist their oversight. 
“Market monitoring” as a market discipline to limit banks’ systemic risk, is performed 
by stakeholders not covered by financial safety provisions (Bliss & Flannery, 2002; 
Frolov, 2007). The greater the level and quality of disclosure, the greater the ability of 
stakeholders to monitor and assess changes in bank condition, and to incorporate those 
assessments into a firm’s security price if negative changes occur. This monitoring 
mechanism generates market signals that convey useful information to supervisors 
responsible for reducing a bank’s risk exposure (Bliss & Flannery, 2002).  
Usually, a decision to disclose information is based on a consideration of 
offsetting costs and benefits. This raises the question of whether disclosures should be 
mandatory or voluntary.  Mandatory disclosures are desirable if voluntary disclosure 
falls short of the socially optimal level that assures effective market discipline (Frolov, 
2007). The banking industry has a sub-optimal disclosure level because of the costs of 
voluntary disclosure of private information (Verrecchia, 2001). Over-disclosing does 
not compensate banks for the disclosure costs beyond those that are necessary, and thus 
they are “typically cautious to go beyond minimal disclosure requirements” (Frolov, 
2007, p. 183). 
Finance institutions have an array of stakeholders (owners, borrowers, 
depositors, regulators and managers) (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a). They provide 
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necessary goods and services, and their business practices are tied to the public interest 
(Miles, 1987). Therefore, increased public visibility demands extra care in addressing 
stakeholders’ expectations through disclosure. Consequently, a greater level of 
legitimacy will be required through a reputation risk management process (Bebbington 
et al., 2008). Further, the opaque nature of banks’ activities supports Diamond’s (1985) 
argument about how disclosure can reduce the costly acquisition of information, and 
therefore explain how it can be considered a socially desirable good.  Greater levels of 
disclosure can reduce banking instability associated with socially undesirable “runs” on 
banks. 
Consequently, supervisory and regulatory authorities impose socially desirable 
levels of mandatory risk information “as a necessary element of the government’s 
prudential supervision of banks” because of the lack of incentives to voluntarily 
disclose (Frolov, 2007, p. 186). This helps assure the effectiveness of market discipline, 
as higher levels of risk transparency enhance market stability and confidence.11  
Studies of RRD by banks have shown that market discipline or appropriate 
levels of supervisory oversight have been ineffective (Bischof, 2009; Boussanni et al., 
2008; Ernst & Young, 2008a; Hirtle, 2007; KPMG, 2008, 2009; Pérignon et al., 2008; 
Pérignon & Smith, 2010; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Woods et al., 2008a, 2008b; 
Woods & Marginson, 2004; Yong et al., 2005). Standard setters have responded by 
developing high quality standards to improve opaque disclosures, remedy their 
deficiencies, and enforce supervisory mechanisms (see Basel II, second Pillar). Studies 
before and after the adoption of high quality standards have reported conflicting levels 
of effect on risk management disclosures. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006, 2008) found 
that the adoption of IAS/IFRS and IFRS 7 did not significantly affect the disclosure of 
risk management activities. However, Bischof (2009) and Woods et al. (2008a) found 
otherwise. Some studies have also documented conflicting results in terms of 
disclosures of operational risk, and market risk. The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, drawing on the BIS (2001, 2002, 2003) and Helbok and Wagner (2006), 
found increases in the extent and depth of voluntary operational risk disclosure. Avram 
and Skully (2007) found increases in disclosure quality, but a stable level of disclosure 
                                                 
11 Credit risk is of particular importance because it is “regarded as the main contributor to a bank’s overall risk profile” (Khambata 
and Hirche, 2002, p. 108). Risks related to off-balance sheet instruments (where credit risk is important) is a good example of 
information that would improve transparency. Before the GFC, the complexity of these instruments, their off-balance sheet nature, 
and poor regulation often meant that very little information was disclosed by banks (Heap, 2008).  
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quantity. KPMG (2008, 2009) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008) reported that banks 
disclosed information about VaR results. However, broader studies, such as by Yong et 
al.(2005) of 146 Asian Pacific banks, and Bischof (2009) of 153 European banks, reveal 
different results: only a small number of banks disclosed VaR results before and after 
the adoption of IFRS 7.  
 
3.2.3.1 Persistent deficiencies in risk-related disclosure  
Disclosure deficiencies reported before the adoption of IAS/IFRS and IFRS 7 have 
persisted after the adoption of those standards: disclosures have been found to lack 
transparency, be insufficient from a user’s perspective, and be incomparable (Woods 
and Marginson, 2004; Woods et al., 2008a, 2008b). Only a few US bank holding 
companies disclosed information for VaR by type of risk, backtesting, and stress testing 
despite market risk disclosures increasing between 1994 and 2004 (Hirtle, 2007). Only a 
third of risk disclosures by Asia Pacific banks followed the Basel recommendations 
(Yong et al., 2005). Although most banks disclose information about how they measure 
and assess performance in managing market risks, only about one-third reported 
quantitative information on market risk exposure and performance. VaR disclosures 
were not comparable. A low level of disclosure of credit, liquidity, and operational risks 
has been found too – such as lack of disclosure of detailed policies to mitigate credit 
and liquidity risk. Pérignon et al., (2008) and Pérignon and Smith (2010) found 
pervasive and persistent overstatements of VaR results and overuse of historical 
simulation (Pritsker, 2006).  
Boussanni et al., (2008) documented a wide disparity in the level and extent of 
liquidity risk disclosures between European banks. They concluded that disclosures 
about contingency planning and internal controls were insubstantive and incomplete. 
Further, risk disclosures were essentially qualitative (Linsley et al., 2006). These results 
were confirmed by Ernst and Young (2008a), KPMG (2008, 2009), and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008). Other deficiencies were detected in credit risk 
disclosures (different time bands used in ageing analyses of past due assets, lack of 
detailed description of the associated collateral), and liquidity risk disclosures (use of 
generic liquidity risk management statements, misalignment between liquidity risk 
exposure and qualitative disclosures regarding management strategies to deal with those 
exposures, and the absence of sensitivity analysis of liquidity risk exposure). 
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These studies found poor transparency features, including unclear 
communication of the risks being managed (Woods & Marginson, 2004), 
misalignments between key risk topics, imbalances between qualitative and quantitative 
data, undue reliance on statistical estimates to create a false sense of quantitative 
precision (Ernst & Young, 2008b), and non-compliance with minimum mandatory 
requirements (Bischof, 2009).  
 
3.3.3.2 Finance sector preparedness for risk disclosure 
Research from throughout the world reveals a high likelihood that managers and 
banks are ill-prepared to deal appropriately with risk exposures. In the US a minority of 
banks used, or planned to use, in-house models of credit risk management (Fatemi & 
Fooladi, 2006). Most senior managers of Nigerian banks were not fully prepared to 
manage liquidity risk exposure and were not conversant with common methods of 
measuring and managing a bank’s liquidity exposure (Toby, 2006). Spanish saving 
banks lacked good knowledge of the operational risk requirements of the Basel II 
Accord, lacked an efficient organisational structure through which to implement an 
advanced operational risk information system, and had information systems that were 
incapable of responding to the Basel II requirements (Flores et al., 2006). Other surveys 
have reached similar conclusions (Ernst & Young, 2006). Despite a good understanding 
of risk and risk management, staff of banks in the United Arab Emirates could not 
prioritize their main risk efficiently (Al-Tamini & Al-Mazrooei, 2007). Generally, 
Islamic banks are moderately efficient in risk assessment and analysis, risk monitoring 
and identification (Hassan, 2009). The techniques they use predominantly involve 
maturity matching, gap analysis and credit ratings (Ariffin et al., 2009). 
There needs to be stronger acknowledgement by senior management that the 
implementation of the Basel II requirements will lead to a better understanding of a 
bank’s risk profile. Inadequate risk management and corporate governance practices, 
and failure of financial regulators to supervise these practices have been identified as 
important causes for the banking crises in Ireland and Iceland (O’Sullivan & Kennedy, 
2010; Sigurjonsson, 2010). In 2008, a survey of leading banks around the world showed 
that ineffective risk governance, risk reporting, and firm-wide risk expertise were major 
contributors to the GFC (Hashagen et al., 2009).  
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3.3 Research Method 
3.3.1 Sample 
From a population of 298 companies with individual annual reports published in the 
Portuguese Central bank database as at December 31, 2007 a sample of 190 PCIs  was 
drawn (Table 3.2). All Portuguese financial institutions (99 companies) and nine PCIs 
(two financial holding companies with incomplete annual accounts for 2006; four 
MACBs that adopted IAS/IFRS in 2006; and one investment bank and two financial 
holdings that adopted PAPBS in 2006) were excluded.  
 
3.3.2 Method 
Content analysis was used to quantify the risk-related quantitative information and 
narrative information disclosed in the annual reports. All items identified as risk 
disclosures required by IAS 1, IAS 30, IAS 32, IFRS 7 and the third Pillar of the Basel 
II Accord were included.12 There were six risk disclosure categories defined as: 
• risk management objectives and policies: risk identification and definitions, risk 
management policies, and whether there was a comprehensive risk report. 
• credit risk: the potential that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to meet its 
obligations in accordance with agreed terms. Indicated by the amount of credit 
risk exposure, past due and impaired assets, collateral held, and credit risk 
quality. 
• market risk: the risk of losses in on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet positions 
arising from movements in market prices. Indicated by the amount of market 
risk exposure and internal/external risk measurement models. Risks subject to 
this requirement pertain to interest rate-related instruments and equities in the 
trading book; foreign exchange risk and commodities risk throughout the bank. 
• liquidity risk: the risk that the firm will be unable to efficiently meet expected 
and unexpected current and future cash flow and collateral needs without 
affecting its daily operations or financial condition. Indicated by the amount of 
liquidity risk exposure and discussion of funding policies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 These were largely in terms of disclosure requirements for capital structure and adequacy, and operational risk. The Basel II 
Accord became mandatory for PCIs after January, 2007. However, PCIs have been preparing for its adoption since 2004. 
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Table 3.2 - Portuguese Credit-granting Institutions in the sample 
 
Number of companies 
Commercial banks  
   - Mutual Agricultural Credit banks [MACBs]  101 
   - Other  22 
Investment banks 18 
Credit Financial Institutions [CFIs]  15 
Financial holding companies 21 
Other entities 13 
Total 190 
 
The Portuguese finance sector is composed of credit-granting institutions and financial companies. 
Decree-Law 298/92 defines credit-granting institutions as “companies whose business is to receive 
deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own accounts” (Article 
2). Financial companies are “companies that are not credit institutions” (Article 5).  This essay deals 
only with RRD practices of credit-granting institutions.  
 
Owing to the different business goals of banks, they were categorized as commercial banks and 
investment banks.17 Commercial banks deal with checking, savings, and money market accounts. 
They accept deposits and perform lending activities. Investment banks raise capital, trade securities 
and manage corporate mergers and acquisitions. Commercial banks are divided into MACBs, and 
Other banks. Only MACBs have adopted the PAPBS in their individual accounts according to 
Notice 1/2005 of the Portuguese Central Bank. All the other companies have adopted adjusted 
IAS/IFRS rules. 
Credit Financial Institutions are regulated by Decree-Law 186/2002, and are very similar to banks. 
They focus on lending activities, but cannot receive deposits from the public.  
Financial holding companies are registered by the Portuguese Central Bank. They hold and control 
equity shares of PCIs included in the sample. Notice 1/2005 of the Portuguese Central Bank also 
applies to financial holding companies whose subsidiaries are credit or investment companies. To be 
considered a financial holding company their subsidiaries should represent at least 50% of 
consolidated assets. However, the Portuguese Central Bank can propose other criteria.  
Other entities deal with leasing, factoring, and mutual guarantee activities. They include investment 
companies and credit-purchase financing companies not classified as banks or credit financial 
institutions.  
 
• operational risk: the risk of loss resulting from inadequate internal processes, 
people and systems, from external events or from the adaptation of information 
systems to the Basel II requirements. 
• capital structure and adequacy: the measure of a bank’s financial strength and 
stability. Indicated by capital structure and amounts of Tier 1, 2 and 3; capital 
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adequacy for different types of risk exposure and capital ratios; and capital 
adequacy approaches adopted under Basel II. 
 
A binary coding system was used in which a PCI scored 1 if the item was 
reported, and 0 otherwise. Such disclosure scoring is useful in measuring the extent of, 
and variations in, reporting practices (Woods et al., 2008a).14 The information about the 
location of disclosures in the annual report, narratives, and information included in 
graphs and tables was coded. Content analysis of the entire sample was performed, 
informed by a prior coding of an initial sample of four annual reports with another 
(independently operating) coder. An inter-coder reliability test was undertaken 
(Krippendorff, 2004) to measure the scale of coding errors (Scott’s pi = 86%). Such a 
level has been considered “an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability” in analysis of 
corporate report disclosures (Hackston & Milne, 1996, p. 87). 
 
3.4 Results  
3.4.1 Accounting and risk management objectives and policies 
PCIs with the lowest frequencies of narrative disclosures about risk-related information 
are those in which Portuguese accounting rules were adopted (that is, the MACBs) 
(Table 3.3). These results corroborate the view that the adoption of IAS/IFRS has led to 
a greater amount of RRD (Woods et al., 2008a; Bischof, 2009). However, the location 
of these disclosures is not uniform. Other commercial and investment banks and Credit 
Financial Institutions [CFIs] usually discuss risk in specific sections of the annual 
report. But, financial holding companies and other entities show lower levels. The 
information is dispersed throughout the annual report, impairing understandability. 
Similar results have been found for periods before and after the adoption of IFRS 7 
(KPMG, 2008, 2009; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Woods et al., 2008a; Woods & 
Marginson, 2004). 
Another surprising result is the low frequency of disclosure of risk management 
policies and control structure in financial holding companies, despite extended 
disclosures at a consolidated level. 
Of the PCIs that adopted IAS/IFRS in their individual annual reports, the highest 
level of disclosure was by other commercial banks, investment banks, and CFIs. 
However,  the  quality  of  risk  reporting  practices  varied  widely. At one extreme, two 
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Table 3.3 - Portuguese Credit-granting Institutions with narrative disclosures 
about risk-related information in risk management sections 
MACBs Other commercial Investment CFIs
Financial 
holdings
Other 
entities
% % % % % %
Key 0 23 17 27 5 8
Generic 0 73 83 67 43 38
Risks 0 82 78 67 38 38
Other 0 27 17 0 5 0
Credit risk 0 91 89 73 19 23
Market risk 0 82 78 27 24 0
Liquidity risk 0 82 67 33 19 8
Operational risk 0 50 44 47 10 15
Credit risk 0 73 78 67 14 38
Market risk 0 68 83 20 14 15
Liquidity risk 1 59 67 27 10 15
Operational risk 0 27 44 33 10 15
Management report 0 64 44 27 33 23
Notes 0 91 100 80 52 54
Risk management sections
Risks identified
Definitions
Risk management policies followed
Overall control structure
Banks
 
commercial banks provided comprehensive risk reports. These defined and reported key 
risks, the overall control structure for each risk factor, the risk management policies 
followed, the risk measurement models used to assess each risk factor, and discussed 
some strategic objectives. At the other extreme, several entities merely indicated they 
had risk exposures but did not explain further — they only provided risk definitions or 
detailed the overall control structure. Moreover, there was a lack of clarity in risk 
management statements, consistent with previous research (KPMG, 2008; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Woods & Marginson, 2004). This made it difficult to 
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assess a company’s risk exposure appropriately. There was no clear identification of key 
risks. Some companies used undefined financial jargon (such as VaR, stress test, 
backtest, and sensitivity analysis).  
 
3.4.2 Credit risk 
Except for financial holding companies, mandatory information required by IAS 30 and 
IAS 32 was provided by all PCIs (Table 3.4, Panel A). This included information about 
the size of credit risk exposure and past due and impaired financial assets. Thereby, this 
helped to assure comparability, confirming research by PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(2008). However, understandability was impaired because narrative explanations of 
numerical information were less than expected. 
There were differences in the detailing of credit risk exposure and past due 
impaired financial assets. Disclosure of risk concentrations (by industry sector) was 
lower. The information most disclosed was aggregated information, possibly because it 
was less costly to produce than non-aggregated information, and has lower proprietary 
costs. Owing to their inherent proprietary nature, and the pre-GFC period of analysis, 
the size of collateral and the discussion of credit risk exposure show lower and different 
levels of disclosure. There were no disclosures for renegotiated assets. As these are 
voluntary disclosures, a possible explanation for the lower levels of disclosure is that 
banks are “typically cautious to go beyond minimal disclosure requirements” (Frolov, 
2007, p. 183). The disclosure level for companies adopting Portuguese accounting rules 
(the MACBs) were lower than for those adopting IAS/IFRS. Despite this difference, the 
disclosures are consistent and comparable. 
Among adopters of IAS/IFRS, there were higher levels of disclosure in other 
commercial and investment banks, and CFIs, than in other entities. For commercial 
banks and CFIs, there were higher levels of narrative explanation of risk exposure, past 
due/impaired assets, and credit risk quality.13 The levels of disclosure were higher than 
those found by Bischof (2009) in European commercial banks after the adoption of 
IFRS 7. Moreover, the disclosures approximated IFRS 7 requirements, except for the 
size of collateral held and renegotiated assets. Commercial banks and CFIs also seemed 
to prepare their credit risk information according to Basel II rules, since credit risk 
                                                 
13 Widely used credit risk quality indicators were: past due ratio, coverage ratio, non performing loans and loan-to-value. Their 
disclosure levels across all PCIs are very different. 
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information by type of credit exposure, geographic distribution, industry type, and 
residual contractual maturity, was at high levels. 
 
Table 3.4 - Portuguese Credit-granting Institutions with credit risk disclosures in 
annual reports 
MACBs Other commercial Investment
% % % % % %
Panel A: Frequent credit risk reporting pratices
Size of credit risk exposure 99 100 100 100 29 100
Narrative explanations of numerical disclosures 1 59 56 80 0 46
Size of past due and impaired assets 100 100 100 100 33 92
Narrative explanations of numerical disclosures 0 27 22 33 0 31
Size of collateral (other enhancements held) 98 41 39 27 5 8
Credit risk quality
Discussion of credit risk indicators 60 82 28 53 29 8
Summary of internal rating systems 2 73 39 67 19 8
Panel B: Comparability problems in credit risk reporting practices 
Size of credit risk exposure
By industry sector (maturing and past due assets) 0 27 17 7 0 8
By maturing assets
Prior year groups (up to 1 year) 0 5 0 0 0 15
Prior year groups (up to 2 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year groups (up to 3 years) 0 0 6 7 0 0
Prior year groups (up to 5 years) 1 9 22 33 0 15
Prior year groups, with qualitative groups 97 41 22 20 0 46
No prior year groups (up to 5 years) 0 9 0 7 0 0
No prior year groups, with qualitative groups 0 14 17 0 0 0
Aged past due assets (time bands)
Prior year groups, only 11 32 33 27 0 8
Prior year groups (up to 1 year) 0 9 6 0 0 15
Prior year groups (up to 3 years) 0 36 22 20 0 8
Prior year groups (up to 4 years) 3 0 0 7 0 0
Prior year groups (up to 5 years) 0 5 11 13 0 8
Other 
entities
Banks
CFIs Financial holdings
 
Transparency flaws in credit risk disclosures are shown in Table 3.4 (Panel B). 
The PCIs who followed IAS/IFRS were inconsistent in the amounts of credit risk 
exposure they disclosed by industry sector and by maturing assets. Some PCIs indicated 
explicitly that the amounts disclosed included maturing and past due assets, whereas 
others indicated explicitly that the amounts disclosed only included maturing assets. In 
the worst case, no explicit information was provided, making it difficult to ascertain the 
amount disclosed. 
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Table 3.4 (Panel B) also shows differences in the maturity/aged time bands used 
to disclose the amounts of credit risk exposure by maturing assets, and past due assets, 
respectively. The differences are in the maximum range in the qualitative groups, and 
different time bands for the prior/no prior year figures. Similar problems were detected 
in studies after the adoption of IFRS 7 (KPMG, 2008, 2009; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2008). 
 
3.4.3 Market risk 
Table 3.5 (Panel A) shows a much lower level of market risk disclosures by companies 
that adopted Portuguese accounting rules (MACBs) than those that adopted IAS/IFRS. 
 Among the companies that adopted IAS/IFRS, banks show the highest levels of 
disclosure compared to CFIs, financial holding companies and other entities. The results 
diverge for frequencies of presentation of the repricing gap and the use of maturity 
dates/repricing gap to measure exposure to interest rate risk. Thus, some PCIs do not 
disclose the amount of their exposure. Moreover, Table 3.5 (Panels A and B) shows 
lower frequencies on monetary results for VaR and sensitivity analysis compared to the 
use of these two techniques. This is consistent with Bischof (2009) and Yong et al. 
(2005), but only for other commercial and investment banks. Although the results are a 
slightly higher than those found in these two studies, they do not confirm the findings of 
KPMG (2008, 2009) or PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008) (where all banks disclosed 
VaR results). A plausible explanation is that the VaR disclosures are costly to prepare, 
complex to interpret, and inherently unreliable, thereby encouraging non-disclosure 
(Chipalkatti & Datar, 2006).  
The proprietary nature of VaR information provides an incentive to withdraw it 
from annual reports to avoid gambling with a bank’s reputation (Frolov, 2007; Pérignon 
et al., 2008). Inconsistencies detected for commercial and investment banks were 
related to VaR, stress tests, backtests, and sensitivity analysis, consistent with prior 
studies (Bischof, 2009; Ernst & Young, 2008a; KPMG, 2008, 2009; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Woods & Marginson, 2004; Woods et al., 2008a, 
2008b; Yong et al., 2005). 
Although stress tests and backtests are essential in assessing the reliability of 
VaR monetary values and in helping to define risk profile more precisely (Marcelo et 
al., 2008), only two commercial banks with comprehensive risk reports disclosed results 
of such tests.  
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Table 3.5 - Portuguese Credit-granting Institutions with market risk disclosures in 
annual reports 
MACBs Other commercial Investment
% % % % % %
Panel A: Frequent market risk reporting practices
Market risk exposure
Foreign exchange risk exposure 0 41 72 0 5 15
Interest rate risk exposure 1 77 83 47 24 31
Measured by maturity dates/repricing gap 0 50 56 13 5 31
Presentation of a repricing gap table 0 36 33 13 0 23
Value-at Risk monetary results 0 32 33 0 5 0
Sensitivity analysis monetary results 0 27 6 7 0 0
Panel B: Comparability problems in market risk reporting practices
Maturity/repricing time bands
Prior year figures, only 0 0 0 13 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 2 years) 0 0 6 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 3 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 5 17 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 7 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 20 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year figures, with qualitative groups 0 18 6 0 0 23
No prior year figures (up to 15 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Value-at-Risk assumptions
Use of Value-at-Risk 0 45 72 0 10 0
Method used - riskmetrics 0 9 17 0 0 0
Method used - historical simulation 0 18 28 0 10 0
Method used - MonteCarlo simulation 0 9 6 0 0 0
Confidence level/Holding period 0 0 0 0 0 0
    99% /   1 day 0 9 6 0 5 0
    99% / 10 days 0 32 17 0 5 0
    99% / 22 days 0 0 6 0 0 0
    99% / 90 days 0 0 6 0 0 0
    99% /   2 weeks 0 9 6 0 0 0
    95% 0 5 0 0 0 0
Use of stress test 0 32 33 0 5 0
Use of backtests 0 27 44 0 10 0
Sensitivity analysis assumptions
Use of sensitivity analysis 0 45 50 7 19 0
Period of analysis - monthly 0 9 11 0 0 0
Period of analysis - quarterly 0 5 0 0 0 0
Period of impact (12 months, only) 0 5 17 7 0 0
Basis point value used - 100 bvp 0 9 22 0 0 0
Basis point value used - 200 bvp 0 23 0 7 5 0
Banks
CFIs Financial holdings
Other 
entities
 
There was a prevalence of historical simulation to measure VaR. As Pritsker 
(2006, p. 578) notes, the inadequacy of such simulations is that they “respond 
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sluggishly to changes in conditional volatility, and respond to large price movements 
asymmetrically (…). Because of these deficiencies, errors in risk estimates accumulate 
through time and sometimes become very large (…) [such that] traditional backtests 
have little power to detect them.” VaR and sensitivity results are also not comparable. 
Table 3.5 (Panel B) shows differences in assumptions and parameters used (relating to 
methods, confidence level, holding periods, analysis period, basis point value, and 
period of impact). In some cases no information is provided.  
Different maturity/repricing time bands were used by the other commercial and 
investment banks that presented a repricing gap table, impairing comparability (Table 
3.5, Panel B). A repricing gap table is a naïve way of presenting interest rate risk 
exposure, if unaccompanied by sensitivity results showing how a positive or negative 
parallel shift in the interest rate curve would affect the gap. Only one commercial bank 
with a comprehensive risk report disclosed this kind of information. The lack of 
objectivity diminished the understandability of risk information. 
 
3.4.4 Liquidity risk 
Table 3.6 (Panel A) shows that liquidity risk disclosures by companies adopting 
Portuguese accounting rules (MACBs) are lower (in level and quality) than for those 
adopting IAS/IFRS. MACBs did not disclose a liquidity gap analysis table, but 
presented a separate maturity analysis for current assets and liabilities. 
For PCIs that adopted IAS/IFRS, Table 3.6 (Panel A) demonstrates non-
compliance with minimum mandatory requirements established by IAS 30 and IAS 32. 
A sub-optimal level of liquidity risk disclosure, found also by Yong et al. (2005) and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008), was characterised by an absence of discussion about 
detailed policies for mitigating liquidity risk and few specific narratives on how 
liquidity risk is managed. Only half of the commercial and investment banks and CFIs 
disclosed their liquidity risk exposure using a maturity analysis table. Further, not all 
clearly stated the maturity concept that was used to build the gap analysis (Table 3.6, 
Panel B). Numerical and narrative disclosures were aligned poorly, consistent with prior 
research (Boussanni et al., 2008; KPMG, 2008, 2009; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; 
Yong et al., 2005). Few companies clearly discussed their funding policies and any 
alignment with their liquidity risk exposure. Users would have to exert considerable 
effort to link exposures to funding policies and to determine reasons for the adoption of 
those policies.  
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Table 3.6 - Portuguese Credit-granting Institutions with liquidity risk disclosures 
in annual reports 
MACBs Other commercial Investment
% % % % % %
Panel A: Frequent liquidity risk reporting practices
Liquidity gap analysis table 0 55 67 47 10 31
Discussion of values 0 9 0 0 0 0
Other isolated maturity groups 99 32 6 27 0 15
0 0 6 0 0 0
Clear discussion of funding policies 0 32 11 7 5 0
Panel B: Comparability problems in liquidity risk reporting practices
Liquidity gap analysis table
Maturity concept clearly stated 99 41 61 40 5 15
Maturity time bands
Prior year figures (up to 1 year) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 14 6 20 5 8
Prior year figures, with qualitative groups 0 1 2 3 4 5
Prior year figures (up to 10 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
No prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 5 0 0 0 0
Other isolated maturity time bands
Prior year figures (up to 1 year) 0 9 0 7 0 8
Prior year figures (up to 3 years) 0 0 6 0 0 0
Prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 23 17 0 0 8
Prior year figures, with qualitative groups 0 18 17 13 5 15
No prior year figures (up to 5 years) 0 14 11 0 0 0
Clear alignment between liquidity gap and 
funding policies
Banks
CFIs Financial holdings
Other 
entities
 
 
The other PCIs either did not disclose any information or disclosed their 
maturity analysis separately (for specific itens such as loans and advances, resources, 
derivatives, subordinated loans, investments held to maturity). Among the PCIs that 
disclosed a liquidity gap analysis, the information was inconsistent, because maturity 
time bands differed (Table 3.6, Panel B), consistent with KPMG (2008, 2009). These 
practices make it difficult for users to assess banks’ liquidity risk exposure 
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appropriately or to build a liquidity gap table. Consequently, comparability across 
companies is rendered a difficult task too.  
 
3.4.5 Operational risk 
Table 3.7 shows that only one commercial bank disclosed an amount for operational 
risk exposure. Only one commercial bank completed the Basel II adaptation process. 
Very low frequencies of operational risk management disclosure and risk exposure were 
made by MACBs compared to the rest of the PCIs surveyed. Other commercial and 
investment banks and CFIs disclosed more in terms of risk management policies, 
operational control structures, and operational risk exposures. These PCIs seem to be 
still adapting to Basel II requirements and therefore are more inclined to address 
disclosure requirements regarding definitions and risk management policies in a self-
contained section of the management report and notes. Moreover, scattered throughout 
the management reports were disclosures about the priorities of institutions in 
implementing new information systems, in training workers, and in restructuring 
organizations. As 2006 was a complex period of adaptation, and because this is 
voluntary information, it is justifiable that (for reasons of caution and reputation 
damage) those disclosures were mainly in the form of generic and imprecise narratives.  
 
Table 3.7 - Portuguese Credit-granting Institutions with operational risk 
disclosures in annual reports 
MACBs Other commercial Investment
% % % % % %
Operational risk exposure 0 5 0 0 0 0
Clear statement of adaptation to Basel II
Adaptation of information systems 3 41 28 20 19 8
Adaptation completed 0 5 0 0 0 0
Banks
Frequent operational risk reporting practices
CFIs Financial holdings
Other 
entities
 
 
3.4.6 Capital structure and adequacy 
The highest level of disclosure for capital structure and adequacy was by banks (Table 
3.8, Panel A) possibly because their higher levels of public visibility increase the need 
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for legitimation with customers by informing them of their ability to avoid a banking 
crisis. These reasons have been used to explain the objectives of capital adequacy 
requirements (Marini, 2008). 
 
Table 3.8 - Portuguese Credit-granting Institutions with capital structure and  
adequacy disclosures in annual reports 
MACBs Other 
commercial
Investment
% % % % % %
Panel A: Capital struture and adequacy reporting practices
Capital structure
Accounting structure 100 100 100 100 100 100
Tier 1 amount 2 14 0 0 0 0
Tier 2 amount 5 27 0 7 10 0
Tier 3 amount 0 0 0 0 5 0
Total eligible capital value 48 41 6 13 10 0
Discussion about composition 6 23 0 7 10 0
Capital adequacy
Discussion of capital adequacy approach 0 5 6 0 0 0
Capital requirements for credit risk 0 9 6 0 0 0
Capital requirements for market risk 0 5 0 0 0 0
Capital requirements for operational risk 0 5 0 0 0 0
Total capital ratio 63 77 67 33 43 8
Tier 1 ratio 11 41 28 7 29 0
Tier 2 ratio 0 9 0 0 0 0
Total capital ratio according to Basel II 0 9 6 0 5 0
Panel B: Adoption of capital adequacy approches proposed by Basel II requirements
Capital adequacy approaches to be adopted
Credit risk
Standard approach (SA) 1 23 11 0 10 8
Internal ratings based approach (IRB) 0 27 17 20 10 0
Market risk
Standard approach 1 0 6 0 0 8
Internal models approach 0 14 0 13 0 0
Operational risk
Basic indicator approach (BIA) 1 14 6 0 0 0
Standard approach (SA) 0 23 6 0 0 8
Advanced measurement approach (AMA) 0 18 6 13 10 0
Banks
CFIs Financial 
holdings
Other 
entities
 
 
However, few PCIs included narrative disclosures that critically discussed the 
amounts calculated for total eligible capital value, impairing understandability. Six 
banks (other commercial/investment banks) disclosed the approaches they followed to 
assess capital adequacy, capital requirements for credit, market and operational risk, and 
total capital ratio, according to Basel II (Table 3.8, Panel A). Some signalled the 
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adoption of more advanced approaches in the future – IRB for credit risk, internal 
models for market risk, and AMA for operational risk14 (Table 3.8, Panel B).   
 
3.5 Conclusions 
When compared to Portuguese accounting rules, the adoption of IAS/IFRS has brought 
a greater flow of RRD but has not assured increased transparency across the Portuguese 
banking sector, consistent with previous studies (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008). The 
Portuguese banking system is highly visible as a consequence of the greater (relative) 
number of branches. The two commercial banks with the best risk reporting 
performance had the highest number of branches, and are listed on a regulated market 
(Euronext Lisbon) and a foreign stock exchange market. However, among the PCIs with 
a lower number of branches (CFIs and other entities), transparency flaws were more 
intense compared to commercial banks, and previous findings (Bischof, 2001; 
Boussanni et al., 2008; Ernst & Young, 2008a; Hirtle, 2007; KPMG, 2008, 2009; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Woods et al., 2008a, 2008b; Woods & Marginson, 
2004; Yong et al., 2005).  
Among financial holding companies, there were low levels of disclosure because 
these institutions made extended disclosures at a consolidated level. Risk reporting 
practices among investment banks are similar to those of commercial banks. But, this is 
not explained by public visibility, because the number of investment banks branches is 
much lower. However, many investment and commercial banks belong to the same 
financial group, possibly explaining that similarity. 
The lack of transparency in minimum binding disclosure requirements for 
market risk, liquidity risk and risk management objectives and policies was similar to 
the levels found in research studies conducted before the adoption of IFRS 7 (Boussanni 
et al., 2008; Hirtle, 2007; Pérignon et al., 2008; Woods et al., 2008a, 2008b; Woods & 
Marginson, 2004; Yong et al., 2005). A lack of transparency was found too in voluntary 
disclosures (for example, of operational risk, capital structure and capital adequacy). 
Only credit risk disclosures presented optimal levels of mandatory compliance, similar 
to the findings of Frolov (2006) and KPMG (2008, 2009). Assuming usefulness to 
                                                 
14 The Basel II Accord proposed the following approaches to assess capital adequacy: standard approach (SA), internal ratings 
approach “IRB – foundation” or internal ratings approach “IRB – advanced” for credit risk; standard approach (SA) or internal 
models approach for market risk; and basic indicator approach (BIA), standard approach (SA) or advanced measurement approach 
(AMA) for operational risk. 
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investors is a direct function of attaining qualitative characteristics of relevance, 
reliability, understandability, and comparability, the findings for PCIs that have adopted 
IAS/IFRS confirm previous research (Avram & Skully, 2007; Bischof, 2009; Boussanni 
et al., 2008; Ernst & Young 2008a; Frolov, 2006; Hirtle, 2007; KPMG, 2008, 2009; 
Linsley et al., 2006; Pérignon et al., 2008; Pérignon & Smith, 2010; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, 2008; Woods et al., 2008a, 2008b; Woods & 
Marginson, 2004; Yong et al., 2005). As in other countries, transparency across 
companies was impaired by comparability difficulties. Breaches of the other three 
desired qualitative characteristics of financial statements were found too, reducing the 
usefulness of RRD in decision making. Users face considerable difficulty in capturing 
the appropriate risk profile of a credit-granting institution and in comparing that profile 
across the sector.  
The understandability of narratives was poor. This was compounded by a lack of 
narratives to explain numerical disclosures. The result is a potential increased 
probability of multiple interpretations by readers, owing to the imprecision, vagueness 
and misleading nature of the statements made. Numerical risk disclosures were useful, 
but were not fully transparent. Many lacked reliability (for example, VaR statistics) 
because no stress tests or backtests assured those statistics under different scenarios. 
They lacked comparability across companies too because of differing disclosure 
practices. They are likely not to be understood fully because of lack of alignement with 
narrative explanations. Users do not know if the information is bad news or good news 
because no further information is usually given. Where given, it is dispersed throughout 
the annual report.  
Although the essay did not analyse risk disclosures after IFRS 7 became 
operational, Bischof (2009), Ernst and Young (2008a), KPMG (2008, 2009) and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2008) confirm that such adoption did not guarantee 
transparency, or assure the effectiveness of market discipline. Considering these flaws 
and the causes of the GFC, attempts have been made to reinforce market stability and 
confidence. The Larosiére Report (European Commission, 2009) proposed a 
recommended basis for the EU position at the G20 meeting in London in 2009, where 
the agenda of regulatory reform included enhancing regulation and strengthening 
transparency; reinforcing international cooperation and integrity in financial markets; 
and reforming the International Monetary Fund, Word Bank and multilateral 
development banks (European Bank Committee, 2009). The G20 agreed to proposals to 
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refine bank capital standards; mitigate bank procyclicality; implement a bank leverage 
ratio standard;15 adopt voluntary executive compensation standards; centralize over-the-
counter derivatives trading and clearing; develop cross-board finance institutions 
contingency plans;16 and converge IFRS and US GAAP (FSB, 2009a).17 After G20 
endorsement of 20 recommendations from the FSB (2009b) to address information gaps 
(described in a report The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps), International 
Organization of Securities Commissions [IOSCO] (2010) published a report (Disclosure 
Principles for Public Offerings and Listings on Asset-Backed Securities [ABS]) to guide 
securities regulators who are developing or reviewing their regulatory disclosure 
regimes with respect to public offerings and listings of ABS. IOSCO is considering 
further work on collateralized debt obligation. 
In 2009, the BIS revised the Basel II market risk framework by introducing 
higher capital requirements to capture the credit risk of complex trading activities. The 
BIS stressed the VaR requirement to reduce the procyclicality of minimum capital 
requirements. Pillars 2 and 3 were reinforced in securitisation, off-balance sheet 
exposures, and trading activities. Following endorsement of the reform programme by 
the FSB and the G20, the BIS issued consultative proposals to improve the quality of 
the Tier 1 capital base. This was intended to promote the build-up of capital buffers in 
good times so that they could be drawn on in periods of stress. The BIS requires more 
forward-looking provisioning to help reduce procyclicality, and to introduce a minimum 
liquidity standard for internationally active banks. In terms of disclosures, banks will be 
required to disclose information about their regulatory capital elements. 
The EU has adopted this recommendation. The Capital Requirements Directive 
[CRD] was amended in 2009 (Directive 2009/111/EC, European Parliament and 
Council) regarding large exposures, hybrid capital, liquidity risk management, and 
securitisation. However, to date, Portugal has not enacted any law to implement this 
directive. Regarding BIS reforms relating to trading book, re-securitisation and 
remuneration, CRD III is under negotiation. CRD IV, which is open for public 
consultation, canvasses proposals regarding the building of a high quality capital base, 
strengthening risk coverage, mitigating procyclicality and discouraging leverage (as 
                                                 
15 The Basel Committee is responsible for this task. Target dates range from December 2010 until December 2012. 
16 The FSB is responsible for this task. Target dates range from March 2010 until December 2012. 
17 The IASB is responsible for this task. The target date is June 2011. 
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well as strengthening liquidity risk requirements and forward-looking provisioning for 
credit losses).  
Following from the G20 conclusions, IFRS 7 was amended to introduce a three-
level hierarchy for fair value measurement disclosures that requires entities to provide 
additional disclosures about the reliability of fair value measurements. The amendments 
also clarify and enhance existing requirements for the disclosure of liquidity risk by 
seeking qualitative disclosures to support quantitative data. They effect a stronger 
alignment between liquidity risk exposure and related risk management policies. 
However, the IFRS 7 amendments were insufficient in overcoming disclosure 
deficiencies detected in studies before and after the initial adoption of IFRS 7. Potential 
reasons are that IAS/IFRS are not aligned with the way financial companies manage 
risk, and they are not bank-oriented standards (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008). 
IAS/IFRS focus only on financial risk. They ignore the other kinds of risks (such as 
operational risks) faced by banks. This misalignment can culminate in the dispersal of 
risk reporting practices throughout an annual report, rendering them incomparable and 
imprecise (KPMG, 2008; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Woods et al., 2008a, 2008b; 
Woods & Marginson, 2004). Furthermore, the principles-based nature of IAS/IFRS 
implies the use of professional judgement, leading to non-comparable reporting 
practices. Thus, risk disclosure regulators should collaborate to require a consistent 
disclosure process that will improve the level of comparability across the sector.18 
Future amendments to IFRS 7 should consider issues of the specific time bands to be 
used regarding the maturity of assets and credit risk exposures, past due assets, 
disclosure of sensitivity to stressed market conditions for market risk, and sensitivity 
analysis/stress tests of liquidity.  
Several studies have shown low levels of compliance with IAS/IFRS in the first 
year of adoption (Carlin et al., 2009; Carlin & Finch, 2010). This is a possible 
explanation for the low levels of disclosure found in the present essay. Ball et al., 
(2003) and Bradshaw and Miller (2008) concluded that formal harmonization does not 
necessarily lead to complete material harmonization,19 but depends on rule enforcement 
                                                 
18 Recent changes in the IASC Foundation Constitution are intended to improve the involvement of stakeholders (including 
prudential regulators and emerging markets). A new monitoring board of market regulators was created with more investors and 
analysts included as members of the Standards Advisory Committee. 
19 Formal harmonization “refers to the way accounting standards are written: that is, to their legal or quasi-legal specification.” 
Material harmonization “refers to the level of concordance exhibited by the actual practices of companies in implementing 
accounting standards” (Mustata & Matis, 2007, p. 27). 
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in the regulatory environment (Bradshaw & Miller, 2008). Consequently, “the extent to 
which accounting rules influence [accounting quality among non-finance companies] 
(...) depends on how well these rules are enforced” (Leuz et al., 2003, p. 523). 
Enforcement mechanism procedures “monitor the compliance of the financial 
information with the applicable reporting framework and taking the appropriate 
measures in case of infringements discovered in the course of enforcement” (Committee 
of European Securities Regulators, 2003). Efforts to improve self-enforcement 
mechanisms in terms of corporate governance structures (e.g., audit committees), 
quality of statutory audits, and institutional oversight systems (e.g., Portuguese Central 
Bank, and Portuguese Stock Exchange Committee) are critical in achieving minimum 
disclosure requirements.20 If better risk reporting is mandated, this will encourage 
companies to implement better risk management systems and better risk reporting 
should ensue (Solomon et al., 2000).  
The findings reported here should be assessed with regard for the limitation that 
the content analysis method (used widely across many disciplines) does not allow 
readily for in-depth qualitative analysis of disclosures. Further, the potential for 
information about risk to be provided in media other than annual reports (such as 
interim reports, press-releases, web sites, analyst meetings or prospectuses) should not 
be overlooked. Future research could investigate factors likely to lead to better RRD 
(such as visibility, ownership structure, and board of directors’ membership).  
  
                                                 
20 In May 2010, Commissaire Barnier announced that agreement on the proposal on supervising reform is needed in order to create 
the European Systemic Risk Board and the European Supervisory Authorities. He also announced the adoption of a Green Paper on 
Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and Remuneration Policies to help address questions of how to manage risk 
effectively in financial institutions, and how to empower shareholders (Barnier, 2010). 
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Appendix 3.1 – Companies in the sample 
 
Agrogarante - Sociedade de Garantia Mútua, SA                                        
Aljardi SGPS, Lda                                        
Alves Ribeiro - Investimentos Financeiros, SGPS, SA                                  
Banco ActivoBank (Portugal), SA                                    
Banco BAI Europa, SA                                   
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Portugal, SA            
Banco BPI, SA                                            
Banco Cetelem, SA 
Banco Comercial dos Açores, SA                           
Banco Comercial Português, SA 
Banco de Investimento Global, SA                   
Banco do Brasil (Portugal), SA                                    
Banco EFISA, SA                                          
Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento, SA                 
Banco Espirito Santo dos Açores, SA                      
Banco Espírito Santo, SA                                                  
Banco Finantia, SA                                  
Banco Invest, SA                                         
Banco Investimento Imobiliário, SA                      
Banco Itaú Eeuropa, SA                                    
Banco Madesan, Sociedade Unipessoal, SA                       
Banco Mais, SA                                           
Banco Millennium BCP Investimento, SA 
Banco Popular, Portugal, SA                              
Banco Português de Gestão, SA                            
Banco Português do Investimento, SA                      
Banco Primus, SA                                         
Banco Privado Português, SA                              
Banco Rural Europa, SA                                   
Banco Santander Consumer Portugal, SA                    
Banco Santander Totta, SA                                
BANIF - Banco Internacional do Funchal, SA               
Banif - Banco Investimento, SA                                              
BANIF Comercial, SGPS, SA                               
BANIF Crédito, SFAC, SA                                  
BANIF Investimentos, SGPS, SA                           
BANIF Leasing, SA                                        
Banif, SGPS, SA                                         
BBVA Leasimo - Sociedade de Locação Financeira, SA                                         
BBVA, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                           
BCP - Participações Financeiras, SGPS, SA                   
BES Leasing & Factoring, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                               
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BESPAR, SGPS, SA                                         
BEST - Banco Electrónico de Serviço Total, SA 
BNP Factor - Companhia Nacional de Aquisição de Créditos, SA                                     
BPN - Banco Português de Negócios, SA                    
BPN - Participações Financeiras, SGPS, Lda                     
BPN Crédito, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                    
BPN, SGPS, SA                                            
BSN - Banco Santander de Negócios Portugal, SA                 
Caixa - Banco de Investimento, SA                        
Caixa de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo [CCAM] Açores                                               
Caixa Económica da Misericórdia de Angra do Heroísmo 
Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos, SA                       
Caixa Leasing & Factoring, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                            
CCAM Águeda                                               
CCAM Albergaria e Sever                                   
CCAM Albufeira                                            
CCAM Alcácer do Sal e Montemor-o-Novo                     
CCAM Alcanhões                                            
CCAM Alcobaça                                             
CCAM Alenquer                                             
CCAM Algarve                                              
CCAM Aljustrel e Almodôvar                                
CCAM Alto Corgo e Tâmega                                  
CCAM Alto Douro                                           
CCAM Alto Guadiana                                        
CCAM Alto Minho                                           
CCAM Amares                                               
CCAM Anadia                                               
CCAM Armamar e Moimenta da Beira                          
CCAM Arouca                                               
CCAM Arruda dos Vinhos                                    
CCAM Azambuja                                             
CCAM Bairrada e Aguieira                                  
CCAM Baixo Mondego                                        
CCAM Barcelos                                             
CCAM Batalha                                              
CCAM Beira Baixa (Sul)                                    
CCAM Beira Centro                                         
CCAM Beja e Mértola                                       
CCAM Borba                                                
CCAM Bragança                                             
CCAM Cadaval                                              
CCAM Caixa Central                                        
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CCAM Caldas da Rainha, Óbidos e Peniche                    
CCAM Campo Maior                                          
CCAM Cantanhede e Mira                                    
CCAM Cartaxo                                              
CCAM Chamusca                                             
CCAM Coimbra                                              
CCAM Coruche                                              
CCAM Costa Verde                                          
CCAM Elvas                                                
CCAM Estarreja                                            
CCAM Estremoz, Monforte e Arronches                       
CCAM Évora                                                
CCAM Favaios                                              
CCAM Ferreira Alentejo                                    
CCAM Fornos de Algodres                                   
CCAM Fundão e Sabugal                                     
CCAM Guadiana Interior                                    
CCAM Guarda e Celorico da Beira                           
CCAM Guimarães                                            
CCAM Lafões                                               
CCAM Lamego e Castro Daire                                
CCAM Loures                                               
CCAM Lourinhã                                             
CCAM Minho                                                
CCAM Mogadouro e Vimioso                                  
CCAM Moravis                                              
CCAM Norte Alentejano                                     
CCAM Oliveira de Azeméis                                  
CCAM Oliveira do Bairro                                   
CCAM Oliveira do Hospital                                 
CCAM Ovar                                                 
CCAM Paredes                                              
CCAM Pernes                                               
CCAM Pinhal                                               
CCAM Pombal                                               
CCAM Ponte de Sôr                                         
CCAM Portalegre e Alter do Chão                           
CCAM Porto                                                
CCAM Porto Mós                                            
CCAM Póvoa de Varzim, Vila do Conde e Esposende           
CCAM Ribatejo Norte                                       
CCAM Ribatejo Sul                                         
CCAM Salvaterra de Magos                                  
CCAM Santiago do Cacém                                    
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CCAM Santo Tirso                                          
CCAM São Bartolomeu de Messines e São Marcos Serra        
CCAM São João da Pesqueira                                
CCAM São Teotónio                                         
CCAM Sátão e Vila Nova de Paiva                           
CCAM Seia                                                 
CCAM Serras de Ansião                                     
CCAM Silves                                               
CCAM Sobral de Monte Agraço                               
CCAM Sotavento Algarvio                                   
CCAM Sousel                                               
CCAM Tarouca                                              
CCAM Terra Quente                                         
CCAM Terras de Miranda do Douro                           
CCAM Terras Sousa, Ave, Basto e Tâmega                      
CCAM Tramagal                                             
CCAM Vagos                                                
CCAM Vale Cambra                                          
CCAM Vale do Dão                                          
CCAM Vale do Douro                                        
CCAM Vale do Távora                                       
CCAM Vale Sousa e Baixo Tâmega                            
CCAM Vila Franca de Xira                                  
CCAM Vila Nova de Famalicão                               
CCAM Vila Nova de Tazém                                   
CCAM Vila Verde e Terras de Bouro                        
Cofinoga Portugal, SGPS, SA                         
CrediAgora, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                           
Credibom, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                       
Credifin - Banco de Crédito ao Consumo, SA                                             
CrediPlus, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                            
DaimlerChrysler Services Portugal, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                  
Deutsche Bank (Portugal), SA                             
Espirito Santo Financial (Portugal), SGPS, SA            
FidisRetail, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                        
Finantipar, SGPS, SA                                      
Fincor, SGPS, SA                                    
Finibanco - Holding, SGPS, SA                             
Finibanco, SA                                          
Finicrédito, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                        
Fortis Lease Portugal, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                              
Garval - Sociedade de Garantia Mútua, SA                              
GE Consumer Finance, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                
Heller Factoring Portuguesa, SA                        
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IBM Financiamento - Sociedade de Locação Financeira Mobiliária, SA                           
IPI Itaúsa Portugal Investimentos, SGPS, SA                  
Itaúsa Europa Investimentos, SGPS, Lda                         
Itaúsa Portugal, SGPS, SA                           
Lisgarante - Sociedade de Garantia Mútua, SA                                         
Norgarante - Sociedade de Garantia Mútua, SA                                         
PME Investimentos - Sociedade de Investimentos, SA                                  
Privado Holding, SGPS, SA                                
RCI Gest Leasing - Sociedade de Locação Financeira Mobiliária, SA                               
Rentipar Financeira, SGPS, SA                            
Santander Totta, SGPS, SA                                
SLN - Sociedade Lusa de Negócios, SGPS, SA               
Sofinloc, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                           
SPGM - Sociedade de Investimento, SA                              
Totta - Credito Especializado, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                        
Unicre, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                             
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Essay 4 
 
Public visibility and risk-related disclosures in Portuguese credit-
granting institutions 
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4.1 Introduction 
This essay assesses the RRD of 190 PCIs based on contention that shareholder theory 
provides an insufficient explanation of banks’ RRD. The essay proceeds on the basis 
that the banking sector is characterised by a multiple set of relationships between 
shareholders, debtholders, borrowers, regulators, and employees (Yamak & Süer, 2005). 
Building good relations with such primary stakeholders is crucial in gaining and 
maintaining legitimacy. Good relations usually result from a legitimation process that is 
part of a policy to manage corporate reputation and achieve stakeholders’ best interest 
through disclosure (Bebbington et al., 2008).  
Because credit-granting institutions are consumer-oriented, they have high levels 
of public visibility (Cowen et al., 1987), implying a high level of stakeholders’ interest 
and power. Since stakeholders are crucial elements of monitoring whether a company 
has a good or bad reputation (Roberts & Dowling, 2002), higher levels of stakeholders’ 
interest and power will require stronger reputation management to fulfil stakeholders’ 
expectations. Reputation management by PCIs is important because such banks have a 
high degree of public visibility: since 2006, the number of credit institution branches 
per 100,000 people has been almost three times greater than in European Common Law 
countries (UK, Ireland and Netherlands). Among European Latin countries, Portugal 
has had the highest growth rate in bank branches (European Central Bank, 2010). 
Few studies have used theoretical frameworks to explain factors affecting banks’ 
RRD. One study that has done so (Linsley & Kajüter, 2008) used legitimacy theory to 
explain how managers in a company in the finance sector restored credibility with 
stakeholders after damage to the company’s reputation. The present essay does not 
focus on a legitimacy-restoring strategy, but on a legitimacy strategy intended to gain or 
maintain reputation levels. The present essay focuses on all categories of voluntary and 
mandatory RRD by credit-granting institutions, in contrast to Helbok and Wagner 
(2006) who focused on the determinants of banks’ voluntary operational risk 
disclosures (based on agency, signalling and political costs theories).  
 By drawing on legitimacy theory and a resources-based perspective, the present 
essay confirms that commercial banks consider stakeholders’ interests. This theoretical 
framework appears suitable in explaining the relationship between RRD by Portuguese 
commercial banks and their greater visibility. Other PCIs (investment banks, CFIs, 
financial holding companies, and other entities) do not seem to attribute great 
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importance to RRD, possibly because their reputation management strategy is not as 
critical to them.  
The present essay proposes a new proxy for public visibility, and a new approach 
to the computation of a RRD index. The proxy for public visibility proposed by Branco 
and Rodrigues (2008a) (the spatial competition [SC] index based on the number of 
branches) only measures market concentration. Since geographic districts have different 
population densities, there is strong potential for banks with branches in highly 
populated districts to have higher exposure to stakeholder monitoring than those in 
districts with lower population densities. Consequently, this essay proposes a new proxy 
for public visibility – the spatial competition adjusted [SCA] index. This is the SC index 
adjusted by the population density per district.  
Previous literature on voluntary disclosure has used discrete variables to capture 
data (Oliveira et al., 2006; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). Studies of risk disclosures 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Linsley et al., 2006; Woods et al., 
2008a) have used unweighted indexes, and have considered each item of risk disclosure 
equally important. However, risk is a multi-faceted concept. Risk can be generated from 
different sources. Some companies are more exposed to specific sources of risk than 
others. Consequently, following Cooke (1992), this essay computes unweighted indexes 
for each risk category. However, to compute a RRD index, principal components 
analysis is needed to “endogenously determine weights from data that would [reveal] 
the relative importance of each variable [risk category] in the overall measure” 
(Sensarma & Jayadev, 2009, p.14).  
 Section 4.2 develops the analytical framework, contextualises the regulatory 
setting in Portugal, and presents hypotheses. Section 4.3 explains the research method 
and describes the sample. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 report the main results. Section 6 
presents conclusions and limitations. 
 
4.2 Analytical Framework 
4.2.1 Regulatory background 
The Portuguese Companies’ Code (Código das Sociedades Comerciais) requires 
companies to disclose their main risks and uncertainties in the management report 
(Article 66). Companies are required to give special focus to financial risk management 
activities, and (at least implicitly) to environmental and operational risks. Listed 
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companies are also bound to comply with Recommendation 3/2005 of the CMVM 
requiring disclosures of corporate governance practices related to internal control 
systems.  
 The accounting and reporting regulation of PCIs changed for financial years 
starting after January 1, 2005 due to Regulation 1606/2002 of the European 
Commission. From 2006, listed and non-listed companies (except MACBs were 
required to adopt adjusted IAS/IFRS in their individual accounts. In 2006, MACBs 
were required to adopt Instruction 4/96 of the PAPBS or adjusted IAS/IFRS in their 
individual accounts. After January, 2007 they were required to adopt adjusted IAS/IFRS 
in their individual accounts. 
 
4.2.2 Theoretical framework 
A normative implication of shareholder theory is that managers have a duty to 
maximize shareholders’ value (Fontodrona & Sison, 2006; Smith, 2003). In the banking 
sector, this theory provides incentive for managers to undertake high-risk projects that 
increase share value (Gulamhussen & Guerreiro, 2009). However, since deposits are 
one of the main sources of funds of credit-granting institutions (European Central Bank, 
2006) that goal will be achieved at the expense of the value of deposits (Gulamhussen & 
Guerreiro, 2009). High risk projects undertaken to maximize shareholders’ value can 
jeopardize solvency. If depositors perceive that solvency is at risk, a social risk can 
arise, leading to a bank run. This would generate a “loss of confidence in the financial 
system (…) and even affect healthy banks via the payment system” (Kern, 2006, p. 19). 
To avoid these social costs, financial regulation (involving deposit insurance and 
capital adequacy requirements) is necessary to limit risk-taking by banks, align 
stakeholders’ interests, minimize information and transaction costs, and promote a 
sound financial system (Ekanayake et al., 2009; Kern, 2006). Therefore, stakeholder 
theory “which takes into account the different actors owning [the resources] offers a 
more comprehensive view of the firm than shareholder theory” (Fontrodona & Sison, 
2006, p. 36). 
Stakeholder theory posits “that a manager’s duty is to balance the shareholders’ 
financial interests against the interests of other stakeholders such as employees, 
customers and the local community, even if it reduces shareholder return” (Smith, 2003, 
p. 85). Stakeholders are those who “supply critical resources, place something of value 
‘at risk’, and have sufficient power to affect the performance of the enterprise” (Post et 
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al., 2002, p. 8). They “evaluate how well firms have met expectations and/or how firm’s 
behaviors have affected the groups and organizations in their environment” (Wood & 
Jones, 1995, p. 231). Building good relations with primary stakeholders is crucial in 
efforts to increase financial returns, and to develop competitive advantages that 
differentiate the company from competitors. Such advantages are in the form of 
intangible assets – such as corporate reputation (Branco & Rodrigues, 2007). One 
fundamental element of such intangible assets is their information content:  
 
Resource holders [the primary stakeholders] will come to the firm (…) 
attracted by the information content of its reputation (…) [and by] knowing 
that the expectations generated are guaranteed. This places the firm in a 
privileged position in markets, enabling it to capture better resources and in 
more favorable conditions (Sabaté & Puente, 2003, p. 281).  
 
Stakeholders have a legitimate demand for greater information transparency. As 
evaluators of this flow, they will monitor manager’s attitudes and reduce opportunistic 
behavior by managers. In the banking sector, this monitoring mechanism (market 
discipline) generates market signals that convey information useful to supervisors in 
reducing a bank’s risk exposure or in assessing suspicions of excessive exposure to risk 
(Bliss & Flannery, 2002). 
To gain, maintain or restore corporate reputation, managers have incentives to 
legitimate themselves in meeting stakeholders’ expectations. They can do this by 
sharing some of the asymmetric information they possess, and by promoting 
information transparency (Sabaté & Puente, 2003). But, sharing of asymmetric 
information is only disclosed by bank managers because of a regulatory mandate aimed 
at ensuring effective market discipline. Bank managers do not have incentives to 
disclose information about risk voluntarily. They are “typically cautious to go beyond 
minimal disclosure requirements” (Frolov, 2007, p.183). Consequently, compliance 
with minimal disclosure requirements promotes a good corporate reputation.  
Legitimacy theory and a resources-based perspective are subsidiary theories of the 
stakeholder meta-narrative (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008b; Campbell et al., 2003). They 
can be used to explain RRD practices by credit-granting institutions. Thus, legitimacy is 
regarded as gained, maintained or restored as a result of a legitimation process to 
manage corporate reputation and achieve stakeholders’ best interest through disclosure 
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(Bebbington et al., 2008). By acting in this way, companies can convince stakeholders 
about how well their corporate reputation is being managed.  
 
4.2.3 Development of hypotheses 
According to stakeholder theory, if the level of stakeholder power increases, the 
importance of meeting the demands of stakeholders increases also. In companies, 
stakeholder monitoring through public visibility (market discipline) suggests that a 
greater level of legitimacy will be required (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a).  
To achieve a state of legitimacy, managers pursue a legitimation process 
involving strategies of repairing, maintaining or gaining legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). 
This essay focuses on the last two strategies. The “legitimation processes are mainly 
focused on influential relevant publics (…) [and] attempt to influence [their] societal 
perceptions” of the firm’s actions and activities, through a specified level of public 
disclosure (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009, p. 556). The legitimation process “rests 
heavily on communication (…) between the organization and its various audiences” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 586). 
The importance of RRD on the market discipline of risk taking in the banking 
industry has been found to confirm theorising that greater disclosure enhances market 
discipline (Nier & Baumann, 2004, 2006), and that better risk management systems 
attract investors (Sensarma and Jayadev, 2009). Consequently, public visibility should 
be associated positively with RRD. 
 
H1:  There is a positive association between public visibility and the volume of 
RRD in an annual report. 
 
Stakeholder theory demands that all stakeholder interests be considered. If only 
profitability is considered, then managers are only considering shareholder interests 
(Smith, 2003). According to shareholder theory, managers’ only duty is to maximize 
shareholder value. However shareholders and investors do not observe companies’ risk 
management activities directly. To ascertain whether their value is maximized, they 
need to be kept informed about the manager’s ability to mitigate risk exposures. Since 
managers have incentives to behave opportunistically, it is likely that they will withhold 
relevant information or manipulate reporting to their advantage by making misleading 
disclosures (Latham & Jacobs, 2000). Therefore, contracts will be devised, monitoring 
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systems will be promoted, and incentives will be created to increase the flow of 
information about those activities, to reduce their uncertainties, and align interests 
(Linsmeier et al., 2002).  
 
H2:  There is a positive association between the maximization of 
shareholders’ value and RRD in the annual report. 
 
4.3 Research Method 
4.3.1 Sample 
From a population of 298 companies with individual annual reports published in the 
database of the Portuguese Central Bank as at December 31, 2007, a sample of 184 
PCIs was drawn (Table 4.1). The 114 companies excluded comprised all Portuguese 
financial institutions (99 companies)21 and fifteen credit institutions (six credit-granting 
institutions that began operations in 2006; two financial holding companies with 
incomplete annual accounts for 2006; four MACBs that adopted IAS/IFRS in 2006; one 
investment bank and two financial holding companies that adopted PAPBS in 2006).  
 
4.3.2 Dependent variables 
Content analysis was used to assess the mandatory and voluntary RRD in the annual 
reports in terms of the disclosure requirements of IAS1, IAS 30, IAS 32, IFRS 7 and the 
third Pillar of the Basel II Accord. Six RRD categories were analyzed (Appendix 4.1): 
risk management objectives and policies [RMOP]; credit risk [CR]; market risk [MR]; 
liquidity risk [LR]; operational risk [OR]; and, capital structure and adequacy [CSA].  
 Content analysis was conducted in four stages: defining an appropriate coding 
scheme; developing judgemental procedures; analysing and codifying the annual 
reports;  and  reducing  the  risk  data  into  a  unique composite risk disclosure index. A 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The Portuguese finance sector is composed of credit-granting institutions and financial companies. Decree-Law 298/92 regulates 
them and defines credit institutions as “companies whose business is to receive or other repayable funds from the public and to grant 
credits for its own accounts” (Article 2). Financial companies are “companies that are not credit institutions”. Because of this 
business limitation, this essay deals only with credit institutions. 
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Table 4.1 - Portuguese Credit-granting Institutions in the sample 
Number of companies
Commercial Banks
   Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks [MACBs] 99
   Other Commercial 21
Non-Commercial Banks
   Investment Banks 18
   Credit Financial Institutions 14
   Financial Holding Companies 20
   Other Entities 12
Total 184
 
 
binary coding system was used to “gain an overall appreciation of the scale and patterns 
of disclosure” (Woods et al., 2008, p. 23). Narratives, tables and graphs were analysed 
(Beattie & Thompson, 2007). Judgmental procedures were adopted in reading the entire 
annual report. This permitted assessment of whether a particular item of disclosure was 
relevant to a particular company, and did not penalise non-disclosure (Cooke, 1992). 
Content analysis of the entire sample was performed, informed by a prior coding of an 
initial sample of four annual reports with another (independently operating) coder. An 
inter-coder reliability test was undertaken (Krippendorf, 2004) to measure the scale of 
coding errors (Scott’s pi = 86.1%). Such a level has been considered “an acceptable 
level of inter-coder reliability” in analysing corporate report disclosures (Hackston & 
Milne, 1996, p. 87). 
 To compute a RRD index for the jth company principal components analysis was 
applied to the six RRD indexes extracted for each risk category. Principal components 
analysis is statistically inappropriate for use with discrete data, such as binary data, 
because “the linear dependence between the dummy variables may lead to incorrect 
estimates of the (…) index” (Howe et al., 2008, p. 3). To overcome this difficulty the 
discrete variables were transformed into continuous variables and a risk disclosure 
index was constructed by company j for each of the k risk categories considered, 
following Cooke (1992), and defined as: 
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RDjk =
j
jk
i
ij
n
n
x∑
= 1 , 0 ≤ RDjk ≤ 1 
where 
njk =  number of relevant items for jth company in the k risk category; 
RMOP (njk ≤ 10); CR (njk ≤ 88); MR (njk ≤ 68); LR (njk ≤ 69); OR (njk ≤ 7); CSA 
(njk ≤ 35); 
ijx =  1 if ith (relevant) item disclosed; 0 otherwise. 
  
Principal components analysis was then applied to obtain a composite measure 
for RRD by PCI.22 Uni-dimensionality was assured because only one component with 
high loadings (Eigenvalue > 1, explaining 65 per cent of the total variance) was 
extracted. No orthogonal rotation was needed. This improved the interpretability of the 
transformed variables in terms of the original variables. To validate the principal 
component analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was used 
(KMO = 0.81). Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2 = 653.79) was statistically significant (p-
value ≤ 0.01). The extracted component is appropriate in explaining the hidden 
correlation structure between the risk categories considered, and is corroborated by the 
high level of Cronbach’s Alpha (0.89). The component extracted represents a unique 
composite RRD index for the jth company: 
RRDj = 0.85*RMOP + 0.85*CR + 0.85*MR + 0.80*LR + 0.77*OR + 0.69*CSA 
 
4.3.3 Independent and control variables 
Table 4.2 presents definitions of the independent variables and control variables. It also 
presents the signs of these variables as they are likely to be predicted by the theoretical 
framework used. 
 
 
                                                 
22 Principal components analysis reduces the amount of data in financial reporting without a corresponding loss in information 
content (Fertakis, 1969). It has been used widely in the construction of indexes in a variety of fields to measure general price level, 
cost of living, level of economic development and regional disparities, quality of life, human development, status of social well 
being, or stock exchange indexes (Mishra, 2007). In the realm of accounting it has been used to generate risk disclosure indexes 
(Deumes, 2008), risk management scores (Sensarma & Jayadev, 2009), and to eliminate collinearity among the proxies used to 
measure the same attribute (Dumontier & Raffournier, 1998; Elgers, 1980; Oliveira et al., 2006). 
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Table 4.2 - Definition and predicted signs for independent and control variables 
Variables Definition Predicted 
Sign
Public visibility Spatial competition index = market share of bank i in district k 
weighted by the relevance of that local market for the bank.
+
Spatial competition adjusted index = market share of bank i  in 
district k  weighted by the relevance of that local market for the 
bank adjusted by the population density of district k.
+
Number of branches +
Number of employees +
Total assets (106 Euros) +
Profit (106 Euros) = Income before taxest +
Maximization of shareholders' valuea Equity growth rate = (Book value of shareholders' equityt - Book
value of shareholders' equityt-1)/Book value of shareholders'
equityt-1
+
Profit growth rate = (Income before taxest - Income before
taxest-1)/Income before taxest-1
+
Company listing status Dummy variable = 1 if company is listed on one or more
regulated stock exchange markets; 0 otherwise. ?
Type of credit-granting institutions Dummy variable = 1 if company is a commercial bank that either
adopted IAS/IFRS (other commercial banks) or PAPBS
(MACBs); 0 otherwise.
?
Panel A: Independent Variables
Legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective
Shareholder theory
Panel B: Control Variables
a The maximization of shareholders’ value could also be proxied using the shareholders’ equity growth rate. However, the PCIs
adopted IAS/IFRS for the first time in 2006. Consequently, the shareholders’ equity caption incorporates the adjustments
related to this transition, which had influenced accumulated earnings. To avoid any bias this proxy was not included in the
model.  
 
The most common proxy for the variable “public visibility” is size. This is 
because the  
 
… interactions of larger firms with society tend to be more numerous and 
hold an economic significance, such organizations tend to be more visible to 
relevant publics. (…) Larger companies tend to favour formal channels of 
communication [annual reports] (…) to disseminate information about 
corporate activities (Brammer & Pavlin, 2008, p. 124). 
 
The size variables most often used to proxy public visibility are total assets, 
number of employees, profit, number of branches and SC index (Branco & Rodrigues, 
2008a). Public visibility has been found to be associated positively with corporate social 
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responsibility disclosures. However, the focus of the present study included in this essay 
is to assess whether there is any association with those variables and RRD. 
The SC index “evaluates the relevance of each bank in each local market where 
it has branches. It means the market share of bank i in district k weighted by the 
relevance of that local market for the bank” (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a, p. 169). It 
does not follow a “proximity to end user metric” approach proposed by Campbell et al. 
(2006, p. 99) because it does not incorporate the stakeholders’ public contact. And, 
“public [stakeholders] cannot report their opinion on a company’s [reputation] with 
which they have had no contact” (Campbell et al., 2006, p. 98). Consequently, we 
propose the following adjustment: 
SCAj = ∑ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ××k k
k
j
jk
k
jk
a
p
n
n
n
n  
Where:  
• nj is the total number of branches of credit-granting institution j in a given year,  
• nk is the number of credit-granting institution branches in district k in a given year,  
• njk is the number of branches of credit-granting institution j in district k in that 
year,  
• pk the number of inhabitants in district k in that year, and  
• ak the area of district k.  
 
With this adjustment, the index indicates the level of visibility of the market 
concentration of credit-granting institution j in district k by the population of that 
district. It measures the level of stakeholder monitoring of credit institution j in district 
k. 
Several proxies for public visibility (SC index, SCA index, number of branches, 
number of employees, total assets, total profits) are highly correlated. To overcome 
potential collinearity, a composite measure for public visibility was computed, by 
applying principal component analysis. Uni-dimensionality was assured. Only one 
component, explaining 79 per cent of the total variance, was extracted (Eigenvalue > 1). 
The application of principal components analysis was validated by the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO = 0.80), and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2 
= 2,008.99; p ≤ 0.01). Internal consistency was corroborated by the high level of 
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Cronbach’s Alpha (0.94). The component extracted represents a unique composite 
public visibility index for the jth company: 
Public visibility = 0.60*SC + 0.94*SCA + 0.98*Branches + 0.98*Employees + 
+ 0.96*Total assets + 0.82*Profit 
The “maximization of shareholders’ value” is achieved through dividends paid 
and return on capital. The proxies widely used to measure dividends paid and return on 
capital are earnings per share, dividends per share, pay-out ratio, and market value. But 
most PCIs included in the sample are not listed, rendering assessment of these measures 
difficult. Profit growth rate was used to proxy the “maximization of shareholders’ 
value”. 
A “company’s listing status” was assigned 1 if the company was listed on one or 
more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise. The relation between listing 
status and disclosures is based on agency assumptions (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). 
Listed companies have greater agency problems. Since higher disclosure reduces 
agency costs, greater levels of disclosure are expected in listed companies. On the other 
hand, listing status can be associated also with public visibility. Listed companies are 
more exposed to stakeholder monitoring and their listing status can be associated with 
intent to signal how well their reputation has been managed (Oliveira et al., 2006). 
The variable “type of credit-granting institutions” was measured considering the 
business models pursued by credit-granting institutions (commercial versus non-
commercial banks) and the accounting frame of reference adopted in 2006. Differences 
in the quantity of disclosures by credit-granting institutions can be explained by 
differences in their business models (Bischof, 2009). To control for different disclosure 
patterns the sample considers two different groups of credit-granting institutions: 
commercial banks and non-commercial banks. The accounting frame of reference 
adopted can generate different levels of disclosure. Among commercial banks, the 
MACBs adopted the PAPBS. All the other PCIs (commercial banks and non-
commercial banks) adopted IAS/IFRS. Therefore, commercial banks that either adopted 
IAS/IFRS (other commercial banks), or PAPBS (MACBs) were assigned 1, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
4.3.5 Estimation technique 
The estimation model used is: 
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RRDj = β0j + β1j PVj + β2jMSVj + β3jCLSj + β4jTCIj + uj 
where PV = public visibility; MSV = maximization of shareholders’ value; CLS = 
company listing status (CLS = 1 if a credit-granting institution is listed on a regulated 
stock exchange market, LS = 0 otherwise); TCI = type of credit-granting institution 
(TCI = 1 if the PCI is a commercial bank that either adopted IAS/IFRS (other 
commercial banks) or PAPBS (MACBS); 0 otherwise). 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Table 4.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent and control 
variables. On average, PCIs have low levels of RRD (mean = 0.63). Results indicated 
that the category most disclosed is RMOP, followed by OR, and CSA. This result 
differs from the pattern found by Linsley et al. (2006), of higher levels of disclosure in 
CR, MR and CSA categories.  
The majority of qualitative disclosures explained general risk management 
policies. Presumably, the reasons for the high level of qualitative disclosures are related 
to the technical complexity of certain aspects of risk management in the banking sector 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2005b). On the other hand, “quantified risk information may be 
highly sensitive and therefore subject to higher levels of proprietary costs” (Linsley et 
al., 2006, p.276). The narratives provided can potentially be “persuasive organizational 
communication” mechanisms (Suchman, 1995, p.587) that are beneficial in 
legitimizing, and promoting a good reputation and image. Their intent can be to gain or 
maintain legitimacy by employing “an impression management strategy [in the] annual 
report to influence the [stakeholders’] perceptions” (Linsley & Kajüter, 2008, p. 66) of 
their expertise in risk management (Linsley et al., 2006). 
Table 4.4 presents the results of Kruskal-Wallis tests for RRD, public visibility 
and maximization of shareholders’ value among the different types of PCIs. There are 
statistically significant differences in the medians of RRD and public visibility among 
the three groups of PCIs. Mann-Whitney U tests confirm that the highest levels of RRD 
and public visibility are found among commercial banks (Table 4.5). This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that RRD is associated positively with public visibility. The two 
banks with the highest level of RRD are among the larger banks in terms of proxies for  
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Table 4.3 - Descriptive statistics for the sample firms 
 
Unit of 
measurement N Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. 
Deviation Skewness
Continuous variables
Risk-related disclosures Index 184 0.14 2.51 0.63 0.45 1.64
Risk management objectives and 
policies
Index 184 0.00 0.90 0.26 0.23 1.05
      Credit risk Index 184 0.00 0.36 0.11 0.07 .91
      Market risk Index 184 0.00 0.43 0.06 0.08 2.46
      Liquidity risk Index 184 0.00 0.23 0.05 0.04 2.57
      Operational risk Index 184 0.00 0.86 0.18 0.17 1.61
      Capital structure and adequacy Index 184 0.03 0.60 0.12 0.10 2.44
Spatial competition index Index 184 0.00 0.30 0.02 0.04 3.14
Spatial competition adjusted index Index 184 0.28 67.92 4.13 9.72 4.46
Number of branches Count 184 1.00 853.00 29.85 119.95 5.41
Number of employees Count 184 0.00 10,520.00 324.90 1,365.36 5.98
Total assets 106 Euros 184 1.34 81,891.87 2,122.20 9,541.84 6.74
Profit 106 Euros 184 -34.64 689.76 24.54 92.19 5.73
Profit growth rate Percentage 184 -10.45 56.00 .6634 4.74222 8.93
Dummy variables Frequency Per cent
Company listing status Dummy = 1 184 6 3%
Dummy = 0 178 97%
Type of banks MACB 184 98 53%
Other commercial 21 11%
Non-commercial 65 35%
Definition of variables:
Risk-related disclosures = principal components analysis (risk management objectives and policies; credit risk; market risk; liquidity risk;
operational risk; capital structure and adequacy); Profit growth rate = (Income before taxes(t) - Income before taxes(t-1))/Income before taxes(t-1) ;
Company listing status = 1 if company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Type of banks = 1 if company
is a commercial bank that either adopted IAS/IFRS (other commercial banks) or PAPBS (MACBs), and 0 otherwise.
 
 
public visibility: they are multi-listed companies, with large annual reports. On the other 
hand, commercial banks had the highest level of quantitative capital structure and 
adequacy disclosure of total eligible capital value and capital ratios. Their public 
visibility increases the need for legitimation to customers for reputation management 
purposes, and to provide information to customers on their ability to avoid future crisis 
and sustain depositors’ confidence on their risk management abilities (Marini, 2008). 
Another noteworthy result is the low levels of disclosure among MACBs (Table 
4.4). Their low levels of disclosures are explainable by the adoption of Portuguese rules 
that have fewer RRD requirements compared to IAS/IFRS (Oliveira et al., 2011a).  
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Table 4.4 - Differences in medians of risk-related disclosures, public visibility and 
maximization of shareholders’ value 
MACB Other 
commercial
Risk-related disclosures 0.37 1.22 0.83 ***
Spatial competition index 0.02 0.04 0.00 ***
Spatial competition adjusted index 1.77 15.84 0.57 ***
Number of branches 5.00 108.00 1.00 ***
Number of employees 26.00 823.00 26.00 ***
Total assets (106 Euros) 69.00 2,192.92 328.70
***
Profit (106 Euros) 0.71 17.18 7.10
***
Profit growth rate 0.01 0.24 0.10
Definition of variables:
Kruskal-Wallis test is used to test the difference in medians
Difference statistically significant at a: ***0.01 level (two-tailed); **0.05 level (two-tailed); *0.1 level (two-tailed).
Risk-related disclosures = principal components analysis (risk management objectives and policies; credit risk;
market risk; liquidity risk; operational risk; capital structure and adequacy); Profit growth rate = (Income before
taxest - Income before taxest-1)/Income before taxest-1.
Commercial banks
Non-commercial 
banks
 
 
4.4.2 Bivariate analysis 
The pairwise correlation matrix between the model variables was determined, as 
presented in Table 4.6. The correlations between RRD and the independent variables are 
statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) for public visibility and (p-value < 0.05) for 
profit growth rate, all with signs as predicted. The correlations between RRD and the 
control variables are significant (p-value <0.01) for other commercial banks, MACBs, 
and (p-value < 0.05) company listing status. The magnitude of the correlation 
coefficients between the explanatory variables suggests that the problem of 
multicollinearity is minimal. 
 
4.4.2 Multiple regressions 
Hypotheses were tested using OLS multiple regression. The raw dependent and 
continuous independent variables were transformed by computing normal scores using 
Blom’s transformation (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008b; Hannifa & Cooke, 2005). This 
was because the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Lilliefors) test suggested they were not 
distributed normally (Table 4.7). To assure the stability of the regression model, 
autocorrelation, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, outliers and influential 
observations, and the normality of residuals were analysed. Twelve outliers were found 
and excluded from the analysis.  
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Table 4.6 - Bivariate relationships for the dependent, independent and control 
variables 
 
(1) Risk-related disclosures 1.00
(2) Public visibility 0.69 *** 1.00
(3) Maximization of shareholders' value 0.19 ** 0.15 ** 1.00
(4) Company listing status 0.22 ** 0.24 *** 0.19 ** 1.00
(5) Other commercial banks 0.46 *** 0.41 *** 0.10 0.25 *** 1.00
(6) MACBs -0.72 *** -0.55 *** -0.14 * -0.20 *** -0.42 *** 1.00
Definition of variables:
Significant at the: *** 0.01 level (two-tailed); ** 0.05 level (two-tailed); * 0.1 level (two tailed).
(6)
Public visibility = principal components analysis (spatial competition index; spatial competition adjusted index; number of
branches; number of employees; total assets; profit); Maximization of shareholders' value = profit growth rate; Company listing
status = 1 if company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Type of banks = 1 if
company is a commercial bank that either adopted IAS/IFRS (other commercial banks) or PAPBS (MACBs), and 0
otherwise.
Dependent and independent continuous variables were normalised using Blom's transformation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Correlations (Pearson) among continuous variables
Panel B: Correlations (Spearman) among categorical and continuous variables
 
 
Table 4.7 - Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Lilliefors) tests of normality 
df K-S statistic p-value K-S statistic p-value
Risk-related disclosures 184 0.22 0.00 0.01 0.20
Public visibility 184 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.20
Maximization of shareholders' value 184 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.20
 
Untransformed data Transformed data
 
The regression model is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) with an adjusted 
R2 of 0.64 (Table 4.8). The removal of outliers and influential observations improved 
the previous adjusted R2 from 0.41 to 0.64. 
RRD is associated positively with public visibility (p-value < 0.01). This result 
supports H1. RRD is not associated with profit growth rate. This result does not support 
H2.  
RRD is associated negatively with MACBSs (p-value < 0.01). This confirms the 
non-parametric tests. Potential reasons for this are the adoption of a different accounting 
frame of reference (PAPBS), demanding less risk information than IAS/IFRS.  
RRD is associated positively with other commercial banks (p-value < 0.05). This 
confirms the results of the non-parametric tests. These credit-granting institutions 
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disclose significantly more risk information than non-commercial banks. Non-
parametric tests also confirmed that they had the highest levels of public visibility. 
Commercial banks with higher public visibility attributed greater importance to RRD as 
part of their strategy to gain or maintain legitimacy and enhance their reputation. 
 
Table 4.8 - Results of regression model for risk-related disclosures 
Variables Pred. 
Sign
Intercept 0.49 (5.94) ††† 0.50 (6.63) †††
Public visibility + 0.37 (5.82) *** 0.38 (7.36) ***
Maximization of shareholders' value + 0.06 (1.16)
Company listing status ? 0.31 (1.02) 0.36 (1.39)
MACBs ? -0.75 -(6.63) ††† -0.76 -(7.68) †††
Other commercial banks ? 0.31 (2.29) †† 0.30 (2.02) ††
R 2  (F-statistic ) 0.65 (62.42) ††† 0.65 (77.25) †††
Adjusted. R 2 0.64 0.64
Durbin-Watson 1.90 1.89
Max. VIF 1.52 1.52
Jarque-Bera statistic (p-value ) 3.85 (0.15) 3.83 (0.15)
Definition of variables:
Significant at the: ***0.01 level (one-tailed); **0.05 level (one-tailed); *0.1 level (one-tailed)
Significant at the: †††0.01 level (two-tailed); ††0.05 level (two-tailed); †0.1 level (two-tailed)
Dependent and independent continuous variables were normalised using Blom's transformation. Figures in parentheses
are t -satistics. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, when necessary. 
Public visibility = principal components analysis (spatial competition index; spatial competition adjusted index; number of
branches; number of employees; total assets; profit); Maximization of shareholders' value = profit growth rate; Company 
listing status = 1 if company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Type of
banks = 1 if company is a commercial bank that either adopted IAS/IFRS (other commercial banks) or PAPBS
(MACBs), and 0 otherwise.
Risk-related disclosures (N = 172)
(All variables) (Without maximization 
of shareholders' value)
Model 1 Model 2 
 
 
The regression model was run after dropping the variable “maximization of 
shareholders’ value”. Results remained the same (Table 4.8). Therefore, the model was 
re-run for commercial banks to check for the relationships between RRD and all public 
visibility proxies, after controlling for company listing status and type of credit 
institutions. Table 4.9 shows that all the models were statistically significant (p-value < 
0.01). In the models there is a positive and significant association between RRD and 
public visibility proxies proposed, which is consistent with H1. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
In addressing calls to enhance research regarding RRD motivations (Linsley et al., 
2006; Schrand & Elliott, 1998; Woods et al., 2008), this essay has proposed a 
theoretical framework in the under-researched banking sector to assess the RRD 
motivations of PCIs. Based on a content analysis of their individual annual reports for 
2006, a RRD index was computed using principal component analysis to “endogenously 
determine weights from the data” (Sensarma & Jayadev, 2009, p. 14). 
Building on Branco and Rodrigues (2008a) and on Bebbington et al. (2008), this 
essay developed a theoretical framework grounded on legitimacy theory and resources-
based perspective to explain RRD by PCIs. A new proxy for public visibility was 
proposed: a spatial competition index adjusted by population density per district. The 
results are consistent with the view that Portuguese commercial banks attribute great 
importance to RRD to gain or maintain legitimacy as part of their reputation 
management strategies (Bebbington et al., 2008). They are more likely to do this than 
other banks with lower visibility (investment banks, CFIs, financial holdings 
companies, and other entities). The reason for this appears to be that Portuguese 
commercial banks have a public profile that is influenced indirectly by their high 
visibility: they operate in a highly concentrated sector with a highly concentrated 
ownership structure (European Central Bank, 2006; Gulamhussen & Guerreiro, 2009).  
Stakeholders’ monitoring is an important factor in explaining RRD of 
Portuguese commercial banks. The SCA index has the same explanatory power for 
RRD for Portuguese commercial banks, compared to the other proxies of public 
visibility.  
The findings should be interpreted with regard for some limitations of the 
content analysis method used in extracting RRD from annual reports. Although focus is 
on RRD in annual reports, other communication media (such as interim reports, press-
releases, web sites, analyst meetings or prospectuses) should not be overlooked. 
Additionally, the results are cross-sectional, based on a sample drawn from one country. 
Thereby, they have limited generalizability. Future research could investigate other 
factors likely to lead to better RRD (such as ownership structure and corporate 
governance structure) and extend the empirical data to multiple timeperiods and other 
countries. 
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Appendix 4.1 – Voluntary and mandatory RRD disclosure itens 
Risk management objectives and policies 
 − Key risk identification 
− Generic risks identification 
− Other definitions 
− Comprehensive risk reports: 
− Includes the definition of core risks 
− Includes a description of overall control structures 
− Indicates the measures used to monitor different risk categories 
− Accounting policies 
− Risk management sections: 
− Management report 
− Notes to financial statements 
− Existence of cross-references 
  
Operational risk 
 − Operational risk definition 
− Description of operational risk control structure 
− Description of operational risk management policies 
− Operational risk exposure 
− Clear statements about the adaptation of information systems to comply with 
Basel II Accord: 
− Adaptation of information technologies to comply with Basel II Accord 
− Adaptation completed 
− Collecting incidents to measure capital requirements 
  
Liquidity risk 
 − Liquidity risk definition 
− Description of liquidity risk control structure 
− Description of liquidity risk management policies 
− Liquidity risk exposure: 
− Liquidity gap analysis table: 
− Maturity concept clearly stated: 
− The remaining period to the repayment date 
− Residual duration 
− Maturity 
− Liquidity gap 
− Maturity time bands (19 itens) 
− Other isolated maturity groups (18 itens) 
− Maturity concepts clearly stated for other isolated maturity groups 
−  The remaining period to the repayment date 
− Residual duration 
− Maturity 
− Liquidity gap 
− Maturity time bands for other isolated maturity groups (18 itens) 
− Clear alignment between liquidity gap table and funding policies 
− Clear discussion of funding policies 
− Key performance indicator 
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Credit risk 
 − Definition of credit risk 
− Description of credit risk control structure 
− Description of credit risk management policies 
− Size of credit risk exposure (44 itens) 
− Size of past due and impaired assets (30 itens) 
− Size of collateral (other enhancements held): 
− Current amount only 
− Discussion of values 
− Credit risk quality (9 itens) 
  
Market risk 
 − Definition of market risk: 
− Market risk 
− Interest rate risk 
− Foreign exchange risk 
− Description of market risk control structure 
− Description of market risk management policies 
− Market risk exposure: 
− Foreign exchange risk exposure: 
− Net balance sheet positions by currency 
− Short term positions and long term positions by currency 
− Interest rate risk exposure: 
− Narrative information of interest rate risk exposure (18 itens) 
− Presentation of a repricing gap table 
− VaR analysis: 
− Description of VaR assumptions and parameters (11 itens) 
− VaR values (11 itens) 
− Stress tests 
− Generic description  
− Details of models used  
− Results (values only) 
− Results (by risk factor) 
− Backtests 
− Generic description 
− Details of models used 
− Results (values only) 
− Results (Scatter-ploted with discussion) 
− Results (Scatter-ploted without discussion) 
− Sensitivity analysis 
− Description of sensitivity analysis assumptions and parameters (7 itens) 
− Results of sensitivity analysis 
− Values only 
− Values by country and maturities 
− Values for shareholders’ equity, profit, and losses 
− Values by market risk categories 
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Capital structure and adequacy 
 − Capital structure: 
− Accounting structure 
− Amount of Tier 1 
− Amount of Tier 2 
− Amount of Tier 3 
− Total eligible capital (14 itens) 
− Capital adequacy: 
− Discussion of capital adequacy approach 
− Capital requirements for credit risk 
− Capital requirements for market risk 
− Capital requirements for operational risk 
− Total capital ratio 
− Capital ratio only 
− Evolution per year 
− Impact of IAS/IFRS 
− Tier 1 capital ratio 
− Tier 2 capital ratio 
− Total capital ratio according to Basel II requirements 
− Clear statement of compliance with all prudential requirements 
− Clear statement of non-compliance with all prudential requirements 
− Adaptation to comply with Basel II requirements: 
− Statement only 
− Description of all steps made to comply 
− Capital adequacy approaches to be adopted under Basel II Accord: 
− Credit risk 
− Market risk 
− Operational risk 
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Appendix 4.2 – Companies in the sample 
Alves Ribeiro - Investimentos Financeiros, SGPS, SA                                  
Banco ActivoBank (Portugal), SA                                    
Banco BAI Europa, SA                                   
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Portugal, SA            
Banco BPI, SA                                            
Banco Cetelem, SA 
Banco Comercial dos Açores, SA                           
Banco Comercial Português, SA 
Banco de Investimento Global, SA                   
Banco do Brasil (Portugal), S.A.                                    
Banco EFISA, SA                                          
Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento, SA                 
Banco Espirito Santo dos Açores, SA                      
Banco Espírito Santo, SA                                                  
Banco Finantia, SA                                  
Banco Invest, SA                                         
Banco Investimento Imobiliário, SA                      
Banco Itaú Eeuropa, SA                                    
Banco Madesan, Sociedade Unipessoal, SA                       
Banco Mais, SA                                           
Banco Millennium BCP Investimento, SA 
Banco Popular, Portugal, SA                              
Banco Português de Gestão, SA                            
Banco Português do Investimento, SA                      
Banco Primus, SA                                         
Banco Privado Português, SA                              
Banco Rural Europa, SA                                   
Banco Santander Consumer Portugal, SA                    
Banco Santander Totta, SA                                
BANIF - Banco Internacional do Funchal, SA               
BANIF - Banco Investimento, SA                                              
BANIF Comercial, SGPS, SA                               
BANIF Crédito, SFAC, SA                                  
BANIF Investimentos, SGPS, SA                           
BANIF Leasing, SA                                        
BANIF, SGPS, S.A.                                         
BBVA Leasimo - Sociedade de Locação Financeira, SA                                         
BBVA, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                           
BCP - Participações Financeiras, SGPS, SA                   
BES Leasing & Factoring, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                               
BESPAR, SGPS, SA                                         
BEST - Banco Electrónico de Serviço Total, SA 
BNP Factor - Companhia Nacional de Aquisição de Créditos, SA                                     
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BPN - Banco Português de Negócios, SA                    
BPN - Participações Financeiras, SGPS, Lda                     
BPN Crédito, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                    
BPN, SGPS, SA                                            
BSN - Banco Santander de Negócios Portugal, SA                 
Caixa - Banco de Investimento, SA                        
Caixa Económica da Misericórdia de Angra do Heroísmo 
Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos, SA                       
Caixa Leasing & Factoring, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                            
Caixa de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo [CCAM] Açores                                               
CCAM Águeda                                               
CCAM Albergaria e Sever                                   
CCAM Albufeira                                            
CCAM Alcácer do Sal e Montemor-o-Novo                     
CCAM Alcanhões                                            
CCAM Alcobaça                                             
CCAM Alenquer                                             
CCAM Algarve                                              
CCAM Aljustrel e Almodôvar                                
CCAM Alto Corgo e Tâmega                                  
CCAM Alto Douro                                           
CCAM Alto Guadiana                                        
CCAM Alto Minho                                           
CCAM Amares                                               
CCAM Anadia                                               
CCAM Armamar e Moimenta da Beira                          
CCAM Arouca                                               
CCAM Arruda dos Vinhos                                    
CCAM Azambuja                                             
CCAM Bairrada e Aguieira                                  
CCAM Baixo Mondego                                        
CCAM Barcelos                                             
CCAM Batalha                                              
CCAM Beira Baixa (Sul)                                    
CCAM Beira Centro                                         
CCAM Beja e Mértola                                       
CCAM Borba                                                
CCAM Bragança                                             
CCAM Cadaval                                              
CCAM Caixa Central                                        
CCAM Caldas da Rainha, Óbidos e Peniche                    
CCAM Campo Maior                                          
CCAM Cantanhede e Mira                                    
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CCAM Cartaxo                                              
CCAM Chamusca                                             
CCAM Coimbra                                              
CCAM Coruche                                              
CCAM Costa Verde                                          
CCAM Elvas                                                
CCAM Estarreja                                            
CCAM Estremoz, Monforte e Arronches                       
CCAM Évora                                                
CCAM Favaios                                              
CCAM Ferreira Alentejo                                    
CCAM Fornos de Algodres                                   
CCAM Fundão e Sabugal                                     
CCAM Guadiana Interior                                    
CCAM Guarda e Celorico da Beira                           
CCAM Guimarães                                            
CCAM Lafões                                               
CCAM Lamego e Castro Daire                                
CCAM Loures                                               
CCAM Lourinhã                                             
CCAM Minho                                                
CCAM Mogadouro e Vimioso                                  
CCAM Moravis                                              
CCAM Norte Alentejano                                     
CCAM Oliveira de Azeméis                                  
CCAM Oliveira do Bairro                                   
CCAM Oliveira do Hospital                                 
CCAM Ovar                                                 
CCAM Paredes                                              
CCAM Pernes                                               
CCAM Pinhal                                               
CCAM Pombal                                               
CCAM Ponte de Sôr                                         
CCAM Portalegre e Alter do Chão                           
CCAM Porto                                                
CCAM Porto Mós                                            
CCAM Póvoa de Varzim, Vila do Conde e Esposende           
CCAM Ribatejo Norte                                       
CCAM Ribatejo Sul                                         
CCAM Salvaterra de Magos                                  
CCAM Santiago do Cacém                                    
CCAM Santo Tirso                                          
CCAM São Bartolomeu de Messines e São Marcos Serra        
CCAM São João da Pesqueira                                
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CCAM São Teotónio                                         
CCAM Sátão e Vila Nova de Paiva                           
CCAM Seia                                                 
CCAM Serras de Ansião                                     
CCAM Silves                                               
CCAM Sobral de Monte Agraço                               
CCAM Sotavento Algarvio                                   
CCAM Sousel                                               
CCAM Tarouca                                              
CCAM Terra Quente                                         
CCAM Terras de Miranda do Douro                           
CCAM Terras Sousa, Ave, Basto e Tâmega                      
CCAM Tramagal                                             
CCAM Vagos                                                
CCAM Vale Cambra                                          
CCAM Vale do Dão                                          
CCAM Vale do Douro                                        
CCAM Vale do Távora                                       
CCAM Vila Franca de Xira                                  
CCAM Vila Nova de Tazém                                   
CCAM Vila Verde e Terras de Bouro                        
Cofinoga Portugal, SGPS, SA                         
Credibom, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA.                                       
Credifin - Banco de Crédito ao Consumo, SA                                             
CrediPlus, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                            
DaimlerChrysler Services Portugal, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                  
Espirito Santo Financial (Portugal), SGPS, SA            
FidisRetail, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                        
Finantipar, SGPS, SA                                      
Fincor, SGPS, SA                                    
Finibanco - Holding, SGPS, SA                             
Finibanco, SA                                          
Finicrédito, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                        
Fortis Lease Portugal, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                              
Garval - Sociedade de Garantia Mútua, SA                              
GE Consumer Finance, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                
Heller Factoring Portuguesa, SA                        
IBM Financiamento - Sociedade de Locação Financeira Mobiliária, SA                           
IPI Itaúsa Portugal Investimentos, SGPS, SA                  
Itaúsa Europa Investimentos, SGPS, Lda                         
Itaúsa Portugal, SGPS, SA                           
Lisgarante - Sociedade de Garantia Mútua, SA                                         
Norgarante - Sociedade de Garantia Mútua, SA                                         
PME Investimentos - Sociedade de Investimentos, SA                                  
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Privado Holding, SGPS, SA                                
RCI Gest Leasing - Sociedade de Locação Financeira Mobiliária, SA                               
Rentipar Financeira, SGPS, SA                            
Santander Totta, SGPS, SA                                
SLN - Sociedade Lusa de Negócios, SGPS, SA               
Sofinloc, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                           
SPGM - Sociedade de Investimento, SA                              
Totta - Credito Especializado, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                        
Unicre, Instituição Financeira de Crédito, SA                                             
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Essay 5 
 
Voluntary risk reporting to enhance institutional and 
organizational legitimacy: evidence from Portuguese banks 
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5.1 Introduction 
Few studies have explored the motivations of banks to make RRD. Those to have done 
so have focused on aggregate concepts of risk or on voluntary operational risk in non-
Latin countries in periods immediately after the Basel I Accord (Linsley et al., 2006; 
Helbok & Wagner, 2006). In contrast, the present essay focuses on voluntary RRD of 
operational risk and capital structure and adequacy that were made in 2006 (the year 
before the Basel II Accord became mandatory in Portugal).  
 The aggregated concept of risk used by Linsley et al. (2006) included credit risk, 
market risk, interest rate risk, operational risk, and capital structure and adequacy. 
Linsley et al. (2006) found a positive association between RRD and size of banks. 
However, they did not use a theoretical framework to explain the motivations for 
making RRD. In contrast, Helbok and Wagner (2006) used a framework of agency 
theory, signalling theory and political costs theory to explain voluntary operational risk 
disclosures. Their dependent variable included two categories designated as 
“operational risk in general” and “definitions.” However, prior research has considered 
disclosures of information in these two categories to be “boiler plate” disclosures 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2005a) of limited usefulness (Linsley & 
Shrives, 2006, p. 400) and conducive to adverse capital allocations (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2007). Accordingly, the present essay considers a concept of voluntary risk 
that does not contemplate such “boiler plate” disclosures.  
Helbok and Wagner (2006) concluded that voluntary operational risk disclosures 
were associated negatively with capital ratio and profitability. They found that the 
economic rationale for RRD was that “outsiders may perceive the impact of an 
operational loss event to be higher for financial institutions which have lower 
capitalization and are less profitable” (Helbok & Wagner, 2006, p. 50). However, Blum 
(2008, p. 1700) argued that banks “know that reporting a high level of risk leads to a 
higher level of required capital.” This essay contends that voluntary RRD are made to 
enhance stakeholders’ confidence in a bank’s reputation.  
 The Basel II Accord became mandatory for Portuguese banks in 2007 (Decree-
Law 103/2007; and Decree-Law 104/2007). However, from 2004, many Portuguese 
banks began to prepare internal systems and processes to conform to Basel II 
requirements in 2007. In doing so, they had an increased need to develop information 
systems applications (Flores et al., 2006). According to Boonstra (2003), banks were 
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motivated to implement information systems to conform to Basel II requirements by the 
desire to improve their competitive position, improve the economic allocation of 
resources, and to be regarded as legitimate by the supervisory entity and the market. For 
Boonstra (2003), one of the most important factors was a political one. The influence of 
the stakeholders was perceived as crucial to the survival of a bank, especially in settings 
where banks are publicly visible to relevant stakeholders and are subject to high levels 
of scrutiny by them. Consequently, the Portuguese setting was chosen because Portugal 
has shown a higher degree of public visibility since 2006 (assessed by the number of 
bank’s branches per 100,000 people) compared to European common law countries 
(UK, Ireland and Netherlands) (European Central Bank, 2010). 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) have appealed for studies to be conducted of 
industry-specific risk disclosures in order to understand managers’ RRD motivations. 
This essay responds to their appeal by drawing on the institutional and organizational 
perspectives of legitimacy theory and resources-based perspective to contend that 
Portuguese banks were motivated to make voluntary risk disclosures for two major 
reasons: first, to conform to institutional pressures from stakeholders to ensure a 
socially desirable flow of information and to make market discipline effective 
(Diamond, 1985; Frolov, 2007; Bliss & Flannery, 2002; Fernández-Alles & Valle-
Cabrera, 2006); and second, to manage stakeholders’ perceptions of a company’s 
reputation in dealing with risk exposures. RRD would thereby help to ensure an 
adequate inflow of resources that are crucial to the viability of a company (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2006a; Bebbington et al., 2008; Sanchéz-Ballesta & Bernal Llórens, 2010). 
Results show that RRD are influenced by the perceived level of stakeholder 
monitoring (as assessed by a bank’s public visibility) and by perceptions of a bank’s 
reputation (as assessed by company age, depositor confidence level, and the ability of a 
bank to manage risk). Results lend support to arguments that disclosure “can be 
conceived as both an outcome of, and part of, reputation risk management processes” 
(Bebbington et al., 2008, p. 338); and that disclosure is “a market mechanism to create 
and sustain banks’ reputation” (Sanchéz-Ballesta & Bernal Llórens, (2010, p. 403). 
The following section reviews the previous literature, develops an analytical 
framework, and proposes hypotheses for testing. Thereafter, the research method is 
explained, results are reported, and conclusions are presented.  
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5.2 Analytical Framework 
5.2.1 Prior literature on risk-related disclosures 
RRD research has focused preponderantly on qualitative, descriptive studies of risk 
reporting practices by banks. Oliveira et al. (2011a) present an extensive literature 
review based on these descriptive studies. They conclude that disclosures of managed 
risks are unclear; that minimum mandatory requirements are not complied with; and 
that the effectiveness of market discipline is impaired. However, there has been a 
growing interest by banks in reporting information about operational risk, and capital 
structure and adequacy (BIS, 2001, 2002, 2003; Helbok & Wagner, 2006; Avram & 
Skully, 2007).  
 
Table 5.1 - Prior literature on determinants of banks’ disclosures 
Type of analysis
Risk-related 
disclosures
Operational 
risk 
disclosures
Corporate 
disclosures
Corporate 
disclosures
Linsley et al. 
(2006)
Helbock & 
Wagner 
(2006)
Hossain & 
Reaz (2009)
Sanchéz-Ballesta 
& Bernal Llorens 
(2010)
Bivariate Multivariate Multivariate Multivariate
Explanatory variables
Size
   Total assets + +
   Market capitalization +
Profitability
   Return on assets 0 −
Leverage
   Book-to-market value of equity 0
   Equity to assets ratio −
   Debt to total assets 0
Liquidity
   Cash to debt 0
Monitoring and reputation
   Size
      Total assets +
   Customers' deposits
      Customers' securities deposited to total assets +
Age 0
Company listing status 0
Complexity of business
   Number of subsidiaries 0
Assets in place
   Book value of net fixed assets to total assets +
Dependent variable
Positive and statistically significant relation: (+); Negative and statistically significant relation: (-); No relation: (0).  
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Table 5.1 shows prior literature on the determinants of banks’ disclosures. 
Hossain and Reaz (2007) and Sanchéz-Ballesta and Bernal Llórens (2010) have 
explored the determinants of corporate disclosures by Indian and Spanish banks, 
respectively. However, neither study used a specific theoretical framework. Instead, 
they assumed that disclosure is a market mechanism to create and sustain a bank 
reputation. Linsley et al.’s (2006) study of RRD by Canadian and UK banks did not 
specify a theoretical framework. In contrast, Helbok and Wagner (2006) drew upon 
agency theory, signalling theory and political costs theory to analyse the determinants of 
operational risk by European, Asian, and US commercial banks.  
Linsley et al. (2006) found a positive association between RRD and size. 
However, they did not find any relation between RRD and profitability, or between 
RRD and leverage.  Helbok and Wagner (2006) found that commercial banks with a 
lower ratio of equity to assets, and lower profitability, accord greater importance to 
voluntary operational risk disclosures. However, they did not control their results for 
size, reputation or ownership structure effects. 
Consistent with Sanchéz-Balesta and Bernal Llórenz (2010) and Bebbington et al. 
(2008), this essay seeks to resolve the conflicting results. It proposes a theoretical 
framework based on legitimacy theory and resources-based theory. The essay contends 
that voluntary risk reporting by Portuguese banks is influenced strongly by two factors: 
monitoring by stakeholders, and corporate reputation. This theoretical framework has 
not been used hitherto in explaining the motives for banks to make voluntary RRD. 
 
5.2.2 Development of hypotheses 
5.2.2.1 An institutional perspective of legitimacy theory  
Institutional theory posits that when institutional pressures “exert strong influences, the 
strategic decisions of managers result (…) in conformity to institutional pressures which 
leads to (…) legitimacy” (Fernández-Alles & Valle-Cabrera, 2006, p. 505). Legitimacy 
“is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Legitimacy is underpinned by a 
process through which a company seeks approval from groups in society (Kaplan & 
Ruland, 1991). Conformity with institutional pressures (such as adherence to Basel II 
requirements) is rewarded through improved social support from stakeholders; and 
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increased company legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities (Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001; Fernández-Alles & Valle-Cabrera, 2006). 
Compliance and conformity with any minimum disclosure requirements promotes 
legitimacy. Stakeholders can assess this legitimacy through monitoring. Therefore, this 
essay argues that stakeholders’ monitoring needs can explain the level of RRD. 
Commonly, the proxy for closer monitoring by relevant stakeholders is public visibility, 
measured either by size or company listing status (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006b, 2008a, 
2008b; Leventis & Weetman, 2004; Sanchéz-Ballesta & Bernal Lloréns, 2010). 
 
Size 
Brammer and Pavlin (2008, p. 124) argue that “larger firms (...) tend to be more visible 
to relevant publics [crucial stakeholders]” since they tend to be more complex. Thereby, 
they are likely to be subject to increased inherent risk. Since most relevant stakeholders 
are unable to participate in the management of a bank, they attribute greater importance 
to information about risk exposures and risk management practices. Consequently, the 
greater the size and public visibility of a bank, the greater are the social and political 
pressures it experiences to provide RRD crucial to fulfilling stakeholders’ expectations. 
Van Hoose (2007, p. 108) argues that “larger banks with more resources may be better 
able to provide the information required to permit market discipline.” Therefore, 
stakeholder monitoring through public visibility (market discipline) suggests that a 
greater level of legitimacy will be required (Branco & Rodrigues, 2008a). 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a positive association between size and the level of RRD.  
 
Company listing status 
Listed companies are more visible in society than unlisted companies. They are subject 
to more extensive RRD related to corporate governance reports. This social visibility 
tends to expose them to greater levels of stakeholder monitoring (Branco & Rodrigues, 
2006b; Oliveira et al., 2006). Thus, greater levels of RRD are expected. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive association between company listing status and 
the level of RRD. 
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5.2.2.2 Organizational legitimacy theory and resources-based perspectives 
From an organizational view “legitimacy [is] a resource (…) that organizations extract – 
often competitively – from their cultural environments and they employ in pursuit of 
their goals” (Suchman, 1995, p. 576). Hybels (1995, p. 243) considers legitimacy to be 
an intangible asset that is “a symbolic representation of the collective evaluation of an 
organization” by the relevant stakeholders and how “each [of them] influences the flow 
of resources crucial to the organizations’ establishment, growth, and survival.” 
Legitimacy needs to be gained, maintained or restored through a specified level of 
public disclosure (O’Sullivan & O’Dwyer, 2009).  
Galbreath’s (2005) typology of intangible resources and capabilities includes 
reputational assets. Corporate reputation is an intangible asset that is difficult to imitate 
(Branco & Rodrigues, 2006a). From a resources-based view differentiation can create 
competitive advantages through the heterogeneity of resources and capabilities that are 
vital for the viability of firms (Fernández-Alles & Valle-Cabrera, 2006). Like 
legitimacy, corporate reputation is something that must be built, maintained and 
restored (Branco & Rodrigues, 2006a).  
Due to their public visibility and their importance to the stability of the financial 
system, banks disclose risk-related information to build a good reputation with their 
relevant stakeholders. Thereby, they reduce information asymmetries between 
managers/owners and debt-holders, attract more deposits, and re-inforce the confidence 
of stakeholders.  
Consequently, according to legitimacy theory and a resources-based view of the 
firm “companies take measures to ensure that their activities, image and reputation are 
acceptable to their stakeholders” (Singh & Point, 2009, p. 23). In similar vein, Sanchéz-
Ballesta and Bernal Lloréns (2010, p. 403) argue that disclosure by banks “…[is] a 
market mechanism to create and sustain banks’ reputation.” Therefore, higher levels of 
legitimacy promote higher levels of reputation through RRD, since higher levels of 
RRD will enhance or sustain appropriate levels of reputation. Commonly, corporate 
reputation is proxied by company age, level of depositor confidence, and risk 
management ability (Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997; Hamid, 2004; Sabaté & Puente, 2003; 
Sanchéz-Ballesta & Bernal Lloréns, 2010). 
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Company age 
Reputation has been considered to represent the public’s cumulative judgements of 
firms over time (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990); and to be “a collective representation of a 
firm’s past actions” (Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997, p. 10). In the latter sense, reputation 
arises “from learning over time from observed behaviour about some exogenous 
characteristics of agents” (Diamond, 1989, p. 829). According to legitimacy theory and 
resources-based perspective, the age of a finance company is related to its public 
reputation, its involvement in enhanced risk management activities, and the level of 
confidence depositors have in it (Hamid, 2004; Sanchéz-Ballesta & Bernal Lloréns, 
2010). The longer a bank has been established, the higher its reputation level is likely to 
be. Therefore, higher levels of RRD are expected to build and sustain reputation. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a positive association between company age and the level 
of RRD. 
 
Depositor confidence 
Sabaté and Puente (2003, p. 281) contend that “resource holders [the primary 
stakeholders such as depositors] will come to the firm attracted by the information 
content of its reputation.” Good reputation about bank risk exposures and bank risk 
management abilities encourage the confidence of stakeholders. The higher the 
confidence of stakeholders, the higher the level of deposits attracted to the bank 
(Sanchéz-Ballesta & Bernal Lloréns, 2010). To sustain this level of resources and 
confidence, a high level RRD will be needed. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  There is a positive association between depositor confidence level 
and the level of RRD. 
 
Risk management ability 
A good way to foster transparency is to improve a company’s risk management system, 
since “the ability of a [company] to quantify fully its risk exposure will be irrelevant if 
it is not underpinned by a strong risk management function” (Heap, 2008, p. 33).  
 An effective risk management system improves corporate reputation about a 
bank’s ability to deal with risk exposures. It will encourage and build the confidence of 
bank depositors (Sensarma & Jayadev, 2009; Sabaté & Puente, 2003). The better the 
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risk management systems are, the better risk reporting seems likely to be (Solomon et 
al., 2000). Moreover, “if banks recognise that they need to disclose more risk 
information, then an incentive exists for them to improve their risk management 
capabilities as they will not want to be viewed as inferior to other banks in this respect” 
(Linsley & Shrives, 2005b, p. 206). 
 
Hypothesis 5:  There is a positive association between risk management ability 
and the level of RRD. 
 
5.2.2.3 Control variables 
Ownership structure 
Gulamhussen and Guerreiro (2009) have suggested the highly concentrated equity 
structure in Portuguese banking sector causes Portuguese banks to experience reduced 
agency costs. Banks do not face a conflict of interest between owners and entrenched 
managers who exercise control without a stake. Rather, they face a conflict between 
controlling owners and minority shareholders. In more concentrated ownership 
structures, agency costs are lower, because owners internalise the benefits of monitoring 
management. This reduces opportunistic behaviour by management and levels of RRD 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Gulamhussen & Guerreiro, 2009). 
 However, if there is a convergence of interests between the largest shareholder 
and outside investors, a positive relationship is expected between the owner’s holdings 
and disclosure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The same is valid when institutional 
holders/blockholders are long term investors (Jung & Kwon, 2002). 
 
Profitability 
Linsley et al. (2006) argue that one of the reasons for a bank to signal its risk 
management abilities through disclosure is because there is a positive relation between 
risk management abilities and profitability. However, they did not find any relation 
between RRD and profitability. Sensarma and Jayadev (2009) argue that better risk 
management systems can have a negative impact on profitability due to regulatory 
capital requirements. Helbok and Wagner (2006) found a negative relationship between 
operational risk disclosures and profitability. 
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Mutual Agriculture Credit banks 
In 2006, MACBs were subjected to a substantial business restructuring and an image 
change. Operational risk disclosure requirements were intensified and all ensuing steps 
to change business processes had to be explained in detail. 
 
5.3 Research Method 
5.3.1 Sample 
The sample consists of 111 Portuguese commercial banks that had individual annual 
reports for 2006 published in the database of the Portuguese Central Bank as at 
December 31, 2007. The study reported in this essay focuses on commercial banks 
because of their high levels of public visibility and consumer-orientation. 
 
5.3.2 Dependent variables 
In analysing voluntary RRD items, two categories required by the third Pillar of the 
Basel II Accord were considered: operational risk, and capital structure and adequacy. 
Disclosures pertaining to these items were voluntary in 2006. For each of these 
categories a list of sub-categories was developed (see Appendix 5.1).  
Two semantic properties were considered: economic sign (monetary/non-
monetary), and type of measure (past/future) (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley et al., 
2006). The list of disclosure items was pre-tested and several decision rules were 
established (Appendix 5.2). The entire annual report was analysed because literature has 
indicated that risk disclosures were scattered throughout the annual report (Woods & 
Marginson, 2004). Most of the operational risk and capital structure and adequacy 
disclosures were narrative. Sentences were used to record those disclosures because of 
conclusions that sentences are more reliable and valid in cases where purely narrative 
text is being studied (Milne & Adler, 1999). Sentences are easily identifiable, less 
subjective to inter-judge variations, and are more suitable in inferring meaning (Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2005). However, some disclosures about capital structure and adequacy were 
included in tables. Therefore, narratives and tables and graphs were codified, as 
suggested by Woods et al. (2008). Inter-coder reliability was acceptable (Scott’s pi = 
83.2%) (Beattie et al., 2004). 
The hidden correlation between the two risk categories was analysed using 
Cronbach’s Alpha (0.82) and then computed the disclosure score as: 
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RRDj = ∑
=
sa
i
ijor
0
 + ∑
=
sa
i
ijcsa
0
  
where  
orij = number of operational risk sentences for the sentence attribute i in the jth bank;  
csaij = number of capital structure and adequacy sentences for the sentence attribute i in 
the jth bank; and 
sa = number of sentence attributes (sa = 4). 
  
5.3.3 Independent and control variables 
Table 5.2 presents definitions of independent variables and control variables. It reveals 
the predicted signs of these variables (based on legitimacy theory and a resources-based 
perspective).  
 
Table 5.2 - Definition and predicted signs for independent and control variables 
Variables Definition Predicted 
Sign
Size a, b Spatial competition index assessed by the market share of credit
institution j in district k weighted by the relevance of that local market
for the bank.
+
Number of branches +
Total assets (1003 Euros) +
Number of employees +
Profit (1003 Euros) +
Company Listing Status Dummy variable = 1 if company is listed on one or more regulated
stock exchange markets; 0 otherwise.
+
Company Age Number of years the company has been in operation since inception
until 2006.
+
Depositor Confidence Total deposits to total assets +
Risk Management Ability Regulatory capital adequacy ratio +
Ownership Structure Shareholdings greater than 2%.  ?
Profitabilility Return on assets = Total income to total assets. ?
Mutual Agriculture Credit Bank Dummy variable = 1 if company is a MACB; 0 otherwise. ?
SC =                                       where:
n j  = total number of branches of credit institution j  in a given year
Panel A: Independent Variables
Panel B: Control Variables
a The spatial competion index proposed by Branco and Rodrigues (2008a) as a proxy for size was calculated as follows:
n k  = number of credit institution branches in district k  in a given year
n jk  = number of branches of credit institution j  in district k  in that year
 ∑ ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ ×k j
jk
k
jk
n
n
n
n
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“Size” was assessed using the following variables: spatial competition index 
[SC], number of branches, number of employees, total assets, and profit (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008a). Since these size variables were highly correlated, a principal 
components analysis was applied to generate an index for size. Uni-dimensionality (one 
component extracted explained 83 per cent of the total variance) and internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.94) were assured. Principal components analysis 
was validated by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO = 
0.80), and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ2 = 1,131.52; p ≤ 0.01). The size index for the 
jth bank is defined as: 
Sizej = 0.564*SC + 0.978*Branches + 0.988*Employees + 0.981*Total assets + 
0.976*Profit 
 
 “Company listing status” was assigned 1 if the bank was listed on one or more 
regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise (Oliveira et al., 2006; Leventis & 
Weetman, 2004). 
 “Company age” was assessed by the number of years a bank had been in 
operation since its inception up until 2006 (Hamid, 2004). 
 “Depositor confidence” was measured by the ratio total of deposits to total assets 
(Sanchéz-Ballesta & Bernal Lloréns, 2010). 
 “Risk management ability” was assessed by the regulatory capital adequacy 
ratio. Sensarma and Jayadev (2009) used this ratio as a proxy for solvency risk. 
However, this regulatory ratio incorporates assessments of minimum capital 
requirements for credit risk, market risk and operational risk. It represents “the available 
cushion to a bank’s unexpected losses and implicitly protects the interests of uninsured 
depositors. (…) [It] builds confidence of bank depositors” (Sensarma & Jayadev, 2009, 
p. 11). Therefore, it is a suitable proxy to overall risk management ability of a credit-
granting institution. 
“Ownership structure” was assessed by the percentage of shareholdings greater 
than 2%, following the concept of qualified shareholding stated in the Portuguese 
Securities Code. 
 “Profitability” was measured by the return on assets ratio (Linsley et al., 2006; 
Helbok & Wagner, 2006). 
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“Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks” was measured by considering the business 
restructuration and image change these commercial banks were subjected to during 
2006: commercial banks classified as MACBs were assigned 1, and 0 otherwise.  
 
5.3.4 Empirical model 
The estimation model tests whether factors associated with legitimacy theory and 
resources-based perspectives [LRb] affect the volume of RRD in bank j after controlling 
for other company-level drivers of disclosure [C]. 
RRDj = f (LRbj, Cj) + ߭j 
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive and bivariate analysis 
Table 5.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control 
variables. On average, Portuguese commercial banks had low levels of RRD (mean = 
16.78 sentences). The effects of this lower level of disclosure were exacerbated by 
comparability difficulties, by inability to understand narratives, and by a failure of 
narratives to explain numerical disclosures (Oliveira et al., 2011a). These results 
support previous findings (Ernst & Young, 2008a; KPMG, 2008, 2009; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008; Woods et al., 2008a, Woods & Marginson, 2004). 
 The highest levels of disclosures were made by large listed banks, consistent 
with the theoretical framework proposed. Their public visibility requires a higher level 
of legitimacy to fulfil stakeholders’ expectations. This reduces information asymmetries 
between managers/owners and debt-holders, helps monitoring efforts of stakeholders’, 
and builds corporate reputation by improving stakeholders’ confidence. 
 The mean values for ownership structure (shown in Table 5.3) confirm that 
Portuguese commercial banks are highly concentrated. This indicates the possibility of 
different agency relations between controlling owners, managers and minority 
shareholders (Gulamhussen & Guerreiro, 2009). 
Table 5.4 (Panel A) shows 1,863 sentences containing voluntary RRD: 968 of 
operational risk, and 895 of capital structure and adequacy. Most of these sentences are 
qualitative and backward-looking, consistent with Linsley et al. (2006). Quantitative 
and forward-looking disclosures are highly sensitive and are subject to higher levels of 
proprietary costs (Linsley et al., 2006). Therefore, consistent with legitimacy theory and 
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resources-based perspective, it is understandable that managers prefer to disclose 
qualitative and backward-looking voluntary risk information. Such disclosures are less 
harmful to corporate image and reputation (Oliveira et al., 2011).  
 
Table 5.3 - Descriptive statistics for the sample firms 
 
Unit of 
measurement N Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation Mean Skewness
Continuous variables
Voluntary risk-related disclosures Number of 
sentences
111 2.00 146.00 22.24 16.78 3.69
Spatial competition Index 111 0.00 0.30 0.05 0.04 2.51
Number of branches Count 111 1.00 853.00 152.02 47.79 4.10
Number of employees Count 111 0.00 10,520.00 1,738.40 496.23 4.55
Total assets 1003 Euros 111 13.93 81,891.87 12,185.75 3,019.63 5.20
Profit 1003 Euros 111 -34.64 689.76 104.69 24.69 5.36
Company age Count 111 0.00 162.00 36.99 46.33 0.64
Depositor confidence Ratio 111 0.21 2.55 0.20 0.85 4.81
Risk management ability Ratio 111 0.08 1.04 0.13 0.17 5.07
Ownership structure Percentage 111 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.73 -1.35
Profitability Ratio 111 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.01 1.91
Dummy variables Frequency Per cent
Company listing status Dummy = 1 111 3 3%
             = 0 108 97%
Mutual Agriculture Credit Banks Dummy = 1 111 89 80%
             = 0 22 20%
Total 100%
Definition of variables:
Spatial competition index = market share of bank j in district k weighted by the relevance of that local market for the bank;
Company listing status = 1 if company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Company age
= number of years the company has been in operation since inception until 2006; Depositor confidence = total deposits to total
assets ratio; Risk management ability = regulatory capital adequacy ratio; Ownership structure = percentage of shareholdings
greater than 2%; Profitability = return on assets ratio; Mutual Agriculture Credit Banks = 1 if company is a MACB, and 0
otherwise.
 
 
Table 5.4 (Panel B) presents the results of the independent sample t-tests and 
Mann-Whitney U tests for RRD. There are statistically significant differences in the 
means (medians) between the two groups of each dummy variable. Listed banks have 
greater levels of RRD because they are exposed to closer stakeholder scrutiny than 
unlisted banks. Despite the fact that MACBs were subjected to a business restructuring 
and image change during 2006, and were required to make additional disclosures to 
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detail the processes involved, the “other commercial banks” show greater levels of 
disclosure. 
 
Table 5.4 - Frequencies and differences in the means (medians) of voluntary risk-
related disclosures 
Panel A: Number of sentences of risk-related disclosures for each sentence attributes
Monetary 462 7 455
Non-monetary 1,401 961 440
Future 55 21 34
Past 1,808 947 861
Total 1,863 968 895
Panel B: Differences in means (medians) of risk-related disclosures
Company listing status:
   Listed - Unlisted 81.76 *** 40.71 *** 41.05 ***
(86.00) *** (44.00) *** (42.00) ***
MACB:
   MACB - Other commercial banks -25.55 *** -14.07 *** -11.49 ***
-(12.00) *** -(7.00) *** -(5.00) ***
Independent sample t -tests (Mann-Whitney U tests) are used to test the difference in means (medians).
Difference statistically significant at: ***0.01 level (two-tailed); **0.05 level (two-tailed); *0.1 level (two-tailed).
Voluntary risk-
related disclosures
Operational Capital structure 
and adequacy
  
 Table 5.5 presents the pair-wise correlation coefficients between the model 
variables. The magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that multicollinearity 
is minimal. 
 
5.4.2 Multiple regressions 
The regression model was tested for autocorrelation, multicollinearity, 
heterocedasticity, outliers, and normality of residuals. Three outliers were identified and 
excluded. Normality tests revealed that the raw continuous dependent, independent and 
control variables were not distributed normally (Table 5.6). Following Cooke (1998) 
these raw variables were normalised using Blom’s transformation. 
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Table 5.5 - Bivariate relationships for the dependent, independent and control 
variables 
 
Panel A: Correlations (Pearson) among continuous variables
(1) Voluntary risk-related disclosures 1.00
(2) Size 0.51 *** 1.00
(3) Company Age 0.12 -0.01 1.00
(4) Depositor Confidence -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 * 1.00
(5) Risk Management Ability -0.19 ** -0.50 *** 0.03 -0.30 *** 1.00
(6) Ownership Structure 0.22 *** 0.33 *** 0.08 -0.25 *** -0.24 *** 1.00
(7) Profitability -0.08 -0.04 0.07 -0.25 *** 0.21 ** 0.03 1.00
Panel B: Correlations (Spearman) between the categorical and continuous variables
(8) Company Listing Status 0.27 *** 0.27 *** 0.00 -0.23 *** -0.17 ** -0.14 * -0.11 1.00
(9) Mutual Agriculture Credit Bank -0.38 *** -0.59 *** 0.20 ** 0.41 *** 0.39 *** -0.49 *** 0.09 -0.34 *** 1.00
Significant at the: ***0.01 level (one-tailed); **0.05 level (one-tailed); *0.1 level (one-tailed).
(8)
Definition of variables:
Size = Principal components analysis (Spatial competition index; Number of branches; Number of employees; Total assets; Profit);
Company listing status = 1 if company is listed on one or more regulated stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Company age =
number of years the company has been in operation since inception until 2006; Depositor confidence = total deposits to total assets ratio;
Risk management ability = regulatory capital adequacy ratio; Ownership structure = percentage of shareholdings greater than 2%;
Profitability = return on assets ratio; Mutual Agriculture Credit Banks = 1 if company is a Mututal Agriculture Credit Bank, and 0
otherwise.
(9)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 
Table 5.6 - Kolmogorov-Smirnov (Lilliefors) tests of normality 
df K-S statistic p-value K-S statistic p-value
Voluntary risk-related disclosures 111 0.32 0.00 0.05 0.20
Size 111 0.44 0.00 0.01 0.20
Company age 111 0.22 0.00 0.03 0.20
Depositor confidence 111 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.20
Risk management ability 111 0.27 0.00 0.11 0.00
Ownership structure 111 0.20 0.00 0.08 0.07
Profitability 111 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.20
 
Untransformed data Transformed data
  
 
The regression model is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01) with an adjusted 
R2 of 0.36 (Table 5.7). The removal of outliers improved the previous adjusted R2 from 
0.30 to 0.36. 
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Table 5.7 - Results of regression model for voluntary risk-related disclosures 
Intercept 0.51 (1.85) †
Size + 0.43 (4.12) ***
Company listing status + 1.15 (2.15) **
Company age + 0.14 (1.72) **
Depositor confidence + 0.23 (2.07) **
Risk management ability + 0.23 (2.23) **
Ownership structure ? 0.09 (0.90)
Profitability ? -0.08 -(0.99)
Mutual Agriculture Credit Bank ? -0.61 -(1.84) †
R 2 (F-statistic) 0.40 (8.40) †††
Adjusted R 2 0.36
Durbin-Watson 1.90
Maximum VIF 3.16
Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic (p -value) 0.05 (0.20)
Regression models: RRDj  = f  (LRbj , Cj ) + υj
Definition of variables:
Significant at the: ***0.01 level (one-tailed); **0.05 level (one-tailed); *0.1 level (one-tailed)
Significant at the: †††0.01 level (two-tailed); ††0.05 level (two-tailed); †0.1 level (two-tailed)
Size = Principal components analysis (spatial competition index; number of branches; number of
employees; total assets; profit); Company listing status = 1 if company is listed on one or more regulated
stock exchange markets, and 0 otherwise; Company age = number of years the company has been in
operation since inception until 2006; Depositor confidence = total deposits to total assets ratio; Risk
management ability = regulatory capital adequacy ratio; Ownership structure = percentage of
shareholdings greater than 2%; Profitability = return on assets ratio; Mutual Agriculture Credit Bank = 1 if
company is a MACB, and 0 otherwise.
Pred. 
SignVariables (N = 108)
Voluntary 
risk-related disclosures
Dependent and independent continuous variables were normalised using Blom's transformation. Figures
in parentheses are t -statistics. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, when necessary. 
 
 
RRD is associated positively with size (p-value < 0.01), company listing status 
(p-value < 0.05), company age (p-value < 0.05), depositor confidence (p-value < 0.05), 
and risk management ability (p-value < 0.05). Hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5 are 
supported. Thus, Portuguese commercial banks appear to adopt legitimacy strategies for 
two major reasons. First, from an institutional perspective, publicly visible banks (as 
assessed by size and company listing status) enhance legitimacy by conforming to 
institutional pressures associated with Basel II requirements. Enhanced legitimacy 
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improves market discipline because of stakeholders’ monitoring (Bliss & Flannery, 
2002; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Fernández-Alles & Valle-Cabrera, 2006; Frolov, 2007). 
Second, from an organizational perspective, banks with higher levels of corporate 
reputation (assessed by company age, depositor confidence, and risk management 
abilities) adopt legitimacy strategies through voluntary RRD to manage stakeholders’ 
perceptions of their reputation (Bebbington et al., 2008; Sanchéz-Ballesta & Bernal 
Lloréns, 2010). 
 RRD is associated negatively with the MACBs (p-value < 0.1). As expected, 
other commercial banks disclosed more voluntary risk information since their public 
visibility is greater. Thus, according to legitimacy theory, they are exposed to extra 
demands to fulfill stakeholders’ expectations through disclosure of voluntary risk 
information. 
 RRD is not associated with ownership structure. This result was expected due to 
the highly concentrated nature of the Portuguese banking sector (European Central 
Bank, 2006; Gulamhussen & Guerreiro, 2009). The latter characteristic reduces the 
possibility of existing agency costs due to management entrenchment. This non-
significant result also indicates a low possibility of existing agency conflicts between 
owners/managers and minority shareholders. The result lends support to the explanatory 
capacity of the theoretical framework proposed to explain voluntary RRD. As expected, 
RRD are not associated significantly with profitability, consistent with Linsley et al. 
(2006). 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The analysis of voluntary RRD practices by Portuguese commercial banks supports 
explanations of RRD that are based on a combination of legitimacy theory and 
resources-based perspective. Corporate reputation risk management seems to be an 
important determinant of voluntary risk reporting practices by banks. 
 Public visibility (assessed by size and company listing status) is a crucial factor 
in promoting legitimacy strategies through RRD. Highly visible banks are subject to 
greater scrutiny because most relevant stakeholders do not participate in a bank’s day-
to-day management. Consequently, publicly visible banks are exposed to extra 
institutional pressures to conform to minimal RRD requirements that are considered 
conducive to reducing information asymmetries. These disclosures also promote 
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stability of the banking system, market discipline effectiveness, and sustain the social 
support of stakeholders. On the other hand, reputation (assessed by company age, 
depositor confidence level, and company risk management abilities) is crucial to a 
company strategy to enhance legitimacy by building a sustainable stakeholder 
management mindset (Jagersma, 2009). Older banks with better risk management 
abilities, and with more confident depositors, take advantage of this situation: through 
disclosure of risk information they try to influence how well stakeholders perceive the 
bank’s reputation is being managed. This promotes confidence among relevant 
stakeholders and, consequently, helps guarantee a continuous inflow of resources to the 
banks (Sanchéz-Ballesta & Bernal Lloréns, 2010; Fernández-Alles & Valle-Cabrera, 
2006). 
The present essay is cross-sectional and based on a Portuguese sample that 
reflects a highly concentrated ownership structure. Such a setting reduces agency 
conflicts. Further research could beneficially investigate whether, in different settings 
with different agency conflicts, the theoretical framework proposed remains suitable 
(Alexander, 2006). Other corporate governance variables not usually included in 
company annual reports (such as board composition, audit committees, external auditor 
quality, leadership duality, and CEO compensation schemes) could be used to control 
the results.  
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Appendix 5.1 – Voluntary risk-related disclosure categories 
Operational Risk a
Operational risk categories
− Internal fraud
− External fraud
− Employment practices and workplace safety
− Clients, products and business practices
− Damage to physical assets
− Business disruptions and system failures
− Execution, delivery and process management
− Purchase of insurance
− Hiring and retaining highly trained and experienced staff
− Outsourcing of specialised business activities
− Outsourcing arrangements based on robust contracts that ensure a clear allocation of
responsibilities between external service providers and the outsourcing bank
− Developing control quality system and equipments maintenance
− Implementing an operational risk management system responsible for developing
strategies to identify, assess, monitor and control/mitigate operational risk, such as self-
risk assessment (checklists, workshops or even scorecards), risk mapping, risk indicators
and measurement
− Have routines in place for ensuring compliance with a documented set of internal policies,
controls, and procedures concerning an operational risk management system
− Regular reporting of operational risk exposures to business unit management, senior
management and to the board of directors
− Regular review by internal/external auditors and supervisory entities
− Developing an operational emergency response plan such as disaster recovery and
business continuity plans taking into account different types of plausible scenarios
− Extensive use and appropriate investments in new processing technology and information
security
− Maintaining comprehensive programs and contingency plans to control health, safety and
environmental risks
− Assess legal risk before making an investment
− Internal process for assessing capital adequacy and for setting appropriate levels of
capital
− Provide analysis of changes in the bank’s capital structure and the impact on key ratios
and overall capital position
− Information about how the requirements, under Basel II Capital Accord, have been
calculated or fulfilled
− External evaluation of risk in a generic way
Operational risk management categories
Capital Structure and Adequacy b
a The development of categories and sub-categories was based on Lajili and Zéghal (2005), and BIS (2005).
b The development of the list of sub-categories was based on BIS (2003).
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Appendix 5.2 – Decision rules 
 
− The recording unit is the sentence, but the context unit is the paragraph. 
− To identify risk disclosures a broad definition of risk shall be adopted. 
− Sentences are to be coded as RRD if the reader is: a) informed of any opportunity or 
prospect, or of any hazard, danger, harm, threat or exposure, that has already 
affected the economic and financial situation of the company or may affect it in the 
future; b) informed of any action to manage, mitigate or deal with any opportunity, 
prospect, hazard, harm, threat, or exposure, or to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
internal controls systems; 
− Disclosures must be stated specifically, not implied. 
− Risk disclosures shall be classified according to categories established. 
− Sentences shall be classified as “past” if they relate to past/present events or 
circumstances in relation to the balance sheet date. Otherwise, they shall be 
classified as “future” if they relate to future events or circumstances. 
− Monetary risk disclosures either disclose directly the financial impact of a risk or 
disclose sufficient information to enable the reader to calculate the financial impact 
of a risk. 
− Sentences with more than one possible classification shall be split into text units, 
according to specific context, and classified independently (Beattie & Thomson, 
2007). 
− If a sentence has more than one possible classification, but cannot be split, the 
classification shall be made according to the category/attribute most emphasised 
within the sentence. 
− Tables (quantitative and qualitative) that provide risk information should be 
interpreted as one sentence per line and classified accordingly (Beattie & Thomson, 
2007). 
− Any disclosure that is repeated shall be recorded as a risk disclosure sentence each 
time it is disclosed. 
− If a disclosure is too vague in its reference to risk, then it shall not be recorded as a 
risk disclosure. 
− Figures, graphs and reports from external entities (inserted in specific boxes), 
related to risk information, shall be recorded as a risk disclosure sentence (Beattie & 
Thomson, 2007). 
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Appendix 5.3 – Companies in the sample 
Banco Primus, SA                                         
Banco Rural Europa, SA                                   
Credifin - Banco de Crédito ao Consumo, SA                                             
Banco Cetelem, SA 
Banco do Brasil (Portugal), S.A.                                    
Caixa Económica Montepio Geral 
Caixa Económica da Misericórdia de Angra do Heroísmo 
Banco Comercial Português, SA 
Finibanco, S.A.                                          
Banco Mais, SA                                           
Banco Santander Consumer Portugal, SA                    
Banco Santander Totta, SA                                
BPN - Banco Português de Negócios, SA                    
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Portugal, SA            
Deutsche Bank (Portugal), SA                             
Banco Popular, Portugal, SA                              
Banco Comercial dos Açores, SA                           
BANIF - Banco Internacional do Funchal, SA               
Banco Espirito Santo dos Açores, SA                      
Banco Espírito Santo, SA                                                  
Banco BPI, SA                                            
Caixa Geral de Depósitos, SA                       
Caixa de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo [CCAM] Açores                                               
CCAM Águeda                                               
CCAM Albufeira                                            
CCAM Alcácer do Sal e Montemor-o-Novo                     
CCAM Alcanhões                                            
CCAM Alcobaça                                             
CCAM Alenquer                                             
CCAM Algarve                                              
CCAM Aljustrel e Almodôvar                                
CCAM Alto Corgo e Tâmega                                  
CCAM Alto Guadiana                                        
CCAM Alto Minho                                           
CCAM Amares                                               
CCAM Anadia                                               
CCAM Armamar e Moimenta da Beira                          
CCAM Arouca                                               
CCAM Arruda dos Vinhos                                    
CCAM Azambuja                                             
CCAM Bairrada e Aguieira                                  
CCAM Barcelos                                             
CCAM Batalha                                              
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CCAM Beira Baixa (Sul)                                    
CCAM Beira Centro                                         
CCAM Beja e Mértola                                       
CCAM Borba                                                
CCAM Bragança                                             
CCAM Cadaval                                              
CCAM Caixa Central                                        
CCAM Campo Maior                                          
CCAM Cantanhede e Mira                                    
CCAM Cartaxo                                              
CCAM Coimbra                                              
CCAM Costa Verde                                          
CCAM Elvas                                                
CCAM Estarreja                                            
CCAM Estremoz, Monforte e Arronches                       
CCAM Évora                                                
CCAM Favaios                                              
CCAM Ferreira Alentejo                                    
CCAM Fornos de Algodres                                   
CCAM Fundão e Sabugal                                     
CCAM Guadiana Interior                                    
CCAM Lafões                                               
CCAM Lamego e Castro Daire                                
CCAM Loures                                               
CCAM Lourinhã                                             
CCAM Minho                                                
CCAM Mogadouro e Vimioso                                  
CCAM Moravis                                              
CCAM Norte Alentejano                                     
CCAM Oliveira do Bairro                                   
CCAM Oliveira do Hospital                                 
CCAM Ovar                                                 
CCAM Paredes                                              
CCAM Pernes                                               
CCAM Pinhal                                               
CCAM Ponte de Sôr                                         
CCAM Portalegre e Alter do Chão                           
CCAM Porto                                                
CCAM Porto Mós                                            
CCAM Póvoa de Varzim, Vila do Conde e Esposende           
CCAM Ribatejo Norte                                       
CCAM Ribatejo Sul                                         
CCAM São Bartolomeu de Messines e São Marcos Serra        
CCAM São Teotónio                                         
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CCAM Santo Tirso                                          
CCAM Salvaterra de Magos                                  
CCAM Santiago do Cacém                                    
CCAM Seia                                                 
CCAM Silves                                               
CCAM São João da Pesqueira                                
CCAM Sobral de Monte Agraço                               
CCAM Sotavento Algarvio                                   
CCAM Terras Sousa, Ave, Basto e Tâmega                      
CCAM Sousel                                               
CCAM Tarouca                                              
CCAM Terra Quente                                         
CCAM Terras de Miranda do Douro                           
CCAM Tramagal                                             
CCAM Vila Nova de Famalicão                               
CCAM Sátão e Vila Nova de Paiva                           
CCAM Vagos                                                
CCAM Vale Cambra                                          
CCAM Vale do Dão                                          
CCAM Vale do Douro                                        
CCAM Vale do Távora                                       
CCAM Vila Franca de Xira                                  
CCAM Vila Verde e Terras de Bouro                        
CCAM Vila Nova de Tazém                                   
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This thesis makes theoretical and empirical contributions to our understanding of RRD 
by extending knowledge of RRD in Portugal and (more widely) by profiling and 
explaining the RRD practices of finance and non-finance companies. 
 This thesis provides a much needed counterpoint to the preponderance of most 
existing descriptive research studies of RRD. Such studies are based on empirical 
evidence that emerges from Anglo-Saxon countries where there is a common law focus 
and accounting is oriented to the achievement of transparency and full disclosure. Listed 
public companies tend to be owned widely. They follow a shareholder model of 
corporate governance that emphasises shareholder rights and investor protection. Stock 
markets are well developed and are the main source of financing. The financial 
reporting on which these studies are based focuses on investors’ interests. Financial 
disclosure is viewed as the likely solution to information asymmetry problems (Ball et 
al., 2000; Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Meek & Thomas, 2004). Since RRD can reduce 
information asymmetries between managers and investors, high levels of RRD are 
expected in these countries (Linsmeier et al., 2002).  
In contrast, Latin countries (such as Portugal) operate under a code law system 
that is oriented toward legal compliance. These countries are characterised by low levels 
of disclosure. In part, this is because listed companies are usually family-based and a 
have a high concentration of ownership by family members. They tend to follow a 
stakeholder model of corporate governance in which “insider communication solves the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders” (Ball et al., 2000, p. 3). 
Stock markets are small, and the primary source of financing is banks and government. 
In such countries, including in Portugal, financial reporting focuses on creditor 
protection (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007; Meek & Thomas, 2004). Consequently, when 
compared with Anglo-Saxon countries, different RRD practices should be expected. 
This thesis reveals and confirms those expectations. 
In periods that pre-date the GFC of 2008/09, RRD were vague, generic, 
qualitative and backward looking, and inadequate for the information needs of 
stakeholders. Among Portuguese finance companies, RRD lacked transparency. This 
undermined comparability, understandability and reliability of RRD. Consequently, 
investors faced difficulties in assessing the appropriate risk profile of a company. 
Moreover, results also indicate that the adoption of risk-based regulation (e.g., 
IAS/IFRS and EU’s Modernisation Directive in 2005) had a positive effect on the 
quantity of RRD, but not the quality. The results reported in this thesis indicate that 
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RRD practices were inadequate. Thus, they should be helpful to the efforts of 
supervisory and regulatory entities to improve risk-based regulation. Currently, most 
risk-based regulations tend to focus only on financial risks (e.g. IFRS 7) or demand 
vague and generic RRD (e.g. European Directives 2001/65/EC, 2003/51/EC, 
2004/109/EC, and 2006/46/EC). Companies should be encouraged to start disclosing 
more relevant risk information (e.g. forward-looking RRD). There needs to be clearer 
explanations of how risk is aligned with strategy, how risk is managed, and how all 
varieties of risk will affect the future performance of the company.  
In terms of quality, the RRD practices of Portuguese non-finance companies and 
finance companies are similar. They show several common deficiencies in terms of 
comparability, reliability and relevance. In terms of quantity, the RRD practices of 
Portuguese non-finance companies are similar to the voluntary risk disclosures of 
Portuguese commercial banks. They are backward-looking and qualitative. Mandatory 
RRD of Portuguese commercial banks tend to be quantitative. However, content 
analysis of the annual reports showed that RRD of highly publicly visible Portuguese 
commercial banks are usually discussed in risk-specific sections of the management 
report and notes to financial statements. For Portuguese non-finance companies, RRD 
are scattered throughout the annual reports. 
The results presented in this thesis indicate that there are other motivations for 
RRD beyond an attempt to resolve information asymmetry problems. At the theoretical 
level, this thesis delivers a broader understanding of the motivations for RRD of finance 
and non-finance companies. It develops a theoretical framework that considers the 
interdependencies between economic theories and social and political theories. In 
particular, it extends the economic theory approach beyond positive accounting theory 
by incorporating other aspects of the business-society relationship. The benefit of this 
framework is that it permits examination of what managers are trying to avoid 
happening (e.g. agency costs, political costs); of what they are doing to create 
heterogeneous resources to sustain competitive advantages; and what communication 
strategies they adopt to enhance those resources (e.g. corporate reputation) (Hasseldine, 
2005). This theoretical framework has not been used hitherto in RRD literature. Its use 
in this thesis results in a more penetrating analysis of RRD practices. That analysis 
draws upon legitimacy theory and resource-based perspectives to reveal public visibility 
and corporate reputation to be crucial influences in explaining RRD.  
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For non-finance companies, results also indicate that agency costs associated 
with leverage are significant influences on RRD. The presence of independent directors 
improves the level of RRD. Thus, corporate governance structure has an important role 
in encouraging RRD. The GFC of 2008/09 showed that boards of directors, in particular 
independent non-executive directors, did not fulfil their key role of identifying, 
understanding and controlling risks. The apparent awareness of supervisory and 
regulatory entities to this seems to be manifest in efforts of the European Parliament and 
Council to reinforce corporate governance structures (e.g. EU Directive 2006/46/EC, 
and the Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and 
Remuneration Policies, published by EU). These recommendations are notable for 
seeking a balance between the skills and independence of directors. 
The thesis results are likely to be of crucial assistance to future researchers in 
investigating RRD. First, because the thesis pinpoints research gaps that make this 
research field very promising. Second, and more specifically, the results can be helpful 
in analyzing the effectiveness of the financial reforms that have been made since the 
GFC of 2008/09 and in an attempt to solve disclosure inadequacies detected in studies 
that pre-dated the GFC. 
Future researchers should acknowledge that although risk is multifaceted and 
multidisciplinary it is strongly related to accounting, economics, finance, and regulation 
(Deumes, 2008). This complexity makes RRD an interesting field of research with 
considerable potential to contribuite in many fields of knowledge.  
This thesis has helped me to understand the holistic ramifications of risk issues 
and the interconnections with fields of knowledge outside of accounting. It is hoped it 
will engender similar responses to others.  
Understanding risk and eliciting better accountability of firms’ exposures to risk 
and management of risk is a challenging task – one that is fraught with many 
difficulties. This thesis takes us on step along the pathway to the resolution of those 
difficulties. 
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